Cosmopolitan Europe and European Studies

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Europe is an object of aspirations – and anxieties – on the European continent. It is as exciting and controversial in Britain. And it is also an object of global interest. At the moment, each of these is focused largely on the notion of a more cosmopolitan Europe. This idea of cosmopolitan Europe is developed in a range of academic analyses. But it is rooted in an amalgam of three different sets of intellectual and popular images.

Europe has long been seen as sophisticated, worldly-wise, the Continent of independent cinema auteurs and Profound Philosophers, Gaulloises cigarettes, Italian suits, and German music. This continues. Cosmopolitanism is in considerable part a name for sophistication. The cocktail is actually an American invention, but the sensibility has a European copyright. Of course, Europeans exemplified this sophistication not just on the Continent, but in their colonial outposts, writing and drinking at Raffles in Singapore, playing dangerous sexual games in Alexandria; painting and partying in Morocco. It is the Europe American and Irish and British artists and writers sought to experience between the wars. It is the decadence that informed their accounts. But this is also a key aspect of Europe that joined elites (even while the connections of ordinary folk remained more often national). It is the Europe of which Paris was the 19th century capital for Benjamin, and which seemed only more sophisticated in the 20th century as war gave it an air of tragedy and then existentialist melancholy. This image of sophisticated Europe persists, reinforced by contrasts between French presidents with mistresses and American presidents who pray. But it has to be said English seems more and more cool in some sophisticated European quarters, partly because business has a new glamour and partly because of global media. And the English doesn’t come all from England (or even Ireland).

Europe is newly exciting because of the project of integration. This is one of the most important political experiments undertaken anywhere in the last half century. Just as Europe was pivotal to imagining the nation-state as the primary unit of politics from the 17th century forward – and making this substantially if imperfectly so – it is now pivotal to discussions of whether the nation-state can be transcended. The nation-state sometimes seems inherited from time immemorial, but it is really a project of the last 350 years. And it has been a project of integration at least as much as division, probably more. This is hard to remember with its history marked so heavily by warfare (not to mention genocide and ethnic cleansing). But national integration – albeit always imperfect - was also a condition of Europe’s achievement of the modern welfare state and closely tied to the development of capitalism. So from the first steps of economic community to proposals to integrate the European Union still further, Europeans have embarked on transforming but continuing a long-term integration, not overcoming nearly natural ethnolinguistic or political divisions. And the basic questions about European integration are not merely
whether nation-states can be transcended and what sorts of identities they retain within a union, but precisely the same questions that were basic for nation-states before: will the structures of integration radically privilege capital or will inequality and accumulation be tempered by redistribution, high levels of public service, and strong rights for labor? Will liberal democracy provide wide enough participation and benefits to maintain a social peace or will there be disenfranchisement and discontent severe enough to nurture revolutionary movements or insurgent violence? As old elites struggle to maintain their power and to do so incorporate some new elites will they resort to mechanisms of policing and social control that make contentious politics (and perhaps progressive change) much harder and riskier?

Not least, Europe is at the center of imagining (and sometimes trying to act on) a cosmopolitan understanding of the world as a whole and itself as part. This is mostly an ethical perspective, rooted in Europe’s old traditions of philosophical and religious universalism. It offers a hint of transcendence to a continent many think of (perhaps misleadingly) as post-religious. This is the European cosmopolitanism that informs high levels of foreign assistance and enthusiasm for careers in human rights advocacy and humanitarian action. It is shaped by a sense of being in a global as well as a continental community of fate – notably in regard to looming environmental catastrophe. It also informed some of the European opposition to American-led war in Iraq (though perhaps not as much of the popular opposition as elite commentators assumed, since there were a variety of reasons to think that invasion was a bad idea). It informs European efforts to work through or in cooperation with the United Nations. And in more academic settings, this cosmopolitanism informs an effort to grasp global political challenges in terms rooted in terms of ethical universalism. Intertwined with this universalistic stance on global ethics is an effort to think through the diversity globalization has brought to Europe itself. Being a part of the globe is not (as at least some Europeans may wish) simply a matter of relations to people off the Continent. Europeans have had to recognize that global diversity is an internal European matter – and cosmopolitan arguments have been posed to address this in similar ways. But this is full of ambiguities, for universalism and embrace of diversity do not automatically go together. Yet “people of color” (other than white) and “people of religion” (including especially Muslims) are now integrally a part of Europe – even if they remind some Europeans of the “others” Europe used to be defined against.

**Cosmopolitan European Studies**

European studies has never been simply a field of European self-study. It has been importantly shaped by views from Europe’s periphery – notably Britain – and Europe’s former colonies. That pattern is partially reproduced in the present volume. Most authors are British; Americans outnumber continental Europeans. This is partly a fluke of language, of course, but not entirely. It is also a reflection of some of the “knowledge-forming interests” constitutive of European Studies.
European Studies was also shaped by continental European engagements in self-understanding. These were always also matters of self-creation. Catholic Christendom’s networks of priestly knowledge and early universities shaped an idea of Latinate Europe. This influenced not only religious identity but political legitimacy, and the two together informed the Crusades as a pan-European project. The Crusades were also pivotal in a history of defining Europe by its others, including not only Islam but Orthodox Christianity. The Protestant Reformation contested Catholicism but also convulsed Europe’s politics, though along with catastrophic conflicts it also brought a new level of popular involvement in politics. Symbolized by vernacular Bibles, this also brought discussion of both transnationally European and national identities.

Of course the Reformation also brought war (though not without other influences). Growing literacy and new religious engagement mobilized citizens in new ways. Religious differentiation challenged the maintenance of political integration. Some princes saw opportunities in defying the Pope, others in challenging the heresies of the first group. And the polities involved were highly heterogeneous, from tiny German principalities and electorates to massive transnational empires. Indeed, the 1648 Congress of Westphalia ended not only wars of religion but wars over the place of empire as a form of European integration. Even more consequentially, perhaps, it marked the marginalization of the transnational Catholic institutions and diplomatic missions that had previously been prominent. Before the Reformation, after all, it had been Church institutions above all that connected different parts of Europe. At the Congress of Westphalia, the parties accepted a definition of secular political authority that excluded these institutions, emphasizing instead the singularity of sovereignty over each territory.

