CHAPTER 11

Renewing International Studies: Regional and Transregional Studies in a Changing Intellectual Field

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There are both public and scholarly reasons to wish for a renewal of international studies in American universities. Such a renewal would serve not only foreign policy but also private voluntary action, private business, and critical public awareness. Because U.S. universities have long been leaders in international studies, renewal—which the Title VI programs could lead—would be of global value. It would also make for intellectually exciting scholarship.

To be successful, renewal would mean not just more teaching and research on international topics, but also better connections across a several disciplines, interdisciplinary programs, and professional schools. Overcoming current fragmentation, international studies programs could better address the connections among local, national, regional, and global processes and deepen knowledge of the intertwined roles of culture, geography, politics, natural resources, markets, religions, and social solidarities.

Stronger international research and teaching would recognize not only the enduring importance of regions but also the ways regions are being reshaped by internal integration—in Asia as well as Europe; by shifting geopolitics that encourage new attention to previously neglected regions such as Central Asia; and by transregional connections, from media and migrations to world religions and world music. Understanding the changing terrain would require drawing on and renewing the expertise developed and taught within traditional area studies fields. But

traditional areas do not exhaust the relevant contexts. Cross-cutting connections from long-distance trading routes to zones of shared environmental concern require research that connects different areas as well as disciplines and professional fields.

Effective renewal thus cannot be a matter of restoration. It will not come simply by increasing resources for old institutional structures or intellectual perspectives; it will require both institutional and intellectual innovation. Many of the structures for international studies reflect the way international affairs looked to American leaders half a century ago. Renewal today means teaching different languages, approaching culture in terms of current creativity as well as historical civilizations, and analyzing politics in an increasingly multilateral world with new geopolitical issues.

Repairing the damage done by neglect of older area studies fields during the past thirty years is vital. However, it needs to be pursued in ways that encourage transregional research, attention to neglected areas, and participation in problem-focused inquiries. Area studies are vastly more important in a larger, collaborative field of international studies than by themselves. Indeed, much of the best area studies work has long been part of such broader inquiries. But to renew these strengths, area scholars need to overcome ambivalence toward both interdisciplinary international studies and professional schools—including not only schools of international affairs but also faculties of law, business, education, public health, medicine, and others.

This is a challenging prescription for area studies fields thrown on the defensive by neglect from funders, hostility from some social science disciplines, and a vogue for thinking of globalization in universal rather than contextual perspective. But many in area studies have already started.

To further the process, I propose in this chapter to reconsider the development of the tacit division of labor among area studies, disciplines, and professional schools and its transformation in recent years with shifting interests of funders and the rise of new interdisciplