
Who Really Wants Donor Co-ordination?

Dale Whittington and Craig Calhoun*

Introduction

In 1987 the Government of Sudan expelled several small private voluntary aid organizations and many were prohibited from future operations in Sudan. The international press reported this event as another inexplicable example of erratic behaviour by an African government. In fact, these and other aid organizations had been operating in Sudan as if there were no sovereign government in the country. Representatives of these donors had not registered with the Sudanese Government and were flying in and out of Khartoum without the slightest pretence of co-ordinating their activities with the government or other aid organizations. The government's action was an understandable attempt to obtain at least some minimal knowledge of and control over donor activities.

Ironically, the World Bank recently cited Sudan as a country which has made significant progress in improving donor co-ordination (IBRD, 1984: 42). Our own work in Sudan suggests, however, that the problem of donor co-ordination is indeed serious and is likely to prove much more intractable than is commonly realized. In the summer of 1984 we initiated a project in Sudan funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to work with the Sudanese Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP) to establish microcomputer-based decision support and management information systems. One of several components of our effort was

* Associate Professors in the Departments of City and Regional Planning and Sociology respectively, University of North Carolina. This article is based on a paper prepared for the Annual Meetings of the North American Regional Science Association, 5-8 November 1987, Baltimore. The authors wish to thank William and Laura Drummond for their work on the system design and programming for the development of the Project Directory, and Faisal Salih and Shadia Bakhiet of the MOFEP.

to create a computerized data base of all ongoing, planned and completed development projects in Sudan which would assist the MOFEP and the donors with the planning and management of development assistance.

The Ministry and USAID conceived of this project as a preliminary step to promote donor co-ordination; it was to provide a fast, easy way for a donor or the Ministry to find out what other donors had done or were doing in a particular sector or region. In this article we describe the failure of the donors to assist in any meaningful way in providing the information required for this project data base to function effectively. We offer several explanations of the donors' failure to co-operate with the MOFEP and discuss the implication of this experience for future attempts at donor co-ordination.

Background

There has for some time been a growing awareness among both bilateral and multilateral donors that lack of donor co-ordination is a major problem and is at least partly responsible for the failure of African economies to utilize their development assistance effectively. In its report *Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*, the World Bank (IBRD, 1984) outlines a series of policy measures necessary for the region's economic rehabilitation. Two of its central recommendations pertain to the need for improved national economic management and donor aid co-ordination. The report calls for more strategic and flexible public sector planning by national governments, and more explicit and monitorable commitments by both donors and recipient governments to implement their responsibilities under an agreed economic recovery programme. Specifically, the World Bank calls for: (a) a strengthening of management information systems in planning and finance ministries in order to facilitate timely policy analysis and strategic planning; and (b) provision of high-quality technical assistance to those governments interested in building up such capacity (IBRD, 1984: 39).

The report (pp. 39-43) pays particular attention to the need for improved donor co-ordination:

Aid administration is a particularly important area for institutional reform. Basic information on aid flows is often lacking; responsibility for donor contact and negotiation is unclear; links seldom exist between the plan, the budget, sector ministries,

project entities, and donor activities ... The weaknesses of uncoordinated aid are increasingly recognized by African governments and donors. More consultative groups, UNDP-sponsored roundtables, and other arrangements have been set up to coordinate aid ... However, consultative groups have generally suffered from two major weaknesses. First, the commitments made by both governments and donors on program content and financial support have not been firm enough. Second, the groups have failed to get more involved in detail — priorities and assistance for particular sectors, programs and projects, or specific changes in pricing and other incentive policies.

Such increased involvement by donors in the details of aid administration is clearly dependent upon improved access to information on both government and donor development activities, and this component of our project was an attempt to work toward improvements in these areas in Sudan.

The World Bank's call for improved donor co-ordination and public sector planning certainly preceded the publication of this report, and Sudan was one of the first countries in sub-Saharan Africa to initiate serious efforts along these lines. At the sixth donor Consultative Group meeting for Sudan, held in Paris in January 1983, several donors, including the United States and the EEC, called for the formation of sub-groups of donors and government representatives, organized by sector, to monitor the implementation of Sudan's economic recovery programme. The idea for these sector sub-groups developed from the World Bank's Country Implementation Review process in which Bank and government representatives meet to review progress on Bank investment programmes. At the January 1983 Consultative Group meeting, the chief World Bank representative and Chairman of the Consultative Group reaffirmed the Bank's support for such monitoring activities, and welcomed the inclusion of other donors in such discussions.