The Treaty of Westphalia was among other things pivotal to a series of efforts to construct a European peace based on agreement among rulers – and a conviction that at least in principle rulers reflected nationally defined and legitimated states. Nation-building was itself transnational as all European countries took on a common approach to identity and political legitimacy. Universities and educational systems more broadly became a prominent feature of this transnational model of nation-building. Each engaged among other things in situating a national self-understanding in relation the larger web of European self-understandings. Prominently, each involved claims to Europe’s classical heritage – the grandeur that was Greece and the glory that was Rome as symbolic resources for 18th and 19th century France and Germany for example. And each engaged European Christendom, and Europe’s histories of conflicts and connections.

In this context, European studies grew as nationally differentiated engagements with a partially common ideals and history. But it might not have gained so strong a sense of European identity without racial, religious, and imperial distinctions from global others. For European empires expanded at the same time that European states integrated. Europeans established colonial universities and secondary schools. In these – and well beyond them – they both taught aspects of the European intellectual tradition and formed an account of Europeanness. This was sometimes tacitly, sometimes explicitly racial. The development of the category of the métis, for example, was racial not national but the construction of whiteness was European. The point is not simply that Europe was racist;
it is, rather, that this specific form of racism was produced in significant part by intellectual work – the work of anthropologists, doctors, and lawyers (Saada 2007). And if this intellectual work was informed first and foremost by inquiry into the biology and culture of those dominated by colonialism it was also informed by reflection on Europeanness.

As important as the demarcation of Europeans from “natives” was the construction of a common identity among Europeans and people of European descent. This was prominent in trading cities and in the “gentlemanly” relations prevailing among Europeans in colonies – even when their home countries were at war. Above all, it was a crucial feature of many immigrant societies. As Tom Paine wrote, “Europe, not England is the parent country of America”. And of course Tom Paine was not simply an American but also an Englishman and at least an honorific Frenchman. In usage such as Paine’s Europe appeared as a source of high cultural resources to be claimed by Americans and to be claimed as a common inheritance, across class lines by upwardly mobile autodidacts such as himself as well as across national lines. Partly racial, partly civilizational, this was different from the mainly national identities dominant on the European continent.

In the English-language world, British imperial dominance shaped European Studies (and America’s rising power shaped it further). The ambiguous relationship of island Britain to continental Europe was long-standing. It was at once able to maintain a discrete sense of itself that projected Europe as “over there” and ruled by a succession of continental European monarchs. Britishness was always constructed in relationship to the continent as well as to other specific nations (and of course the colonies). And as a trading, seafaring power, Britain was also a mediator among Europeans and between Europeans and others. But above all, as the dominant world power in the late 18th and 19th centuries, Britain situated its self-understanding in relation to Europe on the one hand and the rest of the world on the other.

Colonies also posed the challenge of teaching European civilization—to the colonized, of course, but equally to the colonizers. As has been remarked recently (but not always recognized), for example, the first chair of English was in India. In contexts like India, Europeans needed to learn how to understand and reproduce civilizational identities that were less problematic at home. In a different way, this was also an issue for settler colonies, like Australia, where the production of Europeanness was both a claim to connection with “mother countries” – not just Britain but a range of societies sent migrants -- and like whiteness a bond among occupiers. I will discuss the American example but it is hardly the only one.

America’s Europe

America played a distinctive role in the production of Europe (and European Studies). All the settler colonies—Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa among others—had special relationships to Europe. In most cases, though, this was strongly a relationship to particular European nation-states (even if, as in South Africa, two in
succession). In Canada, Britain and France were distinct poles of identity; other Europeans were relatively marginal. But in the United States the colonial tie was severed earlier than in other settler colonies and 19th century immigration was diversely multinational though overwhelmingly European.

Different immigrant groups maintained strong ties to European homelands, constructing “hyphenated” identities, and the WASP elite remained anglophile. Nonetheless, as the higher educational system developed it produced a distinctive preliminary education in European high culture. “Western civilization” was constructed out of a mix of classical antiquity, European history, and great works of modern European thought, art, and literature. Europe anchored an Atlantic civilization as well as a broader Occidental one (see in general Bailyn 2005 and specifically on the Black Atlantic Gilroy 1993).

Much of the intellectual background lay in the close relationship between 18th and 19th century European thought and classical antiquity. Europeans simultaneously celebrated the glory that was Greece, the grandeur that was Rome, and the sense that they were progressing beyond bounds the ancients had never breached, at least in some fields. John Stuart Mill’s fiercely modernizing father taught him Latin and Greek almost as soon as he could walk. Thinkers like Tocqueville, Hegel and indeed Marx all exemplified the 19th century’s simultaneous appreciation of the ancients and desire for progress. These thinkers were required reading for elites in nearly every European country (and indeed for many working class autodidacts). These participated in a common European intellectual world, though most were always intensely conscious of national differences as well. They engaged each other and drew on a common “conversation” with the ancients. But it was a distinctive feature of American universities and colleges not only to demand grounding in the classics, but to marry this to systematic and cross-national teaching of European “culture”.

Even as American universities and colleges gradually gave up the classical curriculum after the 1870s, they continued to embrace aspects of it -- rethought as the roots of European civilization. And even as they took up the curricular structure of the “major” patterned after the research fields of the PhD degree (itself a European, specifically German, import), they continued to consecrate the study of Western Civilization as a necessary preliminary. Indeed, this was in part the homage paid to classics, history, and philosophy when the curriculum was redesigned to emphasize the sciences (including social sciences). And it is significant how little American thought or history the Western Civilization courses incorporated, how much they remained European until their 1960s crisis.

But though the consecration of European Studies as the necessary foundation for higher education ensured it a place, it also tended to ossify it. This quickly became a course that everyone had taken—and thought their descendants should take in the same form. At its most trivial, it was the canonical course that prepared gentlemen to make appropriate allusions in after-dinner speeches and political debates. Even when developed with the most depth and thought, though, it remained rooted in appreciation for the heritage of a seemingly already established tradition rather than the production of new knowledge. It was also an introduction to an enormously broad range of thought, cultural production, and history and thus did not reflect any specific field. Growing specialization
in academia reduced its connection to current scholarship. With the rise of analytic philosophy, for example, philosophers tended increasingly to withdraw from teaching Western Civilization (or even the history of European philosophy; their lower-level undergraduate teaching centered more on courses like logic, each abstracted from attention to any particular cultural context). Historians continued to teach Western Civilization, and some, especially intellectual historians, continued to champion the course and the intellectual tradition it reflected. Textbook authors and teachers tried to draw in the results of new research and intellectual perspectives. But while the Western Civilization approach remained prominent background, the 20th century saw the rise of a new perspective centered in social science.

