

Transition in Social Foundations for Collective Action

**Communities in the
Southeast Lancashire Textile Region
in the 1820s and 1830s**

CRAIG CALHOUN

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

During the 1820s and early 1830s, two largely different populations of working people lived alongside each other in the region surrounding Manchester. Today, they represent, in an important and clear contrast, the social foundations which have supported distinctive directions of popular protest and collective action. The theory of working-class radicalism, as developed by Marx and others, has tended to confound the two. The necessary radicalism and fundamental opposition to the growth of capitalist industry of more traditional communities of craft workers was wedded to the concentrated numbers of new industrial workers and the clarity of their exploitation by capitalists. This marriage took place in theory, but not in concrete social movements. The working class emerged as a foundation for basically reformist collective actions, while the radical and reactionary populist craftsmen lost the war of the industrial revolution.

My task in this article will be largely to establish the disparate existence of these groups in the Lancashire textile region during

Author's Note: *An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Social Science History Association, Columbus, Ohio, on 3 November 1978. I am grateful to Michael Hannagan, Craig Jenkins, Edward Kain, Peter Mathias, Clyde Mitchell, William Sewell, David Snyder, and Charles Stephenson for their comments.*

the 1820s and 1830s and, briefly, to explore the implications which differences in community membership and organization held for collective action. I shall offer a sustained criticism of the argument that workers' protests were the result of a "disturbance" to an established normative order which caused some form of social regression. In the course of proposing an analysis based on the strength of social foundations for collective action, I shall suggest the relative neglect of this consideration by Marxist theory and research.

Much previous analysis has treated the 1820s as a lull in an essentially continuous process of development of the working class. This is the position, for example, of E. P. Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class*: Jacobinism led directly into the resistance movements of the early Napoleonic War years; the foundations laid by Jacobinism and mated with traditional notions of the moral economy provided the basis for the rebirth of radicalism in Luddism and the Parliamentary Reform agitation of the 1810s; by the conclusion of this decade, the working class was "essentially made"; organization proceeded apace on the ground through the 1820s; and England nearly had a revolution during the early Chartist period in the reaction against the limited reforms of 1832 and the resistance to the poor law of 1834 (Thompson, 1968: 781-782). The most common alternative position, widespread before the appearance of Thompson's book, was to regard the earlier movements as rather backward and primitive and to trace the rise of the working class and of British popular radicalism from the Chartist period (Cole, 1932; Webb and Webb, 1920; Cole and Postgate, 1942).

Both positions are wrong. While the latter accurately appreciates the difference between the movements of the 1810s and the 1830s, it inaccurately dismisses the earlier as backward-looking and therefore less radical, as less formally organized and therefore weaker. Such a view is based neither on the evidence nor on the sound use of social theory. In fact, the backward-looking, less formally organized movements of the 1810s were in many ways more radical than the later mobilizations of

the working class at a more "advanced stage of development." Thompson's work performs the very substantial service of pointing out the richness and strength of the earlier popular activity, but by assimilating it, however erratically, to the model of working-class development, obscures both its historical nature and its theoretical significance.

A variety of studies have suggested the importance of the social organization underlying social movements. In general, they have been reactions to the long-enduring elite view of popular action as a result of collective delusions, with these in turn the results of social disorganization in mass society.¹ They have also pointed out the limitations of a view of collective action as simply the aggregate of entirely rational individual choices.² Most of these studies, however, have focused on the formal organization of specific "conflict groups," that is, relatively well-defined collectivities mobilized for a specific purpose. The importance of community has received considerably less emphasis (with the exceptions of Oberschall, 1973; Tilly, 1978; Wolf, 1969). I suggest that social bonds which predate specific "causes" are of critical importance in providing social strength for long-term, risky, and concerted collective action.

The "disturbance" theories best account for unorganized mobs, millennial movements, and ecstatic religious gatherings; applied to early nineteenth-century England, they say rather more about Johanna Southcott and even Methodism than they do about either early or late radical political action. The rationalistic theories best account for fairly stably organized, relatively low-intensity alliances pursuing clearly defined objectives. They provide better explanations for trade union activity (and, indeed, many mobilizations on a wider front during the Chartist era) than they do for the earlier, more community-based agitations of Luddites and followers of Cobbett and Hunt.

Both sides of the main theoretical debate thus work poorly to account for what I have called the populist movements of the 1810s. This is largely because they neglect the social foundations of collective action. Increasing evidence from com-

parative research suggests that communal foundations such as those on which the movements of the 1810s rested dictated neither an aberrant, nor in any simple and dismissive sense a backward, movement. Wolf (1969), for example, has emphasized the dependence of peasant movements on high prior communal organization. Studies (Soboul, 1958; Rudé, 1959; Tilly, 1964) of the French Revolution have shown the coherence of crowd action and its dependence on preexisting communal bonds.

It would appear that the early generalizations which linked the dissociating tendencies of capitalist industrialization to popular radicalism and revolutionary potential were faulty. While threats to and pressures on communal organization have certainly been important motivations for collective action, it has been the enduring strength of traditional communities which has lent concertedness to the resulting social movements. Further, the fact that a cluster of nondiscrete values—family, craft, neighborhood—was generally being defended by the “reactionary radicals” made it especially likely that their movements would be radical, as economically ameliorative reform would not speak fully to their grievances. This leads to some specification of why revolutions have occurred, not in the advanced industrial societies, but in societies still largely traditional in organization but confronting the pressures of industrialization or the intervention of industrial powers. Communities have had both the social strength and the need for revolution; the modern working class usually has, at the most, the rational interest.

Oberschall (1973) has emphasized that social movements organized for conflict seldom are composed of people weakly linked to each other, as the “mass society” theorists would have it. In this regard, he distinguishes communal from associational links. Strength of either kind of internal association, as well as strength of connections between the conflict group and the larger society, predisposes a population to mobilize. Oberschall thus adds a very important, specifically social dimension to the resource mobilization model of collective action. The analysis of this article extends this distinction with a contrast of com-

munity and class foundations for collective action. The earlier, more communally based movements provide in most ways the closer analog to revolutionary mobilizations. The later, more associationally based movements better deserve the label "class actions," but were essentially reformist in orientation and in structural predisposition. A variety of considerable gains were available to them from gradual reform—which was not so for the Luddites, for example.

An important aspect of the problematic theory of class action is its emphasis on variables of consciousness, particularly on clearly defined and systematically radical goals. As I have argued elsewhere (Calhoun, forthcoming), such an emphasis on what people think obscures the social foundations which enable people to act. One effect of this is to deny the political importance, and frequently the true radicalism, of movements with much less focused, well-articulated, and systematic ideologies (see Piven and Cloward, 1977: 4-5, for related discussion). My contention is not just that important radical movements are left out of this analysis, but that those class movements left in are not likely to be radical. This is largely because those people and organizations with sufficient investments in the existing industrial order to favor them are precisely those people who do not need wage revolution but can gain from more gradual, less radical, ameliorative reform.