The discussion held during this Consultative Group meeting led to the establishment of the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) in 1983. The JMC was chaired by the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning and included the resident representatives of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and concerned donors. Its primary purpose was to provide a local forum for more detailed discussions of how donor assistance could be better co-ordinated with Sudan's economic policies and investment programme. It was originally envisaged that the JMC would meet quarterly in Khartoum, and that the JMC Secretariat, consisting of staff from the Planning Wing of the MOFEP, would prepare progress reports and analyses for the quarterly meetings and for the annual Consultative Group meeting.

The JMC met three times in 1983, and by the time of the seventh Consultative Group meeting, in December 1983, it was clear to the donors that additional technical staff needed to be assigned to the Secretariat if the work of the JMC was to be productive. Getting donors and government representatives together was all to the good, but they needed information and analysis of the problems they were to discuss. Nevertheless, members of the seventh Consultative Group meeting were enthusiastic about the potential contribution of the JMC. The Chairman's report noted that there was a consensus that the JMC was performing a useful function and donors should support it in the coming year. The Netherlands representative observed that it might have applicability in other African countries as well, and the EEC representative hoped that the co-ordination would be intensified and extended. Finally, the Sudanese Minister of Finance and Economic Planning promised a strengthening of the JMC, and noted that the local donor representatives would need timely information on commitments and disbursements from their central offices in order to support its work.

The seventh Consultative Group also assigned the JMC several matters which needed examination, the most important being the problem of aid disbursement. The Minister of MOFEP suggested that a comprehensive review of donor disbursement procedures needed to be conducted in order to understand the reasons for the slow-down in disbursement of commodity aid. The representatives of the Arab Fund and the African Development Bank expressed the view that the issue of undisbursed project assistance should be examined to see if ways could be found to increase the flow of already committed money, and also recommended that this task be given to the JMC.

Thus, in December 1983, there was ostensibly strong support for improved donor co-ordination in Sudan and for the work of the JMC, when quite independently we proposed to the USAID Khartoum Mission Director that a microcomputer data base of development projects in Sudan be established. Our initial idea was to create a data base using commercially available software (dBase III); each record in the data base would contain various kinds of information on a specific development project. Users could easily search the project data base for projects of a certain type (e.g. all agricultural and irrigation projects in a particular region, or all energy projects funded by Western European donors which were behind schedule). In fact, this idea was not new; similar efforts had been attempted in the Philippines and Kenya, with mixed results (see Pinckey et al., 1984).

As originally envisaged this computerized Project Directory was to serve two primary objectives. First, a centralized, easily accessible project data base would provide an overview of donor-financed development activities, and promote the dissemination of information on projects among donors. The MOFEP staff could prepare reports in response to specific requests from donors or government agencies for project information. Although conceptually simple, the importance of this objective of information storage and dissemination should not be underestimated. The institutional memory of donor organizations in countries such as Sudan is quite short because of brief staff assignments, and there is an urgent need for basic data on project activities. Paper records are poorly maintained, and project reports are not widely circulated.

The second, and ultimately the more important, objective was to begin to establish a project data base which would support an improved planning and budgeting system within the MOFEP. An up-to-date, centralized project data base is essential for: (i) preparation of the development budget, (ii) sectoral planning, (iii) estimation of recurrent costs, and (iv) project monitoring and evaluation. One major purpose was to provide the Ministry with a system to warn of impending implementation and financial problems on development projects.

The need for a centralized set of data on development projects was widely recognized within the MOFEP and the donor community. The April 1984 World Bank report, *Sudan: Planning and Budgeting for Recovery*, by R. Ridker, called for the establishment of a centralized project directory, and actually proposed two project data forms for use in system design and data collection. The MOFEP itself had made several attempts to collect project data, and various forms were available in the Ministry. For example, when we began our project in the summer of 1984, we were shown a collection of handwritten index cards which contained limited project information. In addition, the UNDP Advisers to the MOFEP had drafted forms to be used to collect information on project activities.