The new social science disciplines all claimed European roots and their early American leaders appropriated European theoretical foundations. Some were immigrants and others studied in Europe. If Social Darwinism was an American invention, it nonetheless clearly built on Spencer and Darwin. From Boas to DuBois, Sorokin to Parsons, Schumpeter to Veblen, social scientists were engaged in a transatlantic conversation. But social science was engaged not only in the appropriation of disciplinary identities and histories; it was engaged in the production of new knowledge and new intellectual orientations. Indeed, the transformation of social philosophy into empirical research agendas – often linked to social reform -- was especially prominent in the US.

The distinctiveness of the United States from Europe was a prominent topic. Many American economists and political scientists were keen to stress the distinctiveness of American institutions but attention to European ones was basic to the comparison. Sociologists sought to understand European immigrants to the US by looking at their social and cultural contexts on each side of the Atlantic. And if the field of comparative politics would eventually attend broadly to states around the world, it grew out of the comparisons of European states to each other and Europe to America—as for example in Gabriel Almond’s and Sidney Verba’s famous studies of civic culture (1963). Much the same was true more generally for the research on “modernization” so influential in the postwar era. Though this became mainly an approach to studying the less developed world, its base lay in historical studies of development in Europe. See, for example, the classic volume edited by Charles Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. This was the capstone to the remarkably influential series of books sponsored by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council – one of the centers of “modernization theory”. In his Foreword, Lucien Pye described it as a “return to Europe”. After the committee’s more than twenty year’s of exploring political change in the developing world, it turned its attention back to the continent that yielded that very contrast of developed and developing.

Decentered Europe

In many of these studies, Europe became something of an unmarked category, simply “the modern”. This would set the stage for later critiques and efforts to “provincialize Europe”, to borrow a phrase from Dipesh Chakrabarty. More generally, social scientists struggled to disengage the specifically European from putatively more universal accounts. While some would focus on the critique of “Eurocentrism” others
(including many of the authors in Tilly, ed., 1975) would emphasize that the canonical accounts did not do justice to Europe either, and needed to be revised on the basis of new research.

Attention to the colonial and postcolonial world also offered another kind of challenge to the conventional approach to Europe. If the critique of Eurocentrism emphasized the fallacy of treating Europe as the world, this second critique emphasized the fallacy of treating European identity, culture, and politics as internal developments of Europe itself. Rather, new work stressed, European ventures outside of Europe made and remade the notion of Europe itself. This was already an important issue in the era of the Crusades and the recovery of Greek classics by way of Arab scholars. It became still more important in the context of voyages of exploration, the development of colonial empires, migrations, and global capitalism.

European self-understanding was heavily shaped by the rise of nationalism and especially the 19th century organization of academic history as national history. While nationalist imaginaries recognized the situation of each nation amid a cluster of comparable others, they encouraged an account of the sources of each as essentially internal. This tended to obscure the nature of conquest and immigration and also early projects of “ethnic cleansing”. The famous 1066 invasion of England, thus, involved Normans only ambiguously “French” and English who were hardly ethnically homogeneous. Yet the Normans become a part of English history and culture, not simply foreign to it (Anderson 1991). Indeed, only a few years before the Battle of Hastings, England’s King Ethelred (wonderfully known as “the unredy” or more politely “the ill-advised”) had issued a proclamation ordering all Danes out of his kingdom; many who had resided in Oxford were killed in the St. Frideswide’s Massacre (which the king found just and honorable, even though it involved the murder of men, women, and children who had taken refuge in the sanctuary of a church). Similar events took place in all European countries, partially undoing earlier mixtures but also creating new ones. The repression of Muslims and Jews in Spain is perhaps the most dramatic early modern case, but obviously the complicated project and horrific results have continued throughout the modern era, afflicting different countries at different times.

This restructuring of European ideas of who belongs where involved a construction of Europe as a collection of nations with putatively rightful claims to specific territories and governed by discretely sovereign states. This was the Westphalian model of 1648 – though it named a project only partly realized over the next 300 years, not an actual fact. In any case, the idea of a Europe of the nations is not simply a new way of thinking about European integration in the context of the EU. It is a renewal of an old—but for the most part modern—understanding of Europe. This built on earlier use of ‘nations’ as a term for people of different culture, language, and descent, but the older ‘nations’ represented for example in medieval universities and church assemblies (e.g., Lombardy, Piedmont) were not constructed as integral political units and do not map neatly on the new state order. They suggested the residues of vernacular differences within the common culture of Latinate Christendom, but not the construction of peoples putatively bound together by history and culture and constituting the bases for evaluating the legitimacy of states. This older meaning was transformed as nations were associated with states and states produced more coherent internal communication, institutions, and
administration. Scholars produced accounts of ostensibly national history, writers and critics produced national literatures, and so forth. If the histories and cultural claims were more integral than simple empirical reality justified, European nations were nonetheless structures for integrating populations across lines of difference – regional, ethnic, religious and sometimes class. This new notion gave Europe clear standing as a location in the world, as constituted internally by symmetrical but discrete states. These were sometimes at war but nonetheless distinctive as a group. And in their colonies, Europeans knew each other both as members of the same racialized dominant group, and as citizens of different European states—and their legal systems commonly provided distinctively for other Europeans.

This new notion also implied the self-production of Europe (just as it did the self-production of each nation within Europe). And thus it suggested the treatment of exploration, colonization, and globalization of markets as something active Europeans did to the passive rest of the world. Much can be (and has been) said about this, but the point I want to make here is that much of the production of modern Europe has involved borrowings and appropriations from non-European sources—from Arabic numerals, to South Asian pajamas, and Chinese habits of cleaning teeth. Moreover, much of the production of modern Europe comes specifically from the colonial venture. Techniques of European state-making were developed in colonial administration and extended into the domestic affairs of national states. The rise of standing armies as part of the conquest and domination of colonies became also a part of domestic life and both in military service and in its representation in the media a source of some integration among different localities within nations. The rise of capitalism and modern industry was not simply a discrete event within Europe but an event in the relationship of Europe to international trade.