The working class, in this analysis, is particularly apt to be a collective actor only through the agency of formal organizations. That is, the working class as such does not constitute a collective actor directly, but only through the mediation of representatives of such organizations. Large and relatively noncommunal populations are especially likely to require some form of coercion to ensure participation in the pursuit of collective goals. Communities are more able to apply informal selective inducements directly through social relations. Accordingly, informal collective action becomes easier as populations are organized into intermediate associations and integrated through dense and multiplex interpersonal networks. These requirements are more likely to be met when workplaces are smaller, population aggregates more

stable, and community patterns in general better established (for implications of size on social bonds, see Blau, 1977).

Community has the considerable advantage of offering a social foundation for concerted collective action without requiring formal organization and the creation of a new set of statuses with new interests. Communities may act with only a limited degree of conscious decision; more elaborate, and especially non-traditional, decisions tend to require some formal mechanisms for both decision-making and practical application. But communities may act in defense of certain traditional values with considerable focus and in remarkable harmony without new formal organization. This so amazed public officials in the early nineteenth century that they invented, together with their informants, elaborate fictitious formal organizations and even systems of pseudo-military rank. What is important about a movement like Luddism is that it needed few leaders, and those only minimally.

Generally speaking, modern industrial working classes have lacked the social foundation for such direct collective action and have instead had to depend on formal organizations to represent their interests.³ This divergence appears, when one looks at the working people of Lancashire, as a shift initially focused on the 1820s and apparent in the fragmentation of the Chartist period.

Attention to these problems on the part of academic sociologists has been weakened by an unfortunate split between "rationalist" and "normative" views, neither of which has dealt well with the social foundations for collective action.

The rationalist perspective holds collective action to be explicable in terms of individual interests and strategies, an economic calculus of self-interest. I suggest, in contrast, that selection among the wide range of objective individual interests is largely socially determined, both through socialization and especially through the constraints on and resources for collective and individual action provided by social structures. The rationalist perspective offers insufficient explanation for the variety

of collective actions people take, and in particular for the changing patterns of collective action taken in early nineteenth-century England. It was not the interests of individual workers but of communities of workers which provided the basis for the movements of the 1810s. Workers were knit together in dense networks of multiplex bonds; their relations with each other were fairly stable and carried long-term obligations (Calhoun, 1980).

The community basis similarly explains why the apparently class-based movement could so rapidly turn to the obviously traditionalist agitation in favor of Queen Caroline.⁴ The national ideology was rudimentary and essentially populist. With some shift in the economy and in the localities most involved, the tone of the protest could be transformed. To whatever extent local communities were truly radical—or even revolutionary—during the 1810s, the economic calculus of rational individualism fails to account for it. The mobilizations of the 1830s and after are a different matter. To a much greater degree, they reveal the sort of limited, reformist collective action which we would expect from formal organizations acting on behalf of relatively free individuals with a range of options, rather than from communities.

The normative perspective sees in collective action mere behavior disturbance. Such disturbances are held to result from the failure of mechanisms of social control—the shaping and channeling constraints of integration into a social order. This view is problematic in its assumption of a smoothly functioning social order and its neglect of internal conflict and/or contradictions. Given the somewhat narrower focus of the present argument, the notion of collective behavior as “disturbance” fails to appreciate the social strengths necessary to engage in collective action, especially with any degree of concertedness. It is difficult, drawing on the normative perspective, to explain the discontinuity of the movements of the 1810s and 1830s. This discontinuity was the result of changes in social strengths of certain key populations, on the one hand, and the divergent possibilities each had for ameliorative reform on the other.

Some normative analysts, such as Smelser, adopt a functionalism which focuses so much on the needs and operation of the postulated "whole society" that it neglects the possibly—and in the present case, frequently—divergent needs and values of local communities. Social organization is not as monolithic as the functionalists have assumed. Where communities, as I have defined them, exist, they are by definition at least partially autonomous organizations and thus capable of autonomous activity, requiring specific analysis. In this orientation, functionalism is similar to the Marxian position which held that the proletariat would somehow grow to meet the historical needs of the overall system—a view formulated with inadequate attention to the foundations on which the collective action of the proletariat was to be based.

Different sorts of communities are apt to be involved in different agitations, and involved in these agitations to different degrees. This is partly because of the different strengths of social and material resources which they can bring to the support of their action, partly because of the different trades which give their members economic interests, and partly because of the different social values which give their members moral interests in one or another kind of agitation. The "resource mobilization" perspective of sociological analysis has focused on propensity to engage in collective action. It has been especially concerned with material resources.

I shall examine the broader set of factors in my analysis, and will challenge the normative view of collective action during the industrial revolution, especially as put forward by Smelser. This view holds, essentially, that the activity of the 1830s was the result of a disruption in the established constraining organization of the family during the 1820s. I shall argue that two different populations of workers were involved, one—the domestic workers—losing its position of strength on which to base collective action.

Industrial development and concomitant urbanization brought a variety of pressures to bear on the traditional communities of

Lancashire. These were concentrated for the most part in a semi-circle from the northwest of Manchester up through the lower Pennines and down to the southeast where the Manchester region extended into Cheshire. This was essentially the area in which water power was readily available during the early years of the industrial revolution. In this region growth was fairly evenly divided between the larger towns and outlying areas. Ashton, Bolton, Manchester, and Oldham grew more rapidly than did Lancashire as a whole; Rochdale's growth approximated Lancashire's decennial growth rate of a little above or below 25%; and Stockport grew more slowly during the first 30 years of the nineteenth century. Unlike the overwhelmingly urban-led growth of the rest of Lancashire and other parts of England, the Manchester region did not see the major towns grow much faster than the surrounding areas in this period.

Despite the relatively consistent pattern of growth in Lancashire, it must be remembered that this was a very rapid growth, and subject to some fluctuations in specific content. For example, the proportion of female residents in the industrial towns rose rapidly between the census years of 1801 and 1811, and fell off even more rapidly thereafter, as is seen in Figure 1. The ratio of women to men working in factories appears to have risen continuously through the early nineteenth century (Mitchell and Deane, 1962: 188).

The fluctuation in the proportion of male residents seems likely, then, to be due to other factors. In particular, the availability of nonfactory work was important, and the relatively low proportion of men in the early years is indicative of the fact that factories only began to dominate the labor force after the post-Napoleonic recession ended. The year 1811 came during a period of low textile production; this was one of the causes of Luddism. Men were more likely than women to be employed in casual labor and they were much more likely than women to leave town and seek work in the countryside, for example in harvesting.⁵ Lancashire's growth owed a great deal more to migration than did that of other counties, including such partially industrialized ones as the West Riding of Yorkshire (Deane and




Figure 1 Ratio of Female to Male Occupants

Cole, 1969: 113).⁶ As this migration was of recent date, people were apt still to have some ties to the areas they had left.⁷

A further possibility is that young single women were sent in disproportionate numbers during the distress of the early 1810s to live with relatives, or in boarding houses, in the towns, with

the hope of finding work in the factories.⁸ Manufacturers also advertised on occasion for "healthy strong girls" and "families chiefly consisting of girls" (Pinchbeck, 1930: 185).⁹ It seems unlikely, however, that factors such as the last could account for the specific fluctuation as opposed to the overall trend.¹⁰ After 1821, the proportion of persons of each sex in the towns remained quite consistent, despite the continued increase in the proportion of female factory workers; indeed, the disparity decreased slightly in the long run.