Thus, although the computerization of a project directory may have been somewhat original in Khartoum, the need for a central file of information on development projects was widely recognized, both by the MOFEP and the donor community. In our opinion, however, the actual physical processing and management of the records for approximately 250 on-going donor-financed development projects and 750 loans and grants proved a major impediment to both simple

data analysis and improved planning and budgeting procedures. A computer data base was the most practical way to manage this amount of information efficiently, and in the summer of 1984 we arrived in Khartoum to attempt to create such a data base (as well as to undertake other technical assistance activities in the MOFEP).

Data collection efforts

The development of the dBase III programmes for the Project Directory was quite straightforward (see Appendix). By far the most difficult part of establishing the Project Directory was the collection of the data to put into the system. There were three primary places where project data could be located: (i) donor offices, (ii) the MOFEP itself, and (iii) the implementing agencies. In this section we describe the efforts to collect data from the donor community (for a discussion of our attempts to gather data from the MOFEP and the implementing agencies see Whittington et al., 1986.)

At the July 1984 meeting of the JMC the Undersecretary of Planning announced that USAID had agreed to fund our project to establish a microcomputer-based development project data base. He requested the donors' assistance in this work, reminding them of discussion along these lines at the December 1983 Consultative Group meeting. In August 1984, together with staff from the JMC Secretariat, we visited the representatives of the major bilateral and international donors in Khartoum to explain the nature of the proposed Project Directory and to solicit their help in completing two data forms which had been designed to collect information on donor-financed development projects. We showed them preliminary copies of the proposed forms and requested their suggestions for modifications which would make them easier to complete and more useful.

We paid personal visits to the Khartoum representatives of the following donors: UNDP, World Bank, EEC, France, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, and USAID. These visits were followed up on 22 August by a formal written request to 22 donors from the Undersecretary of Planning, asking for their assistance in completing these two forms. In addition to the 11 donors noted above, this letter was sent to the Embassy of Denmark, African Development Bank, OPEC Fund for International Development, Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, Islamic Development Bank, Abu Dhabi Fund

for Economic and Social Development, Abu Dhabi Government, Saudi Fund for Development, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, UNCDF, and International Fund for Agricultural Development.

To the best of our knowledge, no reply was received from the World Bank, UNDP, EEC, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, Kuwait Fund for Economic Development, or the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. Contrary to the expectations of the Western donors, by far the most complete, thorough and rapid responses came from the Arab donors. Several of the major Western donors that responded did so in a superficial manner.

In November 1984, and January 1985, we again visited the Khartoum offices of the majority of these donors, asking for their co-operation and in January 1985, the Undersecretary of Planning sent a follow-up letter, noting the importance of this work for the JMC. By the summer of 1985, only two replies had been received to this second request for project profiles: a letter from the Federal Republic of Germany informing the Undersecretary that they did not have time to fill out the forms and two project data forms from the Swiss Embassy. Even in the case of USAID, approval of the project by the Mission Director did not translate into incentives for the lower level staff to co-operate. Only our persistence got the forms completed; the USAID project staff were extremely reluctant to report on the projects for which they were responsible.

What we find extraordinary about this experience is that the majority of donors did not even feel obliged to answer the Undersecretary's letters — seemingly a simple courtesy. Perhaps the experience with the World Bank best illustrates the lack of co-operation on the part of most donors. As noted, the effort was directly responsive to the World Bank policy objectives in sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank's own mission to Sudan in March 1984 called for the establishment of a computerized data base in Sudan. World Bank staff in both Khartoum and Washington were contacted personally on several occasions, at which time they made specific suggestions for changes in the data collection forms and the organization of the Project Directory, all of which were incorporated into the system design. World Bank staff continually promised to co-operate with the MOFEP and USAID to support this effort. Yet finally the World Bank failed to complete either of the two data forms or to answer either of the two letters from the Undersecretary.

Reasons for the donors' failure to co-operate

Certainly part of the blame for the donors' failure to co-operate must lie with ourselves and the manner in which we attempted to implement this component of our project. Although our project team spent about 10 man-months in Sudan over a 12-month period, we did not have a permanent, long-term presence in the MOFEP, and this certainly reduced the effectiveness of our project. Although we intentionally tried to keep the forms simple to facilitate donor co-operation, in the end they may have been too complex. The appendix lists the main headings of information we attempted to collect in the more comprehensive of the two forms; the reader can judge for himself whether we were too ambitious in this regard. Another explanation for the failure of the donors to co-operate must be that famine relief efforts overwhelmed many donors in late 1984 and early 1985. Ironically, as the number of donors operating in Sudan increased in response to the famine crisis, our project became even more necessary and at the same time much harder to do.