Not least of all, the cultural traditions of Europe were enriched by production from outside the European homelands and metropolitan centers. Predictably, this is most true for French, Spanish, Portuguese and English, made world languages partly by colonial projects. Paris is a center for world music and French a vital language for African literature (even as it otherwise declines as a lingua franca). Latin American literary production now outstrips Iberian in fame and vitality. Prominent exemplars of English literature and drama have come surprisingly often from Ireland, from colonial outposts in Asia, and even from those for whom English is a second language. From Joyce and Beckett to Stoppard, Rushdie, and Achebe, English literature is far more than the product of native English authors. Some of this is simply writing elsewhere in originally European languages, but most of it is also an enrichment and transformation of literary traditions initially more narrowly European. And it has wrought transformation as well in humanities fields focused on European studies.

Changing Conceptualizations

The conceptualization of Europe has shifted over time. From centering on the notion of Western Christendom (vis-à-vis Eastern Orthodoxy as well as Islam) it reflected increasingly a field of competition among strengthening states (as well as the continent that housed the metropoles of competing empires). Though migrations, long-distance
trade, and cultural flows characterized Europe from ancient times, the rewriting of European history in terms of the nation-state emphasized the internal production of each country and a notion of Europe as the aggregate of these ostensible separate processes. At the same time, claims to the common inheritance of classical antiquity reinforced a sense of commonalty among Europeans, especially elites. And projects of modernization reflected a commonalty within the competitive project: the partially shared vision (and stakes) of modernization, prosperity, and political legitimacy. These intertwined stories provided the main framework for the conceptualization of Europe in relation to lands beyond the Austro-Hungarian Empire as well as those around the world. Though deeply challenged by the 20th century world wars they were not completely dislodged. Indeed, they were renewed in the years of reconstruction after World War Two with their development of modern welfare states – Les Trente Glorieuse as the French call them. The period from 1945-73 was the Golden Age of Western Europe according to Eric Hobsbawm (1993). Europe suggested a Western model distinct from America as well as the Communist ast.

Even projects that reached beyond this framework—like colonialism and migration and eventually the European Union—were largely addressed in ways that reproduced it. The story of migration to America, for example, was analyzed as a story of modernization that brought some Europeans to a new country where their old national and religious traditions bore new fruit. It was sometimes a morality tale suggesting that Europe needed to modernize more, sometimes one that stressed the importance of claims to European heritage for American status groups. But it was not taken until recently as a basis for problematizing the very idea of Europe.

In the late 20th century, the study of Europe was revitalized and the traditional idea(s) of Europe rethought. One impetus came from the perspective of “postcolonies” trying to establish the meaning of Europe in their histories. Another came from efforts to reconsider the entanglement of Europe with ideas of civilization and progress. This was shaped notably by efforts to come to terms with the Holocaust and the 20th century’s legacy of wars. It was also influenced by a range of social movements that generated interests in “identities” and “differences”—gender and ethnicity among others—that had been subordinated in the dominant accounts of European history (and indeed, contemporary politics, culture, and social life). Not least, the construction of welfare states seemed a culmination of many modern European ideas, projects, and struggles. Though these provided enormous benefits they also generated new and largely unexpected dissatisfactions. “New social movements” reflected some of these. Indeed, the idea of new social movements was distinctively European in both provenance and reference (though appropriated occasionally for studies elsewhere). It reflected a sense of the end of the great social democratic narrative of the integration of different social needs in a single overarching movement and the development of welfare states in response (see, e.g., Melucci 1989). Finally, the project of European Union generated both growing interest in itself and a new interest in conceptualizing Europe. This was both part of an analytic project as researchers sought to understand what was happening in Europe, and part of an ideological-pedagogical project as some European leaders sought to teach students a European self-understanding supportive of the EU (and particular visions of the EU).
EU-Centered Europe

After 1989, European integration was both strengthened and challenged. At the institutional (or “functional”) level, a host of new projects and connections knit Europeans of different nationalities more closely together. Opening of interior borders and introduction of the Euro were perhaps most prominent. A long economic boom stimulated trade and consolidation of enterprises (including some media). But at the same time, migration to Europe from less developed countries grew and became more of a public issue. Some of the less developed countries were in Eastern Europe and these produced their own migrants (as Southern Europe had earlier) and then candidates for enlargement of the Union.

In the 1990s, the EU approached some of the challenges with an effort constitute a new common understanding of Europe. Projects ranged from rewriting history books to sponsoring academic linkages among European countries to funding centers for “EU Studies” in America and elsewhere.

During the 1990s, “cosmopolitanism” became a more and more important dimension of European self-understanding. Sources for this ranged from sociological theories of “reflexive modernization” to growing emphasis on the development of international law to renewal of mostly neoKantian ethical universalism to the prominence of human rights activism and humanitarian assistance. Europe was in the forefront of all of these. And each informed understanding of a distinctively European role in the world.

Indeed, most of these various different sorts of “cosmopolitan” concerns and theories applied in principle to the world as a whole. But they were not only developed disproportionately in Europe; Europe was also understood as a primary example (e.g., Beck and Grande 2006; Rumford, ed. 2007). Britain perhaps led the way in applying the term cosmopolitanism itself, but a range of Europeans participated in this as in all the others and each flourished more in Europe than in most other regions. There are large academic literatures associated with each of these. Cosmopolitanism became part of European self-understanding.