The demographic changes noted may have been due to the partially counterposed operation of two distinct pressures, acting on at least partially distinct populations. The availability of jobs in factories, combined with a surplus of male agricultural labor in rural districts, may have led to a relatively high rate of female immigration, especially in Bolton and Manchester. Conversely, the pressures on domestic craft work may have led many weavers to seek work elsewhere, thus resulting in some male outmigration. If this account is correct, it explains why Stockport, with a low rate of population increase, should show a high imbalance between the sexes.

Stockport had the highest proportion of weavers in its population of the towns for which we have clear data, as shown in Tables 1 and 2. Bolton and Manchester had low proportions of weavers but greater excesses of women and children over adult men. In such cases, we may tentatively conclude that the lure of the factories more than compensated for the loss of such domestic workers as those cities had. In Oldham one finds a rapidly growing population but little imbalance between the sexes. This may be an early manifestation of the strength of the community of workers there, which was able to protect the position of men in the workforce. Either alternatively or additionally, that strength may be due to the fact that Oldham specialized in the relatively finer and more skilled end of the textile industry, while Bolton workers did a greater proportion of cruder work.¹¹

These considerations indicate some instabilities in the underlying structure of much urban community life, at least one of

which—sexual imbalance—abated during and after the 1810s. If factory-oriented communities had the chance to grow stronger after the 1810s, the opposite was true of communities of out-workers, especially weavers. As we shall see, the late 1820s and early 1830s were precisely the periods during which these communities were torn apart.

Smelser, in holding the collective action of workers to be an implicitly irrational response to “disturbances” in family patterns, argues that it was not until the decade of the 1820s that family life was greatly altered, resulting in the agitations of the 1830s. Drawing on scattered evidence that adult male spinners retained their “moral authority” in the factory, often hired their own assistants, worked with other family members, and were part of a web of kinship controls of abuse of child workers, he suggests (1959: 193) that we must

question some accepted views of urban-factory life. Almost as a matter of definition we associate the factory system with a decline of the family and the onset of social anonymity. Certainly the steam powered mule created a new type of factory system. By virtue of an intricate set of controls based on kinship and community ties, and by virtue of the continuing authority of the spinner, however, the potential anonymity of factory life was far from being complete in 1820, even though the factory system had been prospering for four decades.¹²

The period from the 1790s to the 1820s is, for Smelser, something called a “transitional equilibrium.” The apparent meaning of this odd term is that there were changes, but they did not upset things too much. In other words, the basic structure of the family survived intact, but there were a number of shifts in the specific content of family members’ roles. In the period from the mid-1820s to the 1840s, the families of workers moved to a new level of differentiation. By this it is meant that the families became more complex structures, with each member’s role less closely and immediately connected to those of the others, even though the whole is still assumed to constitute a social system and thus to be interdependent. The traditional functions of the

family are treated largely in terms of authority and training. Curiously, both are assumed without discussion to be almost entirely male preserves. But as has been observed by Edwards and Lloyd-Jones (1973: 312-313):

In terms of a textile family entering a factory, the loss of the female training function, and the gain of a new adult male training function, altered dramatically the industrial training roles of adult males and females.¹³

Smelser's assertion that considerable disruption in the division of labor within factory families took place in the 20-year period after 1825 seems hard to credit. There simply is very little evidence that there was substantial employment of whole families (or even substantial parts of families) as cohesive work units in the early mills. Only fairly young children were employed as piecers (assistants to the spinners), so that few adult spinners would have been able to employ their own children consistently. Foster (1974: 302-303) noted this dubious concept, and Anderson (1976: 325) summarized the skepticism:

If there was a trend away from family employment on the shop floor over the first third of the nineteenth century it cannot have been very great, because such employment was at no time particularly widespread.

Smelser's analysis (1968: 83-86) is one of stages: increasing pressure on the family division of labor was initially held in check by "corrective mechanisms," but the pressure would eventually force a new structural adjustment. The pressures came from certain technological advances in textile production resulting in larger factories and more individualistic employment (and presumably, though less explicitly, production) practices. The corrective mechanism was family employment. In the 1820s that mechanism was weakened by new technology; the result, according to Smelser, was that factory workers entered Chartism, factory agitation, and trade unions, and manifested a variety of other "disturbances." The structure of the argument is implicitly

one of temporal conjuncture; Smelser gives no direct evidence of a connection between family structure and the protest and agitation undertaken by factory workers (see Anderson, 1976: 327).

In the first place, the factory agitation was about many things, from wages to the possibility of technological unemployment to the material conditions and hours of work. Child labor was only one aspect, and was only partially connected to traditional notions of family division of labor (some general values concerning abuse of children were also important). Nonetheless, it is possible that a threat to traditional family structure by industrial change was involved. There are two links which need to be empirically verified in such a proposition. First, it needs to be established that there was in fact a strong precondition of family employment which the new technology disrupted. Anderson (1976) and Edwards and Lloyd-Jones (1973) argue convincingly against this. The second part of the proposition calls for a specification of the characteristics of industrial change held to be disruptive and an attempt to establish whether they are systematically tied to mobilization for protest (disturbance).

I shall argue that in comparing the changes Smelser emphasizes (e.g., increasing factory size) among towns in the Manchester region, one finds wide diversity, and if there is any systematic variation, the greatest mobilization of workers occurred where Smelser's conditions obtained least. Smelser does not engage in comparative analysis at any point. He does offer a rather abstracted contrast between "the new factory proletariat" and the "surviving domestic workers." He argues (1959: 85) that prior to the 1820s

the quiescence of the factory operatives is traceable to the persistence of certain fundamental family relations in the factory setting. In many ways their lot was hard and their adjustments many; but these family traditions were being preserved. The pressures on the surviving domestic workers, by contrast, were to abandon a total traditional way of life.

The surviving domestic workers whom Smelser has in mind are primarily handloom weavers. There are several problems in his characterization of them and, generally, with his statement of contrast: (1) It is questionable to what extent handloom weavers represented a wholly traditional craft, because their prosperity was of relatively recent date; it was, for the most part, a transitional product of industrialization (Bythell, 1969: 40). As handloom weavers increased in number by nearly a third (from 184,000 to 240,000) in the fifteen years before 1820s, weaving was not a "total traditional way of life" for those who were just entering the trade (Mitchell and Deane, 1962: 187); (2) it was weavers, not factory workers, who were most able to maintain the domestic family division of labor, although at the expense of rather extreme physical demands on the family members (Hammond and Hammond, 1967; Thompson, 1968); (3) recruits to factory work were seldom ex-weavers, but rather were frequently ex-agricultural laborers and farm servants—populations which had already experienced a good deal of "differentiation" within the family unit, perhaps indeed more than was the case in cotton towns;¹⁴ (4) the clearest distinction between factory workers and handloom weavers did not lie in their respective family relations but in their relative prosperity. It seems plausible that this might be considered a source of differential rates of mobilization for protest; and (5) factory workers generally experienced economic crises as individuals or families during the early years of industrialization. Particular factories failed with astonishing frequency, but there were only a few major industry-wide crises. Handloom weavers, on the other hand, experienced privations as communities. The miseries which affected any of them affected all of them. They were also apt to live in smaller, and, we may safely assume, more densely knit units of population (Calhoun, forthcoming).

