

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TIME IN THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE

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The concept of time is one of the most basic tools for the description of experience and one of the most fundamental concepts of both the human and physical sciences. We perceive 'time' after our own fashions, in nearly every act of our existence and most particularly in our reflexions on our experience. All too often, however, we allow our personal styles of perception to confuse and complicate our analytic conceptualization of time. As a conceptualization 'time' has various uses and meanings and we err when we do not grant it this complexity. In this paper I shall suggest that four concepts placed on a continuum: constancy—continuity—change—chaos, provide a better guide to the understanding of the import and operation of time than do our often simplistic notions of a 'fourth dimension' or our watches and clocks.

In order to pursue our exposition it is necessary that we recognize the idea of the intentionality of perception. By this I refer to the absolute creation of each experience or perception by the individual actor. This stance, which I postulate, includes both the physiological and psychical components of the experiencing individual. It is not, of course, the only possible way in which to view human beings. It does seem, however, to be an appropriate focus so long as we are concerned with individuals as discrete units and are willing to grant men the possession of autonomy over their own lives. These choices are implicit in psychoanalysis, for by it we not only affirm the individual's ability to direct (whether consciously or not) his own experience and action, but we assume that it is possible to treat individuals successfully without changing the whole of their environments. When we are dealing with data of perception, it is important that we realize, as Husserl (1913, p. 117) put it, that 'intuition and the intuited, perception

and the thing perceived, though essentially related to each other, are in principle and of necessity not really and essentially one and united'. Thus, while any object may have an external existence or 'being-as-it-is-in-itself' (Husserl, 1913, p. 47) if we are to treat the mind, then our essential concern must be with the individual's own perception. Further, we must treat this perception as a unit in the *system* of an individual's perceptions, conceptions and imagination—in short, mind. It cannot simply be compared to a culturally accepted set of perceptions or the data of science and then either accepted or rejected as though it were fully discrete. It is of course not discrete, but rather gains whatever importance it may have through connexion to other items of psychical information within the mind of that individual. This is the process which makes free association not simply random memory.

We recognize, then, that objects do not exist for the individual outside his own perception of them. This perception is intentional, by which we mean that it is not solely determined by the nature of the thing perceived, but is also the result of the psychological organization of the person perceiving it. Schilder (1936) writes, 'It is a psychical organism with emotions and drives which determine the final structure of our perceptual world.' In effect, each individual in each situation has a variety of choices as to how he may perceive the raw sensory data with which he is presented. When he looks at a large rectangular piece of lumber, he may perceive a desk-top or a door. In both cases he is likely to be within the realm of intersubjective validation, i.e. his fellows are likely to agree with him. Other situations may be more complex, but none the less they represent choices. As Neu (1973) has put it, 'It is the consciousness of the happening rather than

the actual happening, that has causal efficacy.' The choices which an individual makes have various social and psychological functions. We may see these functions empirically only 'after the fact'. They are, however, a large part of the material with which one deals in psychoanalysis. We shall deal in the rest of this paper with several varieties of functions of choices related to time perception. For now let us simply note that we must look at the individual's *organization* of reality as a complex entity, not just rate its veracity.

Reality, however we may constitute it, achieves its definition through the interplay of two conceptual/perceptual modalities—time and space. This paper suggests that these are best to be seen as measures of difference. The former is a measure of change, the latter of separation. Differences in content (i.e. description) may only be seen through comparison over space or time. In the rest of this paper we shall look, in order, at experiences of fusion, immobilization, chaos and at their interrelations. These are three modes of problematic relation to time. We shall then consider continuity and change and their balance in successful equilibrium, the concept of time in psychoanalytic thought and briefly the relation of individual time perception to social relations. We shall first give an overview of the relation of time to the experiences of the child, since that is the background on which all the later formulations are built.

THE INFANT'S TIME EXPERIENCE¹

It would seem that two sets of organization (or lack of it) dominate the infant's early experience. The first is fusion, generally seen as occurring with the mother-figure. The second is randomness of occurrence and identification. These two principles may be seen as representing the earliest manifestations of a dichotomy (of sorts) which operates throughout the individual's life. The seemingly random experiences of the infant are his first examples of his existence as object of the various occurrences

of a world which is in some fashion external, i.e. they are his first experiences of distinction or separation. The experiences of fusion into what Benedek (1949) has called 'the primary unit mother-child' are prototypical of possible later experiences of unity and undifferentiation. It should be emphasized that in each case it is the child's organization of stimuli, not directly the stimuli themselves, which produces the experience.

When the child does not note connexions in the range of sensory data with which he is confronted, it is generally because he has not yet developed either a repertoire of memory or a classificatory system which encompasses it. Eventually the child comes to remember objects of stimulus and identify similar objects and similar stimuli or experiences. As he does so, he is developing the system of organization which he will continue to elaborate and/or condense throughout his life. Similarly the child eventually begins to distinguish himself from his mother and develop a consciousness of himself. Mahler (1965, 1968 and elsewhere) has perhaps been most prominent in describing this 'separation-individuation process'. She has also noted (Mahler, 1972) that: 'As is the case with any intrapsychic process, this one reverberates throughout the life-cycle.' The randomness which may characterize some of the child's early experiences also has its meanings for the rest of his life. It may be seen as the earliest demonstration of the potential for the process the object-relations school has termed 'splitting'. The splitting process occurs when the ego sacrifices integration (i.e. continuity) in order to defend itself against unbearable conflicts (Kernberg, 1969). This process is distinct from the child's early randomness of perception in that splitting is always an active defence, not a passive lack of established organization. Thus I would suggest that Masler (1973, p. 429) is wrong in suggesting that 'splitting occurs as a stage in the development of an infant'. The phenomena which he describes (the child's assumed inability to 'recognize that the breast