However, we do not believe such problems were the primary reasons for the donors' failure to co-operate. Indeed, other components of our project were notable successes. For example, the management information system unit and its microcomputer laboratory which were established are thriving 3 years after we finished the project and are used regularly for major tasks in the MOFEP, such as the preparation of the development budget.

In their recent book *Does Aid Work?*, Robert Cassen and his associates (1986) note three main reasons for donors' reluctance to undertake meaningful aid co-ordination efforts: (a) co-ordination is likely to impair the freedom with which donors can pursue their political and commercial interests through their aid programmes; (b) donors know that there are both ideological and technical subjects on which they are likely to disagree, and aid co-ordination would create conflicts; (c) aid co-ordination can be costly in administrative time and expense.

Although these explanations certainly have merit, based on our experience in Sudan, the problem of donor co-ordination seems likely to be more deep-seated than these reasons suggest. We found both related and additional explanations for the failure of donors to co-operate with the MOFEP and USAID in establishing a central depository of information on projects. We have categorized them into three groups: (i) reasons internal to the donor bureaucracy,

(ii) donors' impressions of the external planning environment, and
(iii) donors' impressions of the microcomputer technology itself.
All these explanations were informally offered to us by donor
representatives themselves in follow-up interviews we conducted in
the summer of 1985.

First, even if the donors' intentions were good, there are a variety
of organizational pressures which militate against real co-operation.
Donor bureaucracies are not structured to promote aid co-ordination.
There are few incentives to individuals within donor bureaucracies
to work with other donors. As the World Bank (1984: 43) has
noted, donor co-ordination is administratively demanding and time-
consuming, and is rarely rewarded in terms of professional evaluation
or promotion. Both executives and more junior staff are evaluated by
central offices which have little awareness of efforts by their field staff
to work with other donors. In fact, central office personnel evaluation
procedures often foster competition between donors. An enterprising
programme officer who lets others know about some of his 'best'
project ideas may well find them funded by other donors. On the other
hand, many donors make most of their major programming decisions
at central headquarters, so that individuals in the field typically feel
there is little they can do to promote donor co-ordination, even if they
wanted to. Finally, the donor's field offices are typically understaffed
relative to central headquarters, and the individuals from whom we
sought assistance were often extremely busy.

The second set of explanations concerns the donors' perceptions
of their external planning environment. Given the pressures on their
time, donor representatives were forced to make a judgement as to
(a) the likelihood of success of our effort to establish a computerized
project data base, and (b) the effectiveness of such a system if it could
be established. Too often, the subjective probability assigned to both
these events was low. The likelihood that we would succeed in creating
the system in the first place was perceived to be low, perhaps in part
owing to a lack of confidence in us, but also because each donor felt
the other donors would not co-operate.

The Western bilateral donors in particular felt that the Arab
donors would not co-operate with our project. This widespread, but
in our opinion false, belief is indicative of the mistrust and suspicion
which exists in the donor community and is a serious obstacle to
effective donor communication, much less serious co-ordination. In
reality, there are two major donor communities in Sudan: (i) the
Arab donors and (ii) Western bilateral and multinational donors. We

believe these two groups have a fundamentally different attitude to collegial relationships with personnel in the Sudanese Government. The staffs of the Arab donors seem to treat officials of the Sudanese Government much more as professional peers. On the other hand, no one working for the Western bilateral or multilateral donors seems to feel that their counterpart is an official at a comparable level in the Sudanese bureaucracy. Even the most junior-level staff want to deal with extremely senior people in the Sudanese bureaucracy.

For example, our USAID project manager had only recently completed her graduate training. This was her first professional job and her first assignment abroad. Although she was among the most junior project staff at the USAID mission, she insisted on dealing directly with the Undersecretary of Planning of the MOFEP. This problem is exacerbated by the high degree of centralization in Sudanese ministries. Because junior-level Sudanese staff are reluctant to take responsibility for decisions for fear of being overruled, it is natural that donor staff want to deal with someone higher up who can make decisions.

In any event, each donor saw little reason to participate in the data collection effort itself. We had hoped this problem would be addressed by the donors reaching a collective agreement in the JMC to support this effort. In the end, however, the JMC failed to meet regularly, and the Undersecretary of Planning failed to exert informal pressure on donors who did not participate. We can only speculate as to why the Undersecretary was unwilling to press harder for donor co-ordination, but we believe part of the reason was that the formal sector of the Sudanese economy was dependent upon aid to such an extraordinary degree that he simply did not feel he could afford to do anything to jeopardize its flow.

The Western donors also had little regard for the effectiveness of the Planning Wing of the Ministry. To many donor representatives, the Planning Wing was so ineffective as to be irrelevant to their objectives. Their primary interest in the MOFEP had become finding the easiest, fastest means of getting their projects approved and their funds disbursed. An effective planning operation in the MOFEP would inevitably entail less discretion on the part of the donors in programming their aid and, in the short run at least, this was perceived to be an obstacle to their aid programme rather than a necessary step in institutional development. It was thus not clear to donors that they wanted the effort to succeed. As one representative of a private voluntary organization put it:

don't really think you will be able to establish this microcomputer data base, but what happens if you do? I see more problems for me than advantages. Why should I want to give the planning ministry the information to meddle in our affairs?

Another related reason for the donors' failure to co-operate which pertained to their impression of the external planning environment was their perception that the project was too closely tied to USAID. For the Planning Wing of the MOFEP to have a centralized data base of development projects was bad enough; for USAID to be the only donor with such centralized information was even worse. At the July 1984 JMC meeting at which this project was announced to the donors, both USAID and MOFEP representatives assured the other donors that the data in the project directory would be available to all. However, the donors' scepticism is understandable in an environment where data are scarce and are typically treated as proprietary. There was a realistic fear that the Planning Wing of MOFEP, and indirectly USAID, would have much greater access to the project data base. For at least one donor representative there was also an underlying apprehension about creating the institutional capability in what was then a military dictatorship to create and manage centralized data bases. This concern was not entirely unwarranted. Within a matter of just a few weeks after the creation of the new Management Information System Unit in the MOFEP, one of the USAID-supplied computers was commandeered by the security police (whose stated objective was to set up a data base of automobile licence plates in Khartoum).

A third set of reasons for the donors' lack of co-operation relates to their impressions of the technology itself. Individuals working for donor agencies in a place like Sudan can hardly be expected to be up-to-date in the latest developments in microcomputer technology, and indeed they were not. They were thus unable to appreciate the relative simplicity of the management information system under development and the likelihood that it would succeed. Many had had frustrating experiences with mainframe computers of some sort, and tended to extrapolate their horror stories to microcomputers. We encountered a wide range of sceptical comments about computers in general. At least five individuals independently offered us that sage comment: 'Garbage in; garbage out'; by which they meant to imply that the whole effort was futile, not that they themselves should take care in giving the MOFEP high-quality data. The message was really that computers were an inappropriate technology in such a data-poor environment, and that this was simply another example of

a capital-intensive technology being pushed by donors without regard to the needs and capabilities of the local economy. We disagree with this line of reasoning, but it certainly deserves serious examination (see Calhoun et al., 1987).

Several donor representatives felt that the software development applications we proposed were far too sophisticated. In reality, the development of the dBase III programmes was the easiest, most tractable, and least time-consuming part of our assignment. The maintenance of the software and training people in its use, on the other hand, is an important issue, and we devoted a major part of our project to training activities.

Implications for future donor co-ordination efforts

To date the campaign for donor co-ordination has been carried out at a fairly superficial level. It is one more exercise in what Robertson (1985) has termed the ritual of planned development. Many of the donors who rhetorically call for co-ordination simply do not mean it. Moreover, many Western donors adopt an attitude towards the whole process which is both patronizing and the source of a constant misrecognition of the reality of their own and others' performance. At the centre of this patronizing attitude is a belief in their own bureaucratic efficiency and in the inefficiency of the host country's bureaucracy.

Although donors such as the World Bank support the idea of improved donor co-ordination, many of their representatives do not really know what this entails in terms of data management and analysis. Few donor co-ordination efforts have proceeded beyond the level of general discussion because the donors place data management demands upon the ministries of finance and planning which even the donors themselves do not know how to address. Few donor representatives have thought seriously about how they would manage the flow of paperwork associated with hundreds of millions of dollars of aid from thirty donor agencies — all with different accounting procedures, currencies, and priorities — with the limited budget available to a minister of finance or planning in an aid-dependent economy such as that of Sudan.

Ironically, the donors' demands for information on the recipient government's development projects and policies may be greatest in precisely those cases in which the government is least able to

respond and in which the development plans are least likely to be effective. Such demands can contribute to the destruction of host country planning institutions (Morss, 1984). This suggests that the field staff of donor agencies concerned with aid administration need to spend less time giving advice to ministries of finance and planning about data management and planning problems which they themselves have never faced, and more time actually working with these bureaucracies to improve their management information and decision support systems. In our experience, many of the staff of the MOFEP want to do a better job managing and co-ordinating donor assistance, but it is a complicated task with which they need help — particularly in the area of microcomputer applications. Donors tend to berate them while offering little in the way of ideas or concrete assistance, and without adequately appreciating the nature of the data management demands they themselves are placing on the development planning enterprise.

Calls for improved donor co-ordination are likely to fail unless underlying organizational and attitudinal issues are addressed more directly and seriously. Part of the problem is simply that all donors want to *co-ordinate*, but no one wants to be *co-ordinated*. Based on our experiences in Sudan, we believe future improvements in the area of donor co-ordination depend in large part upon more explicit policy directives from top management in both multilateral and bilateral donors. Almost without exception, the donor representatives in Khartoum with whom we dealt treated donor co-ordination as a peripheral concern. Their primary responsibility was typically to see that the budget targets for their aid allocations were spent, not that they were effectively co-ordinated with national government priorities and the work of other donors.

Until top managers in donor agencies change the incentive structure which their staff face so that time spent on co-ordination with other donors is recognized and rewarded in personnel evaluations and advancement, real progress in donor co-ordination will be slow. We would suggest that management experiment with ways of obtaining written evaluations of staff job performance from national government counterparts in the ministries with whom they deal. Management must also realize that donor co-ordination efforts are time-consuming and require a long-term commitment to the institutional development of both the donor agency and the national government. If serious attention is given to the issue of donor co-ordination, then information management support of the kind we tried to develop will be essential.

Appendix

The two objectives of the Project Directory pose somewhat different data requirements. The objective of donor co-ordination and information storage and dissemination could be largely accomplished with static, background data perhaps needing only annual updating. In order fully to support the MOFEP's planning and budgeting activities, however, the Project Directory needed to include information on the physical progress of projects and an up-to-date record of past and projected expenditures. The latter is needed to estimate future financial requirements and recurrent costs. Such data need to be more frequently updated to be useful in terms of integrating financial and physical implementation.

On the other hand, the objective of donor co-ordination required more information on completed projects than did the objective of improved planning and budgeting. For a donor sub-group attempting to co-ordinate aid assistance in the forestry sector, it could prove vital to learn of the experience of two similar projects funded by other donors over the past decade. Such historical information would be of little immediate use in project monitoring. One of the principal decisions in the design of the Project Directory was to find a reasonable balance between the data requirements necessary to meet these two objectives.

The second major design issue concerned the tradeoff between an easy-to-maintain, simple system and an easy-to-use but more complex one. Most recent computer applications in developing countries tend to opt for increased internal complexity in an effort to achieve 'user-friendliness' and to prevent potential errors by inexperienced users. Although user-friendliness is a desirable goal anywhere, in our view this overdesign of software systems is shortsighted. An inflexible computer system which is difficult to modify will fall quickly into disuse in an unstable computing environment such as typically exists in ministries of finance and planning in developing countries. Any software system should also be easy to modify because new technical advisers will be expensive and not readily available as applications change. Turnkey systems which work well at the start will tend to fail because of lack of software maintenance or a changed organizational environment. We thus attempted to keep the software for the Project Directory simple enough to be modified by the Sudanese we trained.

The Project Directory consists of two databases. The Project database has one record for each project and the Donor database has one record for every donor associated with a single project. The data for both data bases were taken from the main questionnaire distributed to donors. The major headings were as follows:

Donor	Planned/actual completion date
Project title	Ministry and department responsible
Economic sector and subsection	Main Sudanese contact
Region	Assessment of progress
Objectives	Cost in Sudanese pounds
Stage of project	Details of donor contribution,
Brief description	including dates of loan or grant
Resource inputs to project	agreement and details of
Output of project	disbursement
Target groups	Details of Sudanese contribution
Duration	Date of latest revision of costs
Planned/actual starting date	Project publications and reports

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