Smelser is right to suggest that domestic workers were under threat of losing their entire way of life, while factory workers were not. Whatever the fluctuations of real wages, working conditions, and rate of employment for factory workers, these

were relatively continuous. They made the workers' situation better or worse but did not threaten them with collective eradication. This only serves further to point out the comparative irrelevance of the family structure which Smelser makes his primary variable. Instead, it was first the extreme of suffering the weavers experienced, and then the absence of any plausible mediate or local solution to their problems, which predisposed them to radicalism. Factory workers, on the other hand, could reasonably be reformist. One might ask why they were not more widely active in reform agitation earlier. Essentially, the answer is that they had not developed the strength of communal and formal organization which would enable them to be so. The migrants into factory towns, far from being quiescent because they preserved a traditional family structure, were quiet because they had very little communal organization on which to base extensive collective action. These migrants did not often or readily fit into a preexisting structure, and so had to build a new sense of community. Those towns which were most active in the early phases of protest (pre-1820) were those with the greatest strength of communal bonds, the most differentiated industry, and the smallest factories.

Edwards and Lloyd-Jones (1973: 314-315) have noted, from an analysis of data for Preston in 1816, that although children working as assistants were unlikely to be employed by their relatives anywhere, they were more often so employed in the district around Preston than in the town itself (11.6% in Preston, 24.5% in the district). It would appear that Smelser's "corrective mechanism" was tied to other characteristics of the community.¹⁵ If the same disproportion obtained in the Manchester district, it would interestingly supplement the evidence presented in Figure 1 on fluctuations and variations in proportions of female residents and in Table 1 on factory workforce characteristics. The census sources indicate that smaller towns and villages had closer ratios of men to women and did not comparably experience the leap of 1811. The disproportionate representation of women in the population is greatest in Manchester and least in the smaller outlying districts, towns, and villages. This suggests that "tradi-

tional family structure" obtained least in the areas Smelser considers most advanced in the development of the factory system.

It is true that two of the great leaps in the rate of factory construction in 1823-1825 and 1832-1834 coincide approximately with the dramatic acceleration Smelser (1959: 194-195) finds in the pressures of industrialization on family structure. He places considerable stress on the concentration of mills in towns, their increasing size, and "the general lack of intimacy associated with increasing scale." These factors are no doubt important, but the conclusions Smelser bases on them are surprising. He treats these changes (and the technological developments with which they were associated) entirely in terms of

a "dissatisfaction" for the operatives' family economy in the sense that family members were no longer able to offer labour to the industry on the new terms and at the same time maintain the traditional organization of family life.

His universal interpolation of "family structure and values" as a key variable in every explanatory chain seems empirically to be quite arbitrary, following only from his general theory. It would make more sense to point out that the rapid growth of factories and the generally good commercial situation for the textile industry gave the factory operatives a stronger bargaining position than they had had for years. Although the power-loom threatened changes in the organization of factory work,¹⁶ it was primarily a threat to the livelihood of handloom weavers. Its improvements in fact rendered the position of the factory worker more secure by limiting the extent to which his bargaining position could be undercut by his employer's recourse to handloom work. It was in these years that the number of handloom weavers began to decline for the first time.

By treating all of the workers' responses to changes in the conditions under which they lived and worked as disturbances to the smooth evolutionary development of industrial society, Smelser renders them uninterpretable.¹⁷ He is unable, for ex-

ample, to see the shift in orientation of workers' movements from the campaigns based essentially on resistance of the 1810s to the agitation for industrial reform of the 1830s. This shift is easily understood when one notes the changing population which was involved in the two efforts. Chartism's diverse collection of political claims and relations to industrial issues falls into clearer focus when looked at from the very different perspectives of artisans and outworkers on the one hand and factory workers on the other. The latter fought for gains internal to the growing factory system. The defense of a way of life was critical to artisans and outworkers; it was never so in equal degree to factory workers.

The increasing scale and impersonality of factories may well have given workers something to complain about more justly during the latter years of the industrial revolution, but the workers were never short of just complaints. A more important consideration is how factory size and impersonality may have affected which claims they put forward against the prevailing systems of political and economic power. The factory workers were in a stronger position than were the outworkers to make internal claims—to demand wage increases or shorter hours, for example. They attempted collective action from a relatively weak communal base, however. This was part of the impact of the increasing scale and impersonality of factories and the mobility of the workforce. Collective action could seldom be for these urban factory workers what it had been for artisans and outworkers—a direct extension of community.¹⁸

This article contains only a very limited amount of comparative evidence on industrial organization during the industrial revolution. Although it is insufficient foundation for the erection of any grand analytic edifice, its tendencies are nonetheless clear, as shown in Tables 1 and 2. The four towns examined divide into two pairs (Oldham and Stockport; Bolton and Manchester) with regard to factory size. Stockport and Oldham have the most even balance between weaving and spinning in factories. Oldham and Stockport would appear to offer

Table 1 Factory Labor Force in 1833

	Bolton*	Manchester	Oldham	Stockport*
Factories in Sample	12 (9)	58	22	19 (17)
Spinners	5,010	12,105	2,409	2,659
Weavers	351	3,057	1,261	3,507
Mechanics, etc.	108	518	97	126
Total	5,469	15,678	3,775	6,292
Mean Number of Employees	455.75 (607.6)	412.58	171.59	331.16 (370.12)
Average Weekly Earnings (pence)	111.50	122.64	127.09	132.02
Adult Males	1,443	4,421	1,318	2,314
Adult Females	1,279	5,731	824	2,176
Ratio F:M	0.89:1	1.30:1	0.63:1	0.94:1
Male Children	1,425	3,801	815	1,556
Female Children	1,322	3,437	820	1,446
Ratio F:M	0.93:1	0.90:1	1.01:1	0.93:1
Ratio Child:Adult	1.01:1	0.71:1	0.76:1	0.67:1
Combined Ratio Female:Male	1.10:1	1.12:1	0.77:1	0.94:1
Ratio all Others to Adult Males	2.79:1	2.93:1	1.86:1	2.24:1

Source: Stanway's Survey of 151 mills, May and June 1833, reported in Ure (1861: I, 390-407).

*Figures in parentheses indicate result if factories owned by one firm are counted as one.

the highest wages (in 1833), followed by Manchester, with Bolton significantly lower. The proportion of men in the workforce was greatest in Oldham, least in Manchester.

Oldham and Stockport come out consistently at one end of the spectrum. Oldham and Stockport were also the towns in which pre-Chartist radicalism was perhaps the strongest. Although

quantitative evidence for membership in these early radical movements and qualitative evidence concerning their organization is extremely scarce, the trend seems clear. The more "proletarian" towns such as Bolton and Ashton produced none of the major

Table 2 Size of Factory Workforce in 1841

<u>Working Full Time</u>				
<u>Fine Spinning</u>				
	mills	capacity workforce	workforce at inspection	mean size of factory (capacity)
Ashton	14	1,555	1,555	111.07
Bolton	13	2,007	1,921	154.38
Manchester	20	7,126	6,877	356.30
Oldham	10	635	635	63.50
Rochdale	0	--	--	--
Stockport	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<u>Coarse Spinning</u>				
	mills	capacity workforce	workforce at time of visit	mean size of factory (capacity)
Ashton	36	4,662	4,526	129.50
Bolton	16	2,564	1,906	160.25
Manchester	29	6,767	6,290	233.34
Oldham	65	4,887	4,492	75.18
Rochdale	52	5,137	4,890	98.79
Stockport	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<u>Spinning and Power Weaving Combined</u>				
	mills	capacity workforce	workforce at time of visit	mean size of factory (capacity)
Ashton	13	6,783	6,522	521.77
Bolton	12	3,660	3,581	305.00
Manchester	35	14,833	13,843	423.80
Oldham	32	7,137	7,061	223.03
Rockdale	17	3,073	2,644	180.76
Stockport	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Table 2 (Continued)

<u>Power Weaving</u>				
	mills	capacity workforce	workforce at time of visit	mean size of factory (capacity)
Ashton	5	390	310	78.00
Bolton	0	--	--	--
Manchester	15	1,461	1,393	97.40
Oldham	6	406	406	67.60
Rochdale	0	--	--	--
Stockport			n.a.	
<u>Doubling Yarn</u>				
	mills	capacity workforce	workforce at time of visit	mean size of factory (capacity)
Manchester	6	302	297	50.33
Oldham	21	230	220	10.95
<u>Working Short Time (all)</u>				
	mills	capacity workforce	workforce at time of visit	mean size of factory (capacity)
Ashton	25	10,505	9,533	420.20
Bolton	14	4,657	4,557	332.64
Manchester	10	1,900	1,614	190.00
Oldham	20	2,273	2,271	113.65
Rochdale	8	682	550	85.25
Stockport			n.a.	
<u>Not at Work (all)</u>				
	mills	capacity workforce	mean size of factory (capacity)	
Ashton	9	899	99.80	
Bolton	6	1,710	285.00	
Manchester	43	5,713	132.86	
Oldham	23	1,936	84.17	
Rochdale*	13	1,157	89.00	

Source: Great Britain Parliamentary Papers (1842).

*includes Middleton

pre-1821 radical leaders. All of the towns, of course, were active by the standards of the country as a whole.

Comparison is made especially difficult by the fact that Stockport and Bolton each had an unusually zealous local magistrate taking an interest in supplying the Home Office with evidence concerning radical activities. But Stockport and Oldham did produce important radical leaders as well as followers. They were also the scenes of important popular meetings, notably the Sandy Brow meeting which preceded Peterloo and demonstrations surrounding the inquest on the body of John Lees afterward. Such activity as appeared during the first quarter of the century in Bolton and Ashton was heavily focused on trade unionism. But in fact the most unionized workers—machine spinners—were also conspicuously absent from the radical leadership. When Bolton figured as the scene of significant protest, it was almost always focused on the town's and the surrounding area's weaving population, not on its factory workers.¹⁹

Small factory size could be taken as an important resource for collective action, as it is conducive to the formation of community and hence to collective action. Wages are certainly to be valued in themselves, but they are also a resource making a variety of (both collective and private) actions possible. The proportion of adult men in factories again seems most likely to be a condition predisposing the population to organization for collective action. It was also, however, likely to have been a result of that action, for men fought sustained struggles to keep women and children from threatening their employment (Smelser, 1959: 232, 299).²⁰ As Table 1 reveals, Bolton and Manchester tend overall to differ from Oldham and Stockport on these mentioned dimensions. While it would be a mistake to treat these figures as especially reliable, the trend which they reveal would seem to be clear. The factory workforces of the towns known to have been disproportionately the home of collectively active workers were generally older, more male, better paid, more evenly divided between weaving and spinning, and employed by smaller factories than those of the less active towns. Table 2 reinforces the general findings on factory size, and indicates that they still

obtained in 1841, more or less independently of the branch of the cotton industry in which any factory functioned.

All of these characteristics seem to have been potentially contributing factors to the collective organization of the towns. In particular, the difference in factory size supports our contention that relatively large populations were likely to be mobilized only on the basis of smaller component groupings, if at all. While Marx had held, and was implicitly followed by most other writers in holding, that the large urban workplaces ought to be central to the collective mobilization of workers, it would appear that the opposite was the case. Had the large factories been subdivided into smaller workgroups, this might have reversed the effect, but adults were generally isolated, working together with only child assistants and youths on relatively large and noisy machines. British industry did not begin to match the division of labor among workplaces with division of labor within workplaces until after 1830, and even then the process proceeded rather slowly (Pollard, 1965; Hartwell, 1970; Hunt, 1936; Landes, 1969; Payne, 1967).²¹

Research on work organizations has found that structural differentiation generally increases with size, but internal differentiation promotes relations mostly among members of different subunits in small organizations (Blau and Schoenherr, 1971: 297-329; Blau, 1977: 203-208). Size and differentiation have opposite implications for the social relations among a population of workers, and therefore affects their capability (and propensity) to engage in collective action. With differentiation held constant, increasing size tends to inhibit successful organization (as, for example, it is likely to lower the density and multiplexity of social relations among the workforce). With size held constant, increasing differentiation makes it more likely that the members of any one group will have social relations with the members of other groups. Further, the subgroups of the larger population are potential foci for the formation of dense and multiplex social networks.²²

The same line of reasoning may be applied to towns and other population aggregates as well as to work organizations. It is thus significant that Bolton and Manchester appear (on the basis

of the limited evidence of Tables 1 and 2) to divide their working populations into fewer subunits of employment. That is, the same places which have the largest factories obviously have proportionately the fewest factories. On simple numerical logic, the propensity toward interrelationships among separate workforces goes down as the number of such workforces goes down and their size goes up (total population held constant).

It becomes all the more clear, following such considerations, why the activity of the emergent population of factory workers (the template for many conceptions of the working class) could only mobilize for collective action through the agency and mediation of formal organizations. In general, the capacity of workers to mobilize for collective action is positively associated with the structuration of tasks so that work is performed by groups rather than individuals, with relatively small and numerous places of work, with subdivision within larger places of work, and with smaller total population units (assuming in each case the other factors to be held constant). For a number of these reasons, this suggests that artisans, outworkers, skilled factory workers, workers in small factories, and workers in towns with a large number of relatively small factories are all more likely to engage in collective action than are those low-skilled workers in large, metropolitan factories who figure so prominently in the vision of the proletariat willed us by Karl Marx.²³

For the most part I have been focusing on factory workers in this discussion. Factory workers only began to assume a significant role in workers' struggles during the 1810s, and did not fully come into their own until the 1830s. The key question is just how that transition was made. That is, if the initial (pre-1820) thrust of the British workers' movement came disproportionately from artisans, craftsmen, and outworkers, what happened to the movement as the balance of the working population shifted; where was it most able to continue, and why?

The early strength of workers' protest was built on the foundation of small preindustrial communities.²⁴ The impetus then shifted to those industrial towns which were able to build rela-

tively strong new communal foundations. Lacking much in the way of direct evidence on the social bonds making up relative strengths of community, I have considered a number of predisposing conditions. One is that smaller factory workforces did not in themselves constitute communities, but they made it much more likely that people would construct them. Similarly, the proportion of the workforce which was female did not act as a direct impediment to the formation of a community on which collective action could be based. Rather, in addition to any cultural reasons which may have made women less likely to organize, four special characteristics of the female labor force seem to have represented problems for stable community organization, in and out of the workplace.

First, women factory workers were much more likely than men to be single.²⁵ Second, women tended frequently to work on an intermittent basis, especially those who were married (Collier, 1964: 16-17).²⁶ Third, women tended to work at relatively unskilled jobs, and thus were in an inferior bargaining position as they could more readily be replaced.²⁷ Fourth, women were paid less, and therefore had lesser resources (see Ure, 1861: I, 400-407; Pinchbeck, 1930: 190-194). In addition, the employment of women tended to drive men from work; men, in this situation, were more likely to leave the community in search of work (even if married) than were women.²⁸

This comparison of towns in the textile district of Southeast Lancashire is hardly complete in itself, let alone representative of the range of community structures throughout England. In the Manchester region there were, in addition to towns of the sort we have considered, country mills with their largely self-contained but highly transient (and frequently very young) workforces;²⁹ villages, either primarily devoted to handloom weaving or to a mix in which weaving gave way to factory employment; the outlying townships around the larger towns we have considered, often growing in step with and sometimes merging with the center; and the new extensions of almost exclusively factory-oriented workforces which generally tended, sooner or later to be absorbed into the older towns.

Of the last, some, like Chorlton Row, would be largely residential areas for workers employed in nearby mills; others, like Duckinfield, were manufacturing locations in their own right. Both these sorts of populations grew quite rapidly. Duckinfield was less than one-eighth the size of Stockport in 1801, but well over half in 1831, increasing its population by a factor of 8 and a half; Chorlton Row's population grew in the same period from 675 to 20,569. Village workers in general, and handloom weavers in particular, were disproportionately important to workers' movements well into the Chartist period. Although workers from each of the types of population aggregate were at some time active, those from the middle sized towns, and especially those with the headstart we have described in community development, were most likely to carry on the struggle, adapting it to their own particular situation. This adaptation meant, among other things, that the struggle became increasingly internal to the emerging industrial system and decreasingly a matter of resistance to it. Many of the smaller communities were economically disabled by the decline of domestic industries and the weak competitive position of small factories. Manchester itself was relatively weak socially, and had a high concentration of low-skilled workers. The most vocal activists were not skilled workers, however, but urban artisans, members of the building trades, and, in specifically trade union activity, the privileged spinners. This again points to the importance of community providing social foundations on which to organize collective action.³⁰

I cannot summarize the picture of community variation throughout Britain, but rather suggest only that it is an important subject for study, together with more conventional variables such as local prosperity, technical changes putting pressures on populations of workers, and political traditions giving direction to thoughts and actions. The special importance of the Manchester region is that, during the 1820s and 1830s, it was one of the places where new communities of workers were most noticeably being formed.³¹ The older communities which had been the mainstay of the earlier period of revolt and protest were losing

their strength, both economically and socially, and indeed, were dwindling in population.

A consciousness of class did develop along with the new urban populations. The uneven development of community, however, impeded the workers' ability to act on the broader basis of class. While Oldham was relatively advanced, Manchester was more backward. Class activity necessarily turned to those forms of action which could be pursued in common by at least a large proportion of the class. And the definition of class, in this sense, could not be local, as class structure was not fundamentally a local phenomenon, though class consciousness might be. If the immediate overturning of capitalist society was too distant a goal to base on the available social foundations, political democratization, improved working conditions, and a higher standard of living were not. Trade unionism, unlike revolutionary class struggle, could successfully be pursued on a local level.

NOTES

1. These "disturbance" theorists find their most sophisticated representative in Smelser (1962). Smelser's treatment of the sources of workers' protest during the industrial revolution is discussed later in this paper.

2. Recent work in the rational individualist perspective is summarized by Berk (1974). Something of this view is embodied in those versions of Marxism which make the correct, rational recognition of the identity of individual and class interests the central source of the proletarian revolution.

3. This perspective helps to shed some light on the status of the widespread recent focus among analysts of the left on "poor people" instead of the working class. Because of a lack of resources, among other reasons, poor people are unable to maintain elaborate formal organizations to seek their collective interests. They do have recourse to the streets, however, and, in general, can employ the tactic of creating enough of a disruption to "civic order" that the powerful must make concessions to them (see Piven and Cloward, 1977). Some analysts, notably Marcuse and Fanon, have attempted in various ways to assimilate the poor (and other peripheral groups such as students) into the position allotted the working class in the Marxist model. This argument is problematic, for it neglects the importance of enduring concerted activity. Because the poor in the Western world are seldom organized into traditional communities, they do not have the advantages of preindustrial workers or peasants. This is why Piven and Cloward suggest that these poor may cause disruption and demand concessions but will not wage a successful revolu-

tion. Other reasons offered are the minority position and the state and elite monopoly of means of production and physical coercion.

4. In 1820-1821 the largest agitation of the pre-Chartist years took place throughout England. It was devoted to the attempt of George IV's spurned consort Caroline to be crowned Queen. The strength of the movement was very intense at the local level, where traditional symbols of sex roles and paternalism provided a key focus. The protest over Peterloo was displaced from the popular conscience and the radical press turned over to Caroline (see Calhoun, forthcoming).

5. "The workmen of the towns knew that in case of unemployment they could find work on farms in the neighborhood of the great manufacturing centres. Hence the price of labor rose or fell in the country as industry prospered or languished in the towns" (Halévy, 1961: 242). Anthropological studies have shown the prevalence of this sort of repeated migration in connection with both seasonal and economic cycles in peasant societies with developing urban centers (e.g. Hart, 1969).

6. The high annual rate of growth suggests the preponderance of migration over natural increase, especially in towns where women most outnumber men.

7. Especially because they were likely to be quite nearby, as shown by Redford (1976).

8. Anderson (1971: 145-155) suggests something of this for Preston later in the century.

9. Later, of course, the Poor Law of 1834 would accentuate this process by moving families consisting primarily of women and children from the southern counties to the textile districts (Great Britain Parliamentary Papers, 1835: 55).

10. It could be objected that the Napoleonic wars themselves were the source of the 1811 imbalance of the sexes, but this seems unlikely. In the neighboring West Riding, for example, the ratio of women to men in 1811 was less than 1.03 to 1; it was still more even for England as a whole.

11. A weakness in this argument is the lack of any correlation between the rates of population increase and the peak of sexual imbalance in 1811; it is impossible to tell whether this is significant, or even whether that peak is perhaps an artifactual result of census enumeration procedures. In general, it is important to note that all the statistical considerations in this paper are intended to be more suggestive than conclusive. We may draw some limited inferences, but no propositions are solidly demonstrated beyond the level of simple description.

12. The extent to which the factory system had been prospering for four decades before 1820 is certainly questionable; it had been extending its influence, but in few areas did it dominate employment. This is all the more significant as Smelser tends to conduct his argument in terms of a "typical" factory family. His suggestion (1959: 190, 220-224) that "depersonalization and differentiation did not reach a critical point until the 1820s" is intended to explain why the Chartist "disturbance" and trade unionism (a) took off then and not earlier, and (b) were of greater scale than earlier "disturbances." Smelser's evidence, however, is almost entirely drawn from testimony before Parliamentary inquiries on child labor, combinations, and factories (and generally from owners, managers and witnesses sympathetic to them). In almost all cases it is indistinct what type and size of mill is being referred to and where it might be located. The only mill for which Smelser presents detailed data is the Catrine Works in the county of Ayr, Scotland. Whatever might be said for or against the use of these data to illustrate an argument concerning Lancashire, Smelser is forced to admit that the Catrine Works constitutes an exception

to the rule he lays down. It did not employ adult male spinners and did employ many children of nonfactory operatives. We also know, as mentioned in Note 9 (above), that factory managers advertised and sent agents into the countryside to seek child labor (Redford, 1976: 23).

13. The same source (Edwards and Lloyd-Jones, 1973: 312-313) also contains a re-analysis of some of the records examined by Smelser and points out that while a number of operatives employed the children of other operatives, relatively few employed their own children—not necessarily an abuse, but not a corrective to weakening of family bonds either.

14. Anderson (1976: 326) makes a similar point regarding Smelser. See also Marshall (1961), Redford (1976), Pinchbeck (1930: 184-185), and Collier (1964: 15-16). There is, however, some evidence of the wives and daughters of distressed handloom weavers entering factories in the 1830s and 1840s (Great Britain Parliamentary Papers, 1834: 80-81).

15. Interestingly, an 1833 survey showed male children much more likely to be sent into those occupations in which children were employed by operatives (principally mule-spinning). The figures for girls are 6091 employed directly by manufacturers, 3541 by operatives. For boys the figures are 3585 and 6557, respectively, as reported in Stanway's Survey (Ure, 1861: 398-399).

16. Smelser does not cite any factory workers who objected to it on the ground of changing their relationships with their children.

17. For example, Smelser (1968: 86-87) writes: "When the Factory Act of 1833 was passed, limiting children's hours to eight and suggesting a relay system for young children, the operatives were not satisfied. . . . For, indeed, the Factory Act of 1833, with its relay system and its eight hour limitation, worked to further weaken the link between parents' and children's labor. . . . With the Factory Act of 1833, Parliament opted in favor of pushing the family toward the future." The workers, of course, could not be anything but irrational to resist this push toward the future, and if it should mean, as it did, that adults' work would be increased to as much as 16 hours per day, well, such was the future.

18. Remarkably, in this connection, Smelser never considers that the repeal of the combination acts in 1825 might have been an important stimulus to this new outburst of "disturbances." He does, elsewhere (1959: 320-321), allow that while in existence the Acts may have "retarded the development of trade unions," though he considers the evidence equivocal. In line with our general argument, the combination acts were far more of an impediment in urban factory areas where new formal organizations were necessary to concerted collective actions among workers than they were in artisan villages which could more readily act on informal lines of organization and, in any case, were more able to keep combinations secret.

19. On the variance in political activity, see Bamford (1967: 8-9), Thompson (1968: 705-708), Read (1958: 49-50), and the Hammonds (1967: 92-121). Foster (1974: 49) is not much concerned with local comparison, but suggests at one point much the same breakdown of which towns were most active. Characteristically, he interprets one dimension of variance at a time, in this case arguing that higher wage rates were caused by "the breakdown in law and order." It should be borne in mind that this ranking of towns would not necessarily apply to the Chartist period when, for example, factory workers were more important and Ashton became a center under the leadership of McDougall.

20. This was particularly true in machine spinning, a fact which reinforces the divergence of Oldham and Stockport because they had proportionately more weavers: this ought, on the surface, to have increased the proportion of women factory workers.

21. The continued production and popularity of such works as Ure's treatises on textiles is an indication of the gradual nature of the change. British firms continued for most of the nineteenth century to grow by the accretion of similar units; as far as scantier evidence can tell, there was little specialization within these units. It should be borne in mind that Taylorism waited for the twentieth century.

22. This aspect of the differentiation issue is somewhat neglected by Blau's treatment (1977), as that work lacks any conception similar to "multiplexity." This is partly because it eschews consideration of the content of social relations in order to focus on structure. Multiplexity is a structural concept, but one which is founded on recognition of the different content given to interpersonal relations by different social contexts.

23. It should be noted that studies finding a higher "propensity to strike" among workers in large factories or metropolitan areas do not disprove, or even necessarily challenge, these conclusions. In the first place, they do not establish the independence of the particular factors they study from the others. In the second place, strikes are only one form of collective action, one particularly suited to workers who can expect to gain and benefit from ameliorative material improvements. The connections between propensity to strike, riot, petition, sabotage, elect, and revolt are not clearly spelled out in the literature, and in any case are probably partial at most. Kerr and Siegal (1954) is the often cited basic work in this tradition. Shorter and Tilly (1974: 287-295) found none of Kerr and Siegal's conclusions borne out by further research; see also Snyder and Kelley (1976) and chapter 3 of Tilly (1978).

24. Small communities, as I (Calhoun 1980) have defined the term socially, need not be small population centers. Villages are such, to be sure, but relatively strongly demarcated urban artisan populations may also be defined this way.

25. "The women in nine cases out of ten have only themselves to support—while the men, generally have families," wrote a union official to the *Manchester Guardian* (1824). A Manchester mill census taken 20 years later (McCulloch, 1847: 702) showed nearly as great a proportion of single women: 40,377 out of 61,098, or 82%. See also Smelser (1959: 203, 232). Of course, single women may have contributed to the support of their parents and/or siblings.

26. Smelser (1959: 186), incidentally, uses the intermittent nature of women's employment as an indication that the traditional family was surviving, and that, therefore, no "disturbance" would be likely to ensue. Anderson's (1971: 71-74) data for Preston at mid-century suggests that women's employment was still intermittent, especially viewed over the life cycle; women worked most frequently when their domestic situations were most auspicious (and when their economic situations least so). Rushton's (1977) work also bears this out, and considers casual labor, especially during the period of the 1850s-1870s, in more detail.

27. Although the extent to which this remains equally true in each town is uncertain, it is possible that the additional proportion of males in Oldham, for example, held jobs as unskilled as their female counterparts in Manchester. Stanway's survey (Ure, 1861: I, 400-407) would seem to bear out that the employment of more men represented, at least in part, the employment of more skilled workers.

28. The men could either leave for the countryside (Halévy, 1961: 242) or could tramp to another town in search of work in a similar trade. The latter practice declined in significance through the period of the industrial revolution, both because work of a given sort became more regionally concentrated (especially in textiles) and because, as Hobsbawm (1968: 34-63) notes, tramping systems were "entirely adapted to single men. . . . Had

they been originally designed to meet unemployment they could hardly have failed to bear the married workman in mind." Tramping applied more to hand weavers than to factory workers in any case.

29. See Edwards and Lloyd-Jones' (1973: 309) comment on the highly casual nature of work at the country mills (which weighs against Smelser's suggestion of the mills' communality, and, less directly, their benevolence).

30. This is not, of course, to ignore the importance of the artisans' and the spinners' greater position of strength due to the relative scarcity of their skills.

31. Regarding the preceding discussion of differing levels of activity, bear in mind that the least active of these Lancashire towns was more active (and more proletarian) than most in England. Furthermore, an important characteristic of each of these towns was its proximity to the others; the towns did not exist in relative isolation but could stimulate and reinforce each other.

REFERENCES

- ANDERSON, M. (1971) *Family Structure in 19th Century Lancashire*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- (1976) "Sociological history and the working-class family: Smelser revisited," *Social History* 6: 317-334.
- BAMFORD, S. (1967) *Passages in the Life of a Radical*. London: Cass.
- BERK, R. A. (1974) *Collective Behavior*. Dubuque, IA: Wm. C. Brown.
- BLAU, P. M. (1977) *Inequality and Heterogeneity*. New York: Macmillan.
- and R. A. SCHOENHERR (1971) *The Structure of Organizations*. New York: Basic Books.
- BYTHELL, D. (1969) *The Handloom Weavers*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- CALHOUN, C. J. (1980) "Community: toward a variable conceptualization for comparative research." *Social History* 5: 105-129.
- (forthcoming) *Before the Working Class: Tradition and Community in English Popular Radicalism during the Industrial Revolution*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
- COLE, G.D.H. (1932) *Short History of the British Working Class Movement, 1789-1837*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- and R. POSTGATE (1942) *The Common People*. London: Methuen.
- COLLIER, F. (1964) *The Family Economy of the Working Classes in the Cotton Industry, 1784-1833*. Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press.
- DEANE, P. and W. A. COLE (1969) *British Economic Growth, 1688-1959*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- EDWARDS, M. M. and R. LLOYD-JONES (1973) "N. J. Smelser and the cotton factory family: a reassessment," pp. 309-319 in N. B. Harte and K. G. Ponting (eds.) *Textile History and Economic History*. Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press.
- FOSTER, J. (1974) *Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.
- Great Britain Parliamentary Papers (1834) 10, Report of the Select Committee on Handloom Weavers.

- (1835) 35, First Report of the Commissioners under the Poor Law Amendment Act.
- (1842) 22, Reports of the Inspectors of Factories (pp. 33-78, Appendix I: report of L. Horner).
- HALEVY, E. (1961) *England in 1815*. London: Benn.
- HAMMOND, J. L. and B. HAMMOND (1967) *The Skilled Labourer*. New York: Kelley.
- HART, J. K. (1969) "Entrepreneurs and migrants: a study of modernization among the Frafrahs of Ghana." Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University.
- HARTWELL, R. M. (1970) "Business management in England during the period of early industrialization: inducements and obstacles," pp. 28-41 in R. M. Hartwell (ed.) *The Industrial Revolution*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- HOBBSAWM, E. J. (1968) *Labouring Men*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- HUNT, B. C. (1936) *The Development of the Business Corporation in Britain, 1800-1867*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.
- KERR, C., and A. SIEGAL (1954) "The inter-industry propensity to strike," pp. 189-212 in A. Kornhauser (ed.) *Industrial Conflict*. New York: John Wiley.
- LANDES, D. S. (1969) *The Unbound Prometheus*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Manchester Guardian (1824) 27 November.
- MARSHALL, J. D. (1961) "The Lancashire rural labourer in the early nineteenth century." *Transactions of the Lancashire and Cheshire Antiquarian Society*, 71.
- McCULLOCH, J. R. (1847) *A Descriptive and Statistical Account of the British Empire*. London: Longmans.
- MITCHELL, B. R. and P. DEANE (1962) *Abstract of British Historical Statistics, Vol. I*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- OBERSCHALL, A. (1973) *Social Conflict and Social Movements*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- PAYNE, P. L. (1967) "The emergence of the large-scale company in Great Britain." *Econ. History Rev.* 20: 217-234.
- PINCHBECK, I. (1930) *Women Workers and the Industrial Revolution, 1750-1850*. London: Cass.
- PIVEN, F. F. and R. A. CLOWARD (1977) *Poor People's Movements*. New York: Vintage.
- POLLARD, S. (1965) *The Genesis of Modern Management*. London: Edward Arnold.
- READ, D. (1958) *Peterloo: The 'Massacre' and its Background*. Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press.
- REDFORD, A. (1976) *Labour Migration in England, 1800-1850*. Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press.
- RUDÉ, G. (1959) *The Crowd in the French Revolution*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
- RUSHTON, P. (1977) "Housing conditions and the family economy in the Victorian slum: a study of a Manchester district, 1790-1871." Ph.D. dissertation, Manchester University.
- SHORTER, E. and C. TILLY (1974) *Strikes in France, 1830-1968*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- SMELSER, N. J. (1959) *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- (1962) *Theory of Collective Behavior*. New York: Macmillan.

- (1968) "Sociological history: the industrial revolution and the working class family," pp. 76-91 in *Essays in Sociological Explanation*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- SNYDER, D. and W. R. KELLEY (1976) "Industrial violence in Italy, 1878-1903." *Amer. J. of Sociology* 82: 131-162.
- SOBOUL, A. (1958) *Les Sans-Culottes Parisiens en l'An II*. La Roche-sur-Yon: Potier.
- THOMPSON, E. P. (1968) *The Making of the English Working Class*. New York: Viking.
- TILLY, C. (1964) *The Vendée*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.
- (1978) *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- URE, A. (1861) *The Cotton Manufacture of Great Britain*. (Vols. I and II) London: H. G. Bohn.
- WEBB, S. and B. WEBB (1920) *History of Trade Unionism*. London: Longmans.
- WOLF, E. R. (1969) *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*. New York: Harper & Row.

Craig Calhoun is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His book Before the Working Class: Tradition and Community in English Popular Radicalism during the Industrial Revolution will be published in 1981 by the University of Chicago Press. Professor Calhoun is currently studying the ways in which economically advanced societies deal with technological obsolescence, and how labor-intensive industry affects economic development.

A New Book Series

Sage Publications, in cooperation with the Social Science History Association, will begin publishing a series of books applying the methods of the social sciences to the study of historical issues. The series will include both single-authored volumes and edited collections of original essays. The desired length of manuscripts is 75,000 to 100,000 words. Further information can be obtained from the Series Editor: Stanley Engerman, Departments of Economics and History, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627.