Humanitarian assistance is indicative. There was an old history: the Red Cross was a European invention. In the wake of the 1960s disillusionment with more direct political engagement, Médecins sans Frontiers (MSF) became the most influential of a new range of humanitarian organizations which combined service with an implicit political challenge in the form of witness to the world’s atrocities. The European Community Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO) was founded in 1992 and quickly became very influential. The EU came by the end of the decade to account for about half of all global humanitarian assistance. Not only the EU but European national donors were prominent, both in total amounts of financing and in pioneering a “good donor” initiative. European youth flocked to work in humanitarian assistance.
International humanitarian assistance was understood as a distinctively ethical way of engaging problems in the larger world – different from what many Europeans understood as the hegemonic stance of the United States. It reflected not only personal ethics, but a sense that Europe itself was particularly ethical. This was of a piece the idea of reflexive modernization as well as the spread of neoKantian ethics. It fit with the notion of a Europe that since World War Two and the Holocaust had taken special pains not only to produce peace but to learn from and correct for previous moral failings (some associated with nationalism). This dovetailed with European abolition of the death penalty. Jean-Pierre Faye offered this as a defining motto: “Europe is where there is no death penalty” (quoted in Savater 2005: 43). It simultaneously marked an ethical stance and an understanding of this ethical stance as a measure of being “more civilized” (pace Adolf Musch 2005: 24, who equated the achievements of Western Europe with a “civilizing of politics”).

It is typical to date this European divergence from the US to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. This certainly sharpened the split dramatically – and made it a source of division within the EU – but it didn’t create it. This is a reminder, among other things, that the divergence is not an artifact of the Bush administration which has sometimes symbolized and often exacerbated it. Indeed, the growing divergence from the United States was publicly prominent in widespread public concern over the US vote against the 1998 Rome Statute that would authorize the International Criminal Court. The United States seemed often to argue for a ‘realist’ foreign policy focused simply on its national interests while Europeans (if not always the EU as such or all national governments) called for an ‘idealist’ engagement with values and higher purposes.

Another arena in which this was particularly pronounced was thinking about the environment. Ulrich Beck’s notion of a world risk society -- a society in which a sense of collective risks was pivotal for self-consciousness and attempts at collective action -- reflected a widespread European sense of being in a community of fate (Beck 1992, 1999; Giddens 1990). And fate looked far too likely to be set by environmental catastrophe. Other possible collective risks – from genetically modified foods to nuclear meltdowns – seemed also especially to galvanize European attention. Some of these seemed open to national or continental solutions but many were necessarily global. So again, a growing dimension of European self-awareness was that of being situated in a problematic world.

At the same time, the EU struggled to develop a foreign policy – notably with regard to the breakup of Yugoslavia and eventual military involvements there. The cosmopolitan orientation that informed humanitarian assistance and environmental consciousness was less help here. On the one hand, some European national governments helped to hasten the dissolution of Yugoslavia by a surprising rush to recognize secessionist states. On the other hand, the wars that followed were troubling on many dimensions. At the simplest, they involved the first wars on European soil in decades. Secondly, ethnic cleansing made them reminiscent of some of the horrors of the Holocaust. Third, under NATO auspices EU member states – including Germany - were called to send militaries into combat.
The 2001 attacks on the United States and subsequent attacks in Britain and Spain heightened security concerns and provoked a dramatic reorientation of foreign policy. Most immediately, they resulted in war in Afghanistan. European troops were prominent and though still members of national militaries were this time sent explicitly in the name of the EU. Already in January 2001 the EU and NATO had begun a “strategic partnership” but now this was put to new tests.

Perhaps most influentially the terrorist attacks focused the already growing European anxiety about immigrants on Muslims in particular. Controversy over Muslim immigrants became a widespread theme in European politics and public debates. On the one hand there were fears – over security, cultural identity, and economic competition. On the other hand there were accusations that government policies were creating a “Fortress Europe”. The prominence of the immigration issue continued into academic European Studies where it was perhaps the dominant topic (both on its own and linked to broader questions about the development of “postnational citizenship”). It was remarkable to what extent academics took the immigration issue as simply a matter of clashes between cultural difference and universalistic ethics, without for example very much critical attention to issues like the aging and low birth rate of European populations that helped to ensure jobs for migrants.

But the reframing also had a further effect, presenting the issue of immigration as also a question about the place of religion on a largely secular continent. Neither public nor policy makers were prepared. Nor were academic experts on Europe, most of whom subscribed uncritically to an understanding of secularization as inevitable in modernity and a matter of simple decline and the subtraction of religion out of public life (Taylor 2007). Moreover, this question coincided with the fact that some of the new members of the EU were dramatically more religious – and publicly invested in religion – than was normative among the old members. Poland was the main symbolic example.

These concerns came to a head with the drafting of a proposed Basic Law for the EU. Popularly dubbed a “constitution” this was subject to widespread controversy. Not the least controversial were proposals backed by German, Italian, Polish and Slovakian delegates to add mention of "God" and Europe's Christian heritage. But the aristocratic leadership of former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was almost as controversial.

In all of these dimensions, academic studies of Europe and academic participation in public debates about the nature and identity of Europe was prominent. This was perhaps most sharply focused in 2003 after the US led a coalition including Britain, Spain and some “new European” countries into war in Iraq. Protests were widespread in Europe. Somewhat surprisingly, Jürgen Habermas (in an essay co-signed by Jacques Derrida and published simultaneously in German and French) suggested that “The simultaneity of these overwhelming demonstrations – the largest since the end of the Second World War – may well, in hindsight, go down in history as a sign of the birth of a European public sphere” (Habermas and Derrida 2005: 4). As Levy, Pensky and Torpey
(2005) point out, Habermas’s claim echoed Dominique Strauss-Kahn’s assertion that “On Saturday, February 15, 2003, a nation was born on the streets. This nation is the European nation.” It is no accident, of course, that where Strauss-Kahn saw a nation Habermas saw a public sphere. The idea that Europe is becoming a nation (or national state) is still nearly taboo among academic Europeanists – though it is an entirely plausible argument. And in any case, for Habermas the idea of nation is associated too indelibly with bad nationalism of the past.

Habermas and many others responded specifically to the failure of Europe to develop a common foreign policy. The American Secretary of Defense followed on various American academics in making an invidious distinction between “new” and “old” Europe. To respond effectively would require a level of cohesion the EU had not achieved. The EU was easily incapacitated in controversial but important matters, Habermas (2006) argued, because of old assumptions that EU affairs were entirely matters for inter-state negotiation and especially that a minority of states should be able to exercise a veto over policies desired by a majority. And here Habermas was prepared to go beyond his previous advocacy of mere “constitutional patriotism” to call for a more substantive European identity. “A transformative politics, which would demand that member states not just overcome obstacles for competitiveness, but form a common will, must connect with the motives and the attitudes of the citizens themselves. … The population must so to speak ‘build up’ their national identities, and add to them a European dimension” (Habermas and Derrida 2005: 7). The Habermas/Derrida essay was controversial partly because it went beyond seeking common denominators to identifying a “core” Europe and charging it with leadership of the rest.

Habermas and Derrida (2005: 9) offered an explicit account of what they regarded as the essence of existing European identity:

In European societies, secularization is relatively developed. Citizens here regard transgressions of the border between politics and religion with suspicion. Europeans have a relatively large amount of trust in the organizational and steering capacities of the state, while remaining skeptical toward the achievements of markets. They possess a keen sense of the ‘dialectic of enlightenment’; they have no naively optimistic expectations about technological progress. They maintain a preference for the welfare state’s guarantees of social security and for regulations on the basis of solidarity. The threshold of tolerance for the use of force against persons is relatively low. The desire for a multilateral and legally regulated international order is connected with the hope for an effective global domestic policy, within the framework of a reformed United Nations.

This is an account that academic Europeanists would find largely familiar, though most would likely find it incomplete: emphasizing politics and policy, making its point about skepticism towards markets one-sidedly and neglecting actual engagement in market capitalism and attendant consumption practices (on which see Victoria de Grazia’s 2005 reminder that this involves features that bring Europe together with
America as well as some which separate). One might also remark on music and style, or on questions of openness – to immigrants and to social mobility.

Habermas and Derrida point, indeed, to many features American specialists on Europe would take to be evidence of “civilizing” tendencies America would do well to emulate. By and large, specialists in European Studies have sympathetic to the EU or even open advocates for increasing integration - as though their scholarly investment in Europe called for clearer ascendancy of the whole over constituent nations. Habermas hoped that this identity would grow stronger, and not least, that it would lead Europeans to constitute a stronger EU by ratifying the proposed Basic Law in 2005. But French and Dutch electorates would come to surprise both Habermas and the academic Europeanists by rejecting the Basic Law.

European integration and the Politics of Fear (and Hope)

In 2005, just before the first series of referenda on the proposed European Basic Law, observers noted a perplexing trend: European Jews voting for far-right wing political parties. In Antwerp, for example, at least 65% of those registered as Jews during World War II died during the holocaust yet at least 5% of the Jewish population sixty years later has voted for Vlaams Belang, the xenophobic far right party that focuses on Muslims but was founded by Nazi collaborators (Smith 2005).

Most Belgian – and more generally European - Jews are probably outraged by Vlaams Belang. There may be a long term drift of Jewish voting from more Leftist to Rightist parties, but that isn’t really the issue. The issue has nothing to do with generalizing about Jews, nor simply with Left or Right. It has to do with fear making for strange alliances, since after all the party the surprising 5% of Jews have voted for is not simply Rightist, it is extreme nationalist. It is, in an ironic way, a party of unity—for some--a party that says one particular common bond should trump certain internal differences and at the same time create a wall against “foreign” incursions.

It is no accident that such nationalism could play on anxieties raised simultaneously by Muslim immigration and European integration. But this is not just a Belgian or European phenomenon. Versions of the same thing are happening in many places in the world. People are seeking protective solidarities against a variety of real or perceived threats. They seek different kinds of solidarities: ethnic, nationalist, religious, regional, corporate, and others. In general, none feels adequate and fears remain powerful—which may help turn any of the defensive solidarities into something offensive.

The strange juxtaposition of Jews voting for the descendants of Nazis because they fear Muslims is not merely an ironic reflection of how difficult it is to make sense of the multiple identities by which each of is located in the modern world. It is a challenge to the notion that “thin” identities, those grounded in the common procedures of a constitution or an entirely civic nationalism are ascendant in Europe. The very language of civic nationalism is ironically deployed in articulating what amounts to an ethnic identity. A group of immigrants is described as undesirable because of the “thickness” of its cultural traditions, which resist assimilation, and the undesirable character of some of
its alleged cultural practices. The charges are framed in the language of civic nationalism and Enlightenment. That a not insignificant number of European Jews join in reflects not only how widespread the phenomenon is, but also the power of this rhetorical formation.

This involves a peculiar form of ‘culturalism’ which is widespread in European debates about immigration (Schinkel 2008). Informed, ironically, by modern anthropological relativism, it suggests that the immigrants need to return to their “own cultures” which must follow their own paths of development. This culturalism is paradoxically coupled with claims to universalistic ethics – as what Europeans have and others lack. Indeed, many in the Netherlands implicitly, if paradoxically, claim the heritage of the Enlightenment as a sort of ethnic attribute. Their main insistence is not on race but culture, on having absorbed the Enlightenment into their culture in a way that Muslim immigrants could not or would not. This sort of view is widespread in a range of European countries where a liberal immigration policy has been juxtaposed to a strong sense of national identity – with the result that the grandchildren of immigrants, themselves citizens and often children of citizens, and not recognized as nationals. And it is analogous to Samuel Huntington’s (2004) arguments about the gulf between the democratic-capitalist culture of the United States and the inescapable alienness of Hispanics.

Cosmopolitanism becomes, ironically, the language of rejection of immigrants who are inadequately cosmopolitan. The immigrants are accused of not respecting human rights or other universal values, thus, as well as of not learning the local language.

European struggles over the relationship of cosmopolitanism to belonging reflect a particular history of nationalism and a particular project of transnational integration. They have influenced the development of cosmopolitanism as a core theme in both political theory and global politics. This has sometimes brought problematic assumptions. For example, the 300 years after the Peace of Westphalia are sometimes treated as an era of global order based on national states. The nation-state project was indeed one powerful force between 1648 and the current period. But to call this an era of global order requires some sense of irony, since nation-states engineered such massive violence. It was in the context of these wars, indeed, that the very cosmopolitan idea of humanitarian actions to reduce the suffering wars entailed took root, with the founding of the International Committee for the Red Cross in 1863 and the Geneva Conventions of 1864 as its symbols. But the fact of these wars, and the fact that refugees were hardly greeted with open arms in all instances remind us that Kant’s effort to renew commitments to the ancient idea of political asylum were efforts in theory that did not immediately define practice.

Likewise, the Peace of Westphalia ended Europe’s main religious wars, but ushered in an era of new struggles to define, unify, and strengthen national states. It was not simply an era of actual nation-states, and therefore the present era is hardly simply the end of the era of nation-states. After Westphalia, national projects—and states—benefitted from the international understanding of nations as crucial to the legitimacy of states, but they also confronted challenges including the integration of populations that didn’t necessarily speak a common language let alone share a fully common culture. Most were in fact confessional states – perhaps ironically a long term reason for European secularism and suspicion of religion – but in the short-run part of the pursuit of
national integration (Casanova 1994). European nationalism, moreover, was almost always intimately connected to European imperialism. At its most Republican, revolutionary France never ceased being actively imperial—not when the Revolutionary Assembly confronted the Haitian revolution and not when the Third Republic faced the Algerian drive for independence.

Over decades, the project of European integration has itself become a response to the fact that no European country is a superpower. This encourages cooperation as much as does the threat of war any one of them might pose the others. Europe needs to unite, Europeans are told, in order to compete effectively in global markets. This is made possible, Europeans are told, by a common European civilization. And moreover, Europeans still have a mission civilisatrice to the rest of the world. Not least of all, as Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (2003) argued in their joint letter after the US invasion of Iraq (published simultaneously in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Libération on May 31 2003), Europeans have an opportunity and a responsibility to “balance out the hegemonic unilateralism of the United States”. Europe’s solidarity is not simply intra-European, but also counterposed to the US and the nonWest. And here again, the assertion of cosmopolitanism figures as among other things an answer to perceived excesses of nationalism.

Global projections of US state power are at the same time imperialist, nationalist, and neoliberal. They combine attempts to reshape ostensibly sovereign nation-states, to derive national advantages for the US, and to promote global capitalism. Some US leaders express ambitions to spread democracy – and indeed claim the language of human rights as an object rather than (as often) a criticism of US policy. When hegemonic powers use the language of democracy and popular will it is easy to be cynical. The neoconservative advocates of “democracy promotion” in fact renewed an older US tradition (Guilhot 2005). But promoting democracy by imperial domination is problematic. At the same time, it is important to recognize that a new assertion of imperial power is not simply a return to some “pre-Westphalian” order, as though for 350 years the world has been neatly and peacefully ordered by nation-states. Nationalism and imperialism have been more mutually connected and interdependent than that. And finally, it is important to recognize that cosmopolitanism can be as much the project of neoliberalism as of cultural creativity or human rights, that global citizenship is extremely inegalitarian, and that national and local structures of belonging still matter a great deal (Calhoun 2003a). We need not embrace nationalism uncritically to see that nation-states still provide the contexts of everyday solidarities and most people’s life projects; they still are they primary arenas for democratic public life; and they are focal points for resistance to imperialism.

A key question was whether Europe could begin to play these roles as well – offering its citizens a meaningful sense of shared belonging and capacity to plan an effective international role counterbalancing imperialism. Cosmopolitan democracy seemed not only an attractive possibility but the clear direction of progress, borne ineluctably on the tide of globalization (Held 1995 offered one of the most important statements). But of course tides have a way of turning, and globalization brought resistances as well as embraces. Theories that made cosmopolitanism seem too easy left many cosmopolitan liberals unprepared for new challenges symbolized by September
11th, and more generally for a world in which suspicions and cultural divisions were powerful, in which a struggle over solidarities and identities was by no means consistently “liberal”, and in which a hegemonic global superpower claimed to be cosmopolitan and advance democracy—though hardly without dissent. Even in Europe, the politics of fear flourished.

The proposed “constitution” of 2005 seemed to embody the cosmopolitan ideals of European integration. It fared no better than the dream of a common foreign policy faced with US-led war and struggles against terrorist tactics. Indeed, the so-called constitution illustrated not only a weak point of the European Union but also the weakness of approaches to transnational unity grounded only in formal legal arrangements not social solidarity. It was a document only technocrats could love, and which some technocrats loved partly because it was designed to empower them at the expense of democratic public participation. It was too long to be read, let alone memorized; too complicated to be incorporated in a meaningful way into the collective consciousness of Europeans. It was a manifestation of a process that thought of a constitution as simply a basic law and not as a process of constituting political relations among citizens. That the writing was overseen by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, a quintessential “Énarch” (graduate of France’s super-elite national school of administration), was apt and that he showed no comprehension of the depth of doubt and distrust his document inspired was telling.

Ironically, the debate over the constitution may have been the most meaningful demonstration of a European public sphere yet seen. It involved much more active public debate and discussion though fewer protests in the streets than the opposition to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 which Habermas, Derrida, and others identified as the birth of this public sphere. But the opposition was as strong as it was (and still is) partly because the process of “constituting” Europe had not included the nurturing of a strong pan-European public sphere (Calhoun 2003b; Nash 2007). This contributed to suspicions of the technocratic constitution and indeed fear of the European project itself, at least as currently led.

Moreover, just as the domination of national states and large-scale markets achieved in the 19th century over local communities and other groupings like craft unions or provincial cultures was hardly a one-sided blessing, so too would it be a mistake to think transcending the national is only and entirely a path of progress. Europe, for example, is perhaps less “neoliberal” in policy than the US (though at points Britain and some of the new European countries would rival the US). But it is just as embedded in global capitalism. Who wins and who loses is in every historical recurrence an open question, decided in significant part by how the process plays out—and by struggles over its terms. In such struggles, power is typically lopsided. As Pierre Bourdieu (2002) has suggested, unification usually benefits the dominant.

This was true in the forging of national states, but the process nonetheless created openings for new groups and occasions for struggle to increase democracy and public services. There are similar opportunities in European and indeed global integration. But the advance of democracy is far from a simple or guaranteed byproduct of such integration. It still takes struggle fought with very unequal resources.
In such struggles, seemingly anti-cosmopolitan resistance is often a weapon of those in danger of intensified exploitation by dominant interests; it may shape a better international order and eventually better terms for cosmopolitan transcendence of parts of the nation-state system. But equally, extensions of transnational power and capitalist markets can also inform fears that fuel populist reactions against immigrants. These are fears not merely from the ethnically prejudiced—though they may also be that—but fears as well from citizens who feel that their citizenship buys them less and less protection from global threats and less and less participatory democracy.

European integration and non-Western immigration put enormous pressures on the solidarity and self-understanding of European societies. Much cosmopolitanism speaks only poorly to this predicament. By insisting on the language of liberal universalism as a basis for European integration or global rights, by relying one-sidedly on notions like constitutional patriotism, and by imaging that larger solidarities are always produced by escape from narrower ones, rather than by transformations of these, it loses purchase on reality. In particular, it loses purchase on the possibility of actual historical production of larger and better but still incomplete and imperfect projects of integration.

Crucially, as Claus Offe (2006) has argued, even when discussions of the EU invoke a potential European identity, they seldom offer any suggestion that the completion of European integration would be a process of liberation. Integration may be practically useful. It may strengthen economic competitiveness. It may enable Europeans to act with more effect on the world stage. But it does not seem to offer liberation from either illegitimate government or external domination. In invoking American imperialism, Habermas suggests that (at least “core”) Europeans are being dominated. But this is domination in setting policy towards other parts of the world – not in governing Europe itself. By contrast, nationalism has often captured emotional commitment by its integration with projects that promised liberation – from colonial rule, for example, or from aristocracies at home that abused the people.

The defeat of Europe’s new constitutional treaty in French and Dutch referenda sent the European Union – and the European public sphere – into crisis. Defeat was greeted with shock by many European elites, even though the discontent behind the votes had been brewing for years and been manifestly boiling for months. As the referenda approached, opinion polls sounded the alarm for pro-European intellectuals. Jurgen Habermas (2005) famously wrote to French voters—and in general called on the European Left to vote in favor of the Constitution. “In my view,” he said, “a Left which aims to tame and civilise capitalism with a "No" to the European constitution would be deciding for the wrong side at the wrong time.”

Backing Europe, however, meant in this case backing the “basic law”, described widely as a constitution. Habermas grasped that the document was flawed and that there was widespread impatience with the elites driving European integration. He did not seem to grasp equally how elitist and offensive the document itself was, how perfectly it symbolized the notion that a cosmopolitan Europe would be democratic only in form, not in egalitarian participation. Habermas hoped Europe would be enabled to act with greater agency when bolstered by the legal unity of the constitution. “We can only meet the challenges and risks of a world in upheaval in an offensive way by strengthening
Europe,” he wrote, “not by exploiting the understandable fears of the people in a populist manner.”

A politics of fear was very prominent in the European constitutional referenda. It seized in large part on immigrants and Europeans Muslims. But it also reflected the notion that democratic participation in public affairs was to be diluted precisely at a time when powerful global forces were undermining social benefits which citizens of different countries felt they had gained by centuries of struggle—and when their states were engineering neoliberal reforms rather than protecting important institutions from the leveling effects of either global capitalism or the power of an “American model” and military. Immigrants became readily available and relatively easy to name targets for fears aroused by other sources.

The results are sometimes saddening as well as perplexing -- as in the case of Antwerp Jews who voted for Vlaams Belang. Fear—a widespread basic insecurity—is a central issue, and a challenge to which global cosmopolitanism has not yet faced up. People do not always name the sources of their fears very accurately. They say they are afraid of immigrants when they are most afraid of losing their jobs. They say they are afraid of European integration when they are most afraid that their children will fail to find careers and not be there for them in their old age. Politicians may manipulate their fears by playing on the most visible foci, those easiest for them to articulate. But the pervasiveness of the fear and anxiety are clues that they transcend these causes. They come from global neoliberal capitalism and its destruction of stable economic institutions. They come from new technologies that change social relations, even inside families, and thereby fundamental human relations to the world. They come from aging—both individually and in whole generations—with its attendant worries over sickness and death and in the meantime where to find care and money a safe place to live. They come from natural disasters like tsunamis and from such not completely natural disasters as the AIDS pandemic or avoidable famines and such humanly wrought disasters as civil wars and genocides, terrorism and counterterrorist projects that seem only to breed more terrorism. And the fears and anxieties are magnified by the media because they produce audiences as well as political extremists.

There are many and realistic reasons for fear and anxiety—indeed, there are enough that we should be impressed that we are not afraid all the time. We take public transport despite terrorist attacks. We approach most strangers with an optimism that we will find good ways to get along and maybe find pleasure in our very differences. We have children—despite the world they will face. But we are able to do these things precisely because we do not face the frightening and anxiety-provoking world alone. Ironically, the liberal individualist underpinnings of much cosmopolitan thought suggest in essence that we should. That is, they suggest that we start from individual moral subjects abstracted out of particular social relations and cultural traditions and ask what obligations they owe to each other. This is a mistake, for the antidotes to insecurity and the capacity for democracy alike lie not simply in individual reason but in social solidarity. This starts at the very personal and the very local, but matters also for communities, cities, and nations. An integrating Europe needs to be experienced as providing, not removing, such webs of solidarity.
Conclusion

Europe has always mattered beyond Europe. It was a curious and sometimes threatening northern frontier to the Roman Empire. It was a collection of alluring, frustrating, and exploitative metropoles to Europe’s colonial dominions. It was the central focus of world wars that brought death and destruction to every continent. It was the site from which the idea and ideal and ideology of The West were carried to a range of Easts from Russia to India to the “Middle East” and the Far East (both comprehensibly named only in relation to Europe). It was the birthplace of capitalism. And it is now the world’s most interesting experiment in transnational integration.

So too, European studies – as a loose collection of inquiries and as a more or less organized field of study -- have important roots in views of Europe from off the continent. They are also the product transnational institutions and connections that predated nationalism. European studies have long been and still are important parts of the making of Europe. This means both imagining culture and society at the level of the continent, and using scholarly and research-based knowledge of Europe as a basis for practical policy.

European history and contemporary European affairs are shaped by both cosmopolitanism and nationalism – at the same times, not just serially. Europe is indeed one of the best natural laboratories for studying cosmopolitanism – whether by this one means an elite style, and ethnical universalism, or an engagement with difference. Such studies reveal tensions among these versions of cosmopolitanism, and between each and nationalism (as well as religious and other commitments or structures of belonging).

European studies is likely to thrive because these challenges make Europe interesting – not because it is obvious what Europe means as a historical category, how integrated it is today, or what it will be in the future.

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