¹ When we speak of the 'experience' of children, we speak in either more or less sophisticated conjecture. The experience of another are always beyond our knowledge, though we may at least compare ideas of adult

experience to memories of our own. Our own experiences in infancy are too distant for even this subjective verification.

that frustrates it at one moment is related in any way to the breast that gratifies it at another point in time') are not inevitably splitting but rather a manifestation of the same general principle—the non-identification of relation between seemingly connected events or objects.

EXPERIENCES OF FUSION

The infant's situation is among the most easily conceptualized examples of the importance and power of 'time' as an organizing concept. We shall now look at the way in which one set of early experiences—that of fusion—admits of parallels later in life and in a variety of different situations. Mahler (1972) tells us: 'Consciousness of self and absorption without awareness of self are the two polarities between which we move, with varying ease, and with varying degrees of alternation or simultaneity.' I agree whole-heartedly, adding only that this is not the only set of polar oppositions between the poles of which we live.

E. Fromm (1956) wrote some years ago:

The experience of separateness arouses anxiety; it is, indeed, the source of all anxiety (p. 8).

Man—of all ages and cultures—is confronted with the solution of one and the same question: the question of how to overcome separateness, how to achieve union, how to transcend one's own individual life and find at-onement (p. 9).

Fromm is right, but he approaches the issue from only one side. He ignores the fact that man—and men—are equally concerned with establishing and maintaining individuality as with achieving unity. Experiences—religious, psychedelic or psychotic—of extreme undifferentiation may function in a variety of different ways for both individuals and societies. We may briefly consider four groupings of experiences of unity or fusion.

The idea of some form of consciousness-change during orgasm has come up periodically in the psychoanalytic literature. Unfortunately, many English language authors have followed Freud's interest in the subject by pursuing something they termed 'orgastic loss of consciousness' (Needles, 1953, 1973). The idea of 'loss' of consciousness comes from the translation of the German *Entgang*, discussed by Eissler (1959) and disputed by Needles (1973). I am not

prepared to argue the translation, but rather to assert that whether correctly rendered from Freud or not, the term is an unfortunate one. It would be much more aptly descriptive to refer to an 'altered state of consciousness' (following Tart, 1972) or an 'experience of altered perception' (Calhoun, 1975). In the first place, it is very difficult for anyone, even a psychoanalyst, to record confidently the absolute presence, absence or description of a psychical state in another. Notations of changes are more plausible and may be fleshed out by personal experience or the 'after the fact' descriptions given by others. There is, furthermore, some unclearness about the meaning of the term 'consciousness' in this phrase. If it refers to conscious control over thought processes, then loss may be an acceptable modifier. If it refers to reflective as opposed to immediate experience, then, again, it may be absent at times. If, however, consciousness refers to the recording and/or awareness aspect of experience, and this seems to be Needles's usage, then I assert that it is not lost but rather altered. Needles (1973) suggests that *normally* consciousness is not lost but that it may be lost, as a demonstration of some psychical aberration, in some individuals. He looks as well for a link with fainting. It would seem that an alteration in consciousness is very close to a part of the definition of full orgasm, while loss of consciousness is a distinct state which may in certain individuals become associated with sex as a defensive reaction.

Although the sort of argument which Needles set up proceeds from an unfortunate starting point and fails to substantially improve understanding of its topic, that topic is none the less important. As early as 1909 Freud found relation between a change in consciousness during orgasm and hysterical attacks. The loss which may be occurring in both sets of altered states of consciousness may be that of time-sense. Time, as we have noted, can be an important organizing principle for the human psyche. If its perception is removed, organization and, in particular, differentiation will be altered and reduced. Thus it would seem to be not consciousness, but one (and perhaps more) of the organizing dimensions of consciousness which is lost during orgasm. This may be the extent of the relationship to hysterical attacks, but

it is a significant extent both in that connexion and in the relation to various other forms of altered perception, ranging from the lack of differentiation which severely regressed psychotics may experience, to the religious experiences described under the label *Kairos*, to the experiences of mystical and/or ritual union anthropologists have described, often under the rubric 'communitas'. The experience of altered perception during orgasm may well be seen as, if not prototypal, at least archetypal of this sort of experience of unity. There is little evidence that hysterical attacks necessarily include the dimension of unity.

There is no manner of absolute demonstration that orgasm includes a dramatic experience of unity either, but it would seem that this is true at least for a certain class of orgasms, most frequently during intercourse between emotionally involved individuals. It is, thus, certain outside conceptual and/or interpersonal characteristics of the experience which determine its nature, not simply its physiology.² This is also the case with the manifestations of a psychotic regression. Some patients with a depressive disorder may indicate a feeling that time fails to pass. Schilder suggests that this may be a necessary defence against aggressive impulses which make the patient fear that any action is likely to be harmful. On the other hand, timelessness itself may become the complaint with some patients who experience a kind of dreadful eternity (Schilder, 1936). A great deal of the general pathology of psychotic patients often has to do with the inability to disassociate past affect from present situations.

A variety of experiences of unity or undifferentiation are not so clearly individual in nature. The individual who has this sort of experience does so either as part of a group or culturally patterned situation. *Kairos*, the immediate religious experience of oneness with the world, is an example. Although a man may experience this feeling or perception alone, it is generally a part of a mythic structure. This structure is responsible for establishing (in its more

general nature) the existence of the supernatural which makes the merging possible and (in its more specific character) for establishing the particularities of nature and method relating to the supernatural.

It is very difficult to attempt to distinguish categories of religious experience on any but a philosophical level. It is, however, possible to distinguish categories of function for religious experiences, and categories of situations in which they may take place. This, however, would take us into the proper topic for another paper. At present, it is only important that we note again that the negation of the time sense seems a common characteristic of all such experiences.

A related set of experiences are those which the anthropologist Victor Turner has designated 'communitas' (Turner, 1969). Although the usage is somewhat unclear in Turner's writings, it would seem that this term has its best reference to temporary experiences of transcendent unity among members of a group of individuals. These experiences may occur with the aid of psychotropic drugs, they may take place in ritual or casual contexts in a variety of different cultures. One of the best considerations of the sort of phenomena in a structured ritual context is that published by Barbara Myerhoff (1974). She describes the nature of the Huichol Indian peyote hunt in North-central Mexico. This is a ceremony during which several members of the group make a journey to the mythical land of the ancestors. During the course of the peyote hunt a number of ritual reversals are incorporated. Old men are called children and the deference to age is shown to the young, people say 'good-bye' in greeting and 'hello' in farewell, they walk backwards and, most crucially, they shoot the peyote with small bows and arrows, plant pieces of deer flesh in the ground and call the maize peyote. When asked why they do this, they reply that the deer, maize and peyote are all one. Yet, apart from ritual occasions, the Huichol make complete distinction between the three items. They plant

² Bateson (1949) has given an interesting discussion of the relation between 'climax' in the sexual act or elsewhere and cultural patterns including systems of symmetrically rising action interspersed with release. An

alternative formulation is that of involvement or action sustained at a plateau rather than allowed to build up to release.

and harvest the maize successfully and are perfectly aware of the nature of peyote. In their everyday lives they treat these objects in much the same way we might treat three unrelated artifacts. They are, however, 'one' during the course of the peyote hunt. In order to explain this, it becomes necessary to refer to (a) the timelessness of the 'communitas' experience which characterizes the peyote hunt and (b) the time referents of Huichol culture. In the first matter, the peyote hunt is rather a 'time-out' from everyday life, so that the problems which would ordinarily arise from the 'confusion' of several items do not obtain. In addition, since timelessness (in perception) is the key to the experience of interpersonal unity, the passage of time is not recognized as usual, so there becomes no acceptable epistemological way to reckon differentiation other than the categories in the mythic structure.

The time-referents of Huichol culture constitute a basic reason why it is functional to 'unify' the deer, maize and peyote. On the basis of existing evidence it is fairly reasonable to assume that the Huichol were at some point a hunting culture and settled down fairly recently to agriculture. In addition, the peyote-use of the group seems to have come from some other neighbouring population relatively recently (Furst & Myerhoff, 1966). Deer, maize and peyote are all important symbolic identifiers of the Huichol. The deer may be seen as standing for the ancestors, the maize as being the current source of sustenance (and a distinction of Huichol from Mestizo), and the peyote as both a distinguisher of Huichol as opposed to neighbouring groups which are *Datura* (Jimson Weed) users, and as an element of considerable importance since it is somewhat new and anomalous. Thus the rituals of the peyote-hunt *communitas* experience seem to provide a way for the Huichol to perceive themselves as one people, whole and united (for further discussion see Myerhoff, 1974; Calhoun, 1973, 1975).

We may note here that the timelessness discussed above seems to perform an important function for the Huichol. It enables the maintenance of a feeling of continuity where discontinuity has in fact been largely the norm. This would seem to be essential for a strong

cultural identity. It would seem likely that something similar is true on the individual level. One of the functions of the time distortion which Freud early noted in dreams and other manifestations of the unconscious (Freud, 1900 and elsewhere) may be to preserve continuity in the existence of the individual. We may suggest that an individual who did not 'distort' chronology at an unconscious level would in fact be quite likely unable to conceive of himself as a continuous and responsible being. We shall return to this later.

We should note that the Huichol statement that the deer, maize and peyote are one, is in no way indicative of an impaired reasoning ability. As we have seen, this would be a far from adequate explanation of the association and would, moreover, fail to take into account its situation-specific nature. Some writers, however, have made unfortunate assertions along these lines. Lee has suggested writing on the Trobriand Islands that the natives exist with an (in her opinion largely linguistically determined) inability to recognize that an object may change in some attribute and yet retain its identity (Lee, 1954). Masler makes the common error of taking too readily a single convenient source from another discipline without thoroughly researching the topic when he follows Lee and reports: 'Anthropologists have verified that the natives are unaware of any connexion between the same yam at different stages' (Masler, 1973, p. 425). Masler refers to Lee's comments regarding the stages of development of yams from unripe to overripe. Lee argues her point from the fact that linguistically the stages have completely distinct names. I suggest that the conclusions drawn by both Masler and Lee from this fact are patently absurd. Boy and man are linguistically completely distinct in English, yet I think we would hesitate to accuse ourselves of being unable to recognize the connexion between the two stages in male human development! The Trobriand Islands are, thanks to Malinowski (1929) one of the best-researched areas in anthropology, and one which has had much relation between ethnography and psychoanalysis, beginning with Malinowski's correspondence with Freud. There is no need for this kind of error. As we have noted above, time is a measurement of

change. Linguistic names are also indicative of difference. Where one chooses to draw the lines may vary from person to person or culture to culture without the fundamental principle varying at all.

The affect of similar experiences may work in different ways for both individuals and groups as well. 'Communitas', for example, does not always function as a successful integrative force for a whole society, as it seems to in the Huichol example above. 'Communitas' may also exist as a unifier of small groups of revolutionaries or members of what came to be called a 'counter-culture' in the West in the late 1960s (see Turner, 1969; Myerhoff, 1975; Calhoun, 1975). We may conclude this part of the discussion by simply noting that whatever the content of an experience of 'communitas', the timelessness and increase in intensity of affect characteristic of the experience will dramatically increase the impact of any symbolic elements which are incorporated.

With the (possible) exception of psychosis, the experiences of fusion which have been discussed above are of necessity temporary. One cannot have a permanent orgasm, the Indians must eventually return to daily life, and religious experience generally leads to religious organization or disappears. The experiential component of these events may occur as part of a normal individual life and enrich, otherwise change or leave unaltered that life. The next set of experiences of 'non-normal' relations to time is not a set of qualitatively different experiences, but rather certain characteristics of regular experience which may occur simultaneously or in extreme cases produce a definably separate experiential event. These we classify experiences of immobilization.

EXPERIENCES OF IMMOBILIZATION

We noted above the importance of maintaining a sense of continuity and identity in individual organization *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world. We normally think of organization and identity as something rather intrinsic or 'given'. Thus it is that most of our conceptualizations in the area are of the defence mechanisms which may help to maintain that organization. Cameron (1963) opens a discussion of the major defence mechanisms by saying:

The prime functions of any *organism* are to remain organized, at as effective a level as possible, in an environment whose organization is always different from that of the organism, and if possible to develop and mature according to its own built-in plan. The prime functions of the human *psychodynamic system* are to remain organized at as effective a level as possible, to develop and mature, in the face of stresses arising from interaction with external and somatic realities, and in the face of strains arising within the system itself (p. 232).

Part of the great difference of psychoanalysis from some of the other psychological and therapeutic disciplines is its affirmation of the complexity and frequent internal contradictions of the system of human drives and desires and their subsequent organizations and elaboration. It is important to remember that the human condition is one which not only allows for but produces contradictory desires. For the small child it may be equally attractive to be tucked securely into bed by the mother, or to be allowed to explore some new excitement or sensation. Security and excitement often conflict and since one cannot have both (or at least all of both) at the same time, a decision must be made. Similarly, individuals develop whole styles of relating to the balance which must be established between these two poles. Freud noted the idea of contradictory attractions and the necessity for (even unconscious) decisions very early in his work: 'A contradiction to my theory of dreams produced by another of my women patients (the cleverest of all my dreamers) was resolved more simply, but upon the same pattern: namely that the non-fulfilment of one wish meant the fulfilment of another' (1900, p. 184). It is essential that the functioning human being be able to make the decisions which are required by the various situations of his life. In John Barth's (1958) *The End of the Road* the doctor tells his patient:

'You claim to be unable to choose in many situations . . . Well, I claim that the inability is only theoretically inherent in situations, when there's no chooser. Given a particular chooser, it's unthinkable. So, since the inability *was* displayed in your case, the fault lies not in the situation but in the fact that there was no chooser. Choosing is existence: to the extent that you don't choose, you don't exist' (p. 83).

Immobilization occurs when one either has no feeling at all on the matter at hand or when one

views the alternatives as completely and equally posed. When one is unable to choose or act, one is in a way unable to change and thus time does not pass. Time is a progression of changes viewed from any standpoint of continuity.

At a 1973 case meeting in a large New York psychiatric hospital a middle-aged man who was diagnosed as an undifferentiated schizophrenic was asked by a psychologist if he knew who the President of the United States was. He hesitated, then asked: 'Is it Kennedy?' Psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers around the table all smiled slightly and looked at each other knowingly. All assumed this to be a symptom of the man's disorder. In a way, perhaps it was, but might it not have been more profitable to consider just what should have made this man aware of the time that had passed? There had been no significant changes in his situation. No newspapers were readily available to him. There was no clock on his ward. It was the same ward to which he was admitted years before, painted the same colour—grey—as at the time of his admission. Most of the patients on this ward were considered severely regressed. Admission records did not indicate that any of them were as fully dissociative at the time of admission as at the time of observation. How much of a role did the lack of change by which to measure time and difference have in this 'regression?' If reality is demarcated by space and time, then we must have differentiation in these dimensions in order to perceive 'reality'.

Immobilization can occur in another way as well. In this case it is the extremely rigid individual organization which views the world as chaotic and itself as secure. In different situations this formation may function better or worse. At times, as perhaps during a situation of (more or less) actual chaos, such as a war, the rigidly organized individual who does not admit of great environmental influence may be able to withstand the chaos with much less trauma. In more normal times of gradual change, however, the rigid individual is unlikely to be able to adapt as successfully to new situations and is likely to become alienated. The immobilization here is that of an individual who cannot change because of an identity too strong and absolute, rather than too weak

and indefinite. At times this may produce a feeling either of being trapped or of great security.

EXPERIENCES OF CHAOS

The next large set of problematic time organizations which we must consider are those which produce experiences or randomness of non-predictability. These experiences are conceptually (and to an extent functionally) opposite to those we have designated 'fusion' but both fall under the general rubric of 'timelessness'. A comparison of the two types should indicate considerable reason for not relying on a simple distinction between 'timelessness' and 'duration' (Masler, 1973).

A dramatic example of the experience of chaos may confront the reasonably well-organized person who moves from one culture into another. He is likely to find himself considerably confused and will frequently suffer metabolic and psychosomatic disorders (insomnia, etc.). Culture shock, as this phenomenon is designated, seems to have two principal components. One is the lack of communication which isolates the individual from a great many of the referents by which he measures his everyday life and from the social contact which is not only reality-testing but support. This communication problem is frequently a function of language differences but is by no means solely linguistic. The newcomer is likely to suffer as well from a considerable discontinuity in experience from that of the natives which further impedes communication. The second component of culture shock is related to this. The individual in a new and dramatically different situation is likely to find that his learned categories and cultural constructions are inadequate to deal with new material and social data or situations. One may note the considerable tendency of tourists to search out restaurants serving food native to their homelands, and then consider how much more dramatic the difference between, say, a South Pacific Island culture and New York City. We may further remember that this difference is just as great in both directions.

We also learn, both as members of a particular culture and in the particular patterns of our individual lives, a certain set of constructions which allow us to anticipate the behaviour of

others and to read meanings and imports into that behaviour. Davitz (1959) has reported on differences in the perception of others varying with fear or anxiety and we may easily see the probability of similar problems of phenomenological interpretation coming across cultural lines. We may note that fear and anxiety frequently reach intolerable levels for a person at the same time that he becomes unable to read the cues of his environment accurately.

The social cues with which an individual is presented change not only when he moves from one culture to another, but when he substantially changes his position within the same culture. The readiest example of this phenomenon is the person who moves from obscurity to become a 'star on the silver screen' or (more likely, in our present culture) a rock-music star. We might term this condition 'status-shock'. One can only imagine the discontinuities which must have been experienced by the Beatles in their meteoric rise from virtually anonymity to millionaire folk-heroes. In such a transition the units by which we determine meaning disappear and must be re-established. The world becomes chaotic because we have nothing to measure it by. The recently popularized phrase 'future-shock' (Toffler, 1970) provides another example of a similar sort of phenomena. In this case, it is the society itself which is changing so rapidly that its members cannot apprehend the new matrices of meaning as rapidly as is necessary. In both of these situations it is the *speed* of the change which produces the difficulties. Mead (1970) has detailed something of the same sort of operation in relating research on immigrants to the idea of the 'generation gap'. She suggests that one of the interesting parallels between the two situations is that the children are in the position of being able to teach the adults the ways of the new culture more readily than the other direction. She designates such learning as pre-figurative. The youth, of course, learn largely from their peers, a learning which Mead calls 'co-figurative'.

Certain temporary events may also produce experiences of chaos. Often mass events such as wars, riots and some of the rock-music festivals of the late 1960s may produce an environment of seeming chaos for some of the

participants. We may note in particular the relation of this set of events and experiences to those discussed above under the rubric 'communitas'. Events such as rock festivals may produce 'communitas' for some of their participants and chaos for others. The same is true of the use of hallucinogenic drugs. Much of the difference seems to depend on the extent of ritual structuring of the event, as well as on the psychical organization of the participants. It would seem that in such events the experiences of 'communitas' would be shared among relatively small groups, no matter how large the sphere of identification. Certain characteristics of the various occasions seem to make them more or less likely candidates for the egalitarian structuring which can be conducive to 'communitas'. The Woodstock festival, while in many ways chaotic, took place for a relatively homogenous population and in relatively benign conditions. The participants seemed to share an ideology of a relatively simple egalitarian-naturalist foundation (for a psychoanalytic description of Woodstock see Titchener, 1972). The Altamont festival, on the other hand, included a much more diverse set of participants and was somewhat less benign in its formal procedures for the maintenance of order. In addition, the ideology seems to have been of a considerably different nature. Indeed, it may perhaps be better characterized by a jaded absence of ideology in favour of an attempt to provide maximal raw stimulation. Certain 'accidental' events such as a murder turned the festival into something of a large scale chaotic nightmare. We may suggest that both festivals gained a great deal of their emotive symbolic power, and this power was considerable, from the shared characteristic of 'timelessness'. The timelessness in the one case benefited and in the other suffered from the vicissitudes of context and content. We must acknowledge here, however, that context and content influence structure, for the experiences of chaos which have come to be the primary symbolic identification of Altamont, and of 'communitas' for which Woodstock has become nearly synonymous, differ greatly in structure.

Uncontrolled use of hallucinogenic drugs can (indeed we may postulate *does*) usually

produce experiences of this sort. By control I refer to a structuring of the psychedelic experience whether through a cultural milieu as in the case of many Amerindian and Eastern groups, through literary documents or simple, even *ad hoc* group organizations. In the West a variety of literary sources both document such experiences and provide structures for new ones. Aldous Huxley's vivid recordings of his experiences with various psychotropic drugs have made *The Doors of Perception* (1954) a classic of the literature. In it Huxley relates experiences drawing largely on the *Tibetan Book of the Dead*, a document which indeed related to the structuring of mystical experiences in its original cultural context. This book, in the Evens-Wentz translation of 1927, also formed the base for *The Psychedelic Experience* (Leary, Metzner & Alpert, 1964) which as a manual of sorts for psychedelic use has exerted a profound influence on thousands of 'trips' and on a whole sub-culture. Drugs such as mescaline and LSD seem to operate to remove limits which our normal conscious organization places on the paths and extent of connexions which the mind makes between units of information. In particular, identity across time and space becomes a much more open matter. This means that unless some other structure of the immediate experience is substituted for the normal conscious organization, sub- and un-conscious patterns, images and affect influence the individual's awareness much more directly. This can be enlightening in doses small relative to the strength of the individual personality, but it is profoundly dangerous. Many such drug trips are like accelerated psychoanalyses without the guidance of the analyst. It should be noted that these references are primarily directed towards introspective use of hallucinogens. It is, of course, also possible to use these drugs and not turn inward, being rather entirely dominated by the environment (in which case there are other, often physical, dangers) but for our purposes these are excluded, falling under the rubric of controlled (by the environment).

Introspective hallucinogen use tends to be individualized, inasmuch as it is governed by the structure of the individual personality of the user (rather than whatever external influences

are present). Participation in interpersonal situations, even such chaotic ones as, say, riots, tends to keep our behaviour—and thus, to an extent, experience—conforming to at least some limited set of shared perceptions and standards. To a degree this is co-terminous with aspects of 'reality-testing'. Jacobson (1973) has correctly noted the importance of temporal and spatial differentiation in the maintenance of reality-testing in his recent article. He discusses in particular, the way in which transference distortions represent a particular example of interference with normal processes of differentiation, an integral part of reality-testing. Although Jacobson does not explicitly take up the relation, he has pointed to one of the core aspects of the psychoanalytic process more commonly identified with Sullivan (1940) and Thompson (1964). This is the idea that the analyst is involved in an interpersonal relationship with the patient, who may be expected to benefit from the reality-testing the relationship provides. Jacobson (1973) writes about this as an interesting variety of the transference neurosis, the reverse of 'The analytic situation (which is usually) so arranged as to promote suspension of differentiated perceptions of the analyst in order to allow the transference displacements to occur.' It would seem that in the case of Jacobson's patient, who benefited from coming more and more in touch with the reality of the analyst as a specific figure, the process is qualitatively different from the more traditional idea of transference. Each may be of advantage to different sorts of patients. Not all analysands have as a problem a lack of differentiation of objects and specification of relationships. Some—paranoids frequently are an example—suffer from the reverse. In their case the very vague and basically unknown analyst figure may be more advantageous to therapy. In some ways projection (particularly when accompanied by a high rate of daydreaming and related phenomena) and acting out may be mutually exclusive stylistic tendencies.

James Deutsch (personal communication from unpublished Ph.D. research at Columbia University) suggests that we may view any individual's current state as being a balance (or attempt at balance) in a matrix one dimension of which is the continuum between internal

and external stimulation responsiveness, while the other is the continuum enhancer/reducer.

It seems likely that this matrix of personal relation to stimuli will prove related to such psychical productions as daydreams. J. Singer (1966) has reported significant variances among certain populations on frequency and content of daydreams. One may well be able to further specify the psychological mechanisms involved and thus begin to produce a psychological causal explanation where Singer finds only correlation between various crude social categories and daydreaming behaviour. Daydreams are a kind of internally stimulated production, which are probably not highly associated with persons who act out. That is, those who immediately translate preconscious material into action do not take the time to fantasize. This may be related to early learning with regard to the ability to tolerate tensions and delayed gratification (Benedek, 1938; Spitz, 1965). As Jacobson notes, Loewald (1960) has discussed this subject in some detail and remarked on the importance of the mother's ability to provide acceptable tension levels for the development of a *directed* drive. We may suggest that the converse may also be true, i.e. that a failure on the part of the mothering figure to maintain appropriate levels of tension may produce an inability to accept or anticipate delayed gratification, and thus leave the child with an inadequate system of psychical organization and a very diffuse drive. This may be reflected through the measurement of daydreams and, as Deutsch's preliminary work suggests, in differing patterns of symptom choice, such as the relation between personality factors and the abuse of differing drugs such as heroin and amphetamines.

EXPERIENCES OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

Of course the ability to deal with delayed gratification and to organize a coherent and directed set of drives is an ability to deal with time. Unlike either (sometimes) pathological pattern of perception—non-differentiation or randomness—this represents a perception of both continuity and change. While the other modes of perception we have noted are frequently a part of the formulation of certain pathologies, they are not necessarily maladaptive

in any particular instance. They have at times (i.e. for certain periods of time) valuable functions. Similarly, while we may designate a balance of continuity and change as the 'normal' perceptual mode, I do not intend to imply that this balance encompasses all that is 'good' or even all that is necessary. Certain elements of perceptual fusion and flux are important in a variety of social and psychological ways, of which some have been noted above. Further, as L. Dooley (1941) and M. Bonaparte (1940) have noted, an excessive emphasis on serially measured—'normal'—time may be indicative of a fear of the unconscious and thus best be seen as a defence mechanism. Of course, as Bonaparte emphasizes, one may conversely fear and try to escape from time.

Continuity and change are much the same and, indeed, they imply each other, like two points of view on the same object of perception. All phenomena admit of an isolated view from either of these two perspectives. If one sees again the house of one's childhood, one may either choose to emphasize its similarity or its difference. One view may overwhelm the other in our consciousness but it must be acknowledged that in order to perceive a change in the house, e.g. dilapidation, we must recognize it to be the same house. On the other hand, a bit more distant from our usual thought patterns but none the less true, in order to perceive that the house is the same now as it was years ago, we must note some change in some aspect of our environment to demonstrate the passage of time. As Hans Myerhoff (1967, p. 14) has noted (following Henri Bergson): 'The experience of time is characterized not only by successive moments and multiple changes, but also by something which endures within succession and change'. These two modes operate within the same range of phenomena and perception. Their distinction is largely a matter of temporal relativity.

Certain individuals have stylistic emphases which tend more towards one or the other of these modes of perception in various areas of their lives. Everyone is of course familiar with individuals who are either rigid or flighty. It may be noted in passing that it is in some ways fallacious to regard either of these as being dependency on the environment as opposed

to the other. Certainly many people who are excessively subject to environmental changes are flighty and unable to focus drives and attention. On the other hand, however, it would seem that the excessively rigid individual is frequently just as dependent on the environment and that the rigidity is largely an attempt to control the environment out of unwarranted fear of change. This is why a rigid person may live (relatively) comfortably (sometimes) in an environment tailored to his particular rigidities. There is an element of this rigidity in all of us, as can be seen readily through such phenomena as culture shock. It is usually identified only when it becomes problematic.

As we have noted above (particularly following Jacobson) one of the major functions of a well-organized time-sense is to aid in the process of object identification and specification. Distinguishing between objects implies, of course, differentiation and most often, classification. These two functions become possible (indeed perhaps inevitable) with the perception of continuity and change. With this perception one has produced the tools of such a selection process but not its particular parameters. The next step for the individual is one of developing the scheme of classification with which to group and associate the various objects. While there is, of course, overlap of these functions in the psyche, we may note that the time function is essential to the classification function while the reverse is not true. This would seem to indicate a more basic nature to the time function.

Modes of perceiving continuity and change—periodicity—may vary between individuals or across culture lines. The Nuer, a Nilotic people of the South Sudan, for example lack an abstract conceptual system of time (Evans-Pritchard, 1940). They organize periodicity rather about an 'ecological time', a kinship time and so forth. The former refers to organizing around nature-related functions—from rainy vs. dry seasons down to milking time vs. mealtime. In essence, it (and similar systems) makes temporal reference by notation based on shared concurrent acti-

vities. We do the same thing with those few activities which we hold in common and have some temporal concurrence about. For example if I say, 'he called at lunchtime', it will give a relatively good idea when he called, and indeed one of at least as much 'meaning' as 'he called at noon' conveys. Even here, however, our experiences and organizations are not completely conjunctive. When I invite someone to dinner, I cannot simply say 'come at dinner-time' and expect him to arrive at any certain hour. If I am American and I address a European, there is likely to be a difference of perhaps three hours in our conception of 'dinnertime'. The Nuer seem to have no such problem. Although kinship or other social structural time is something which deserves considerably more detailed treatment, we may simply note here that it functions along a similar pattern. If one wishes to denote an event some time in the past, one may refer to those who were living then, indicating their position in the structure of age sets.³ The basic point is that a lack of a conceptual or abstract system of 'time' is not an indication of inferior psychical development for a people (as Masler, 1973, seems to suggest). Rather, it is a function of a highly unified and not too diverse culture. One does not need an abstract system of time as long as the set of experiences of the referent population is highly congruent.

The temporary, distinct names for yams mentioned by Lee and Masler are also a cultural variation within, not in contradiction to, the principles of continuity and change. Yams are an item of great importance to the Trobrianders, not only as a major foodstuff but as a cultural artifact used in a variety of symbolic interchanges (Malinowski, 1929, pp. 121, 290 and elsewhere). It is not therefore unreasonable that the culture (including the language) should differentiate a number of different stages in its development. These stages have different social and technical meanings. That the Trobrianders are aware of the continuity of the existence of the individual yam is amply demonstrated by their ability to cultivate yams, quite

³ Of course this variety of time, like Western 'history', becomes something often manipulated for current social ends. See Peters (1960) for an interesting discussion of the manipulation of genealogy.

without making errors in temporal sequence of treatment. We might simply suggest that it is our understanding of yams which lacks sophistication with comparison to the Trobrianders. Similarly, the Eskimo, to whom snow is very important, distinguish several kinds by separate names. To us, roadways are important and we distinguish highways or motorways from streets. More to the point, we distinguish raw vinyl from phonograph records. We are able, in the course of time, to turn the one into the other, but only with the addition of certain effort. We cannot use the one in place of the other any more than a Trobriander can eat a green yam (or exchange it) in place of a ripe one.

Masler does bring up the important point that 'integration of time is an adaptive mechanism of the ego' (1973, p. 426). That is, one of the aspects of balance-maintenance for the ego is to attempt to keep a workable perspective on the past wherein it is perceived with less intensity than is the present, yet with sufficient involvement to give the individual a sense of 'continuity of being' (to borrow Winnicott's 1963 phrase). It would seem at a cursory glance that in the recent psychoanalytic literature more attention has been given to the idea of helping the patient achieve continuity of being than flexibility of being. In light of the foregoing discussion we may suggest that both aspects of consciousness are important. Especially with a number of middle-aged persons today it would seem that a rapidly changing world has made inflexibility an important problem. Even with the earliest of psychoanalytic patients, however, continuity of being in the sense of currency of past affect was not lacking. Rather, many patients were quite rigidly locked into patterns stemming from an overvaluation of past affect at the expense of current flexibility. Thus many of Freud's earliest treatments were devoted to helping patients achieve freedom from these past determinations of present emotion and behaviour. Without going into the sociology of psychiatric complaints, it may be only after the chaos of the Second World War and related social upheavals that achieving continuity became a central issue. None the less, it is important that the individual maintain a balance between his immediate perceptions and the broader learned view of issues that face him.

TIME AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

At this point it may be worthwhile to look at some examples of the use of the concept(s) of time in psychoanalytic thought. With no pretence of comprehensiveness we shall consider the related ideas of 'timelessness' of the Unconscious, the importance of temporal juxtaposition in unconscious thought and the 'distortion' of time in dreams.

There are frequent references in the psychoanalytic literature to the idea that the Unconscious is in a way 'timeless'. For our purposes it may be well to note that by 'Unconscious' we refer chiefly to the innate drive structure in the concept of id and the deeply repressed materials particular to the patient. Each of these aspects of the Unconscious has been referred to as being 'timeless'. The way in which each supersedes our normal usage of the concept of time is different, however. It is a postulate of most psychoanalytic writings and research that the basic instincts or drives remain much the same throughout the mature life of the individual (with the exception of certain defined periods of biological change which are for the most part insufficiently explored). In addition, the drives are, at the id level, chaotic. That is, they always war with each other (as well as with control mechanisms of the ego and superego) and defy firm demarcation. This idea that the unconscious drives do not admit of simple 'solution' is one of the most important of Freud's contributions to therapeutic thought, and one of the principle issues that distinguishes Freudian psychoanalysis from many derivatives and other forms of therapy. As Rieff comments, drawing on the 'Three Essays on Sexuality' (Freud, 1905): 'We are not unhappy because we are frustrated, Freud implies; we are frustrated because we are, first of all, unhappy combinations of conflicting desires' (Rieff, 1959, pp. 376-377). This is very different from romantic notions of 'freedom' vs. 'repression' all too often espoused by thinkers of less complex bent.

The second element of unconscious materials which are described as 'timeless' is the deeply repressed memory and affect which functions to demarcate the patterns of our psychic organization and is inaccessible to conscious thought until freed during psychoanalysis or on other

occasions, including, ironically, certain forms of psychotic regression. These materials are timeless but not in the same way in chaos. Rather, they are elements of constancy. They remain unchanged and are the basic organizers of our individual personalities. Thus, at the roots of psychoanalytic thought on personality genesis are the chaos of the drives and the constancy of primal memory.

Both in adult dreams and in early experience, temporal juxtaposition is of vital importance in unconscious thought. Thus a phobia may develop not because of any accurately remembered harm at the hands of the feared object or event, but because of its temporal contiguity to the trauma which may form the root cause of the phobia. We may add that it is a distinction between the psychoanalytic view of experience and that of the more simplistic learning theorists that the former notes that the memory which produces later fears may be just as much learned, though unconscious, and that the choice of object for phobia is not directly related to intensity or frequency of experience. That is, one may fear all things blue because an intensely traumatic experience occurred in a blue room. This cannot be understood through a consideration of the conditioning related directly to 'blue' but only through the intermediary concept of the trauma and its unconscious importance (and the importance of its repression).

One of the most obvious areas in which time distortion has been noted is dreams. Freud (1900) made several notations of the 'condensation' which seemed to be characteristic of the temporal organization of dreams. To some extent this seems to be a function of memories as well and serves to highlight the point that time is a measurement of changes. A dream is a recording of several significant changes (read also: connexions) without the necessary

filling in of space between them with less significant material (or a lesser density of material).

It would seem that from an analytic standpoint, however, it is misleading in some ways even to talk about dream-time as being condensed. While this may be an important element of the experience of a dream, it leads us to assume, incorrectly, that dream-time functions as just a compressed version of ordinary time. I suggest that this is not true, but that in dreams 'time', as we normally use the word, is not a crucial demarcation. Rather, certain elements of structure (see Lacan, 1966) produce connexions which are expressed in terms of time and space. Sequence may be more important than duration, for example. The 'time' of dreams, not in the narrative but rather in the functional sense, is the single unitary time of the unconscious. Elements of the unconscious are not distinguished from each other by any measurement in time. Their connexions and differentiations are of another order. Rather than temporal connexions, they are connexions of psychical import. It is only a detail of spurious relevance that the dream seems to express these connexions through time.⁴

The function of any perception of time is to establish connexion or differentiation. These connexions and differentiations may themselves be temporally constituted and determined but this need not be so. They may be connexions of another sort altogether, or distinctions on different criteria, simply expressed through the medium of time. Both as medium of expression and as criterion for differentiation/relation, time would seem to be a perception, a conception, an imagination of considerable importance in our lives.

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⁴ It is of spurious relevance, that is, that dream-time is related to our usual conception of time. Both, however,

include aspects of demarcation and linkage as discussed earlier in the paper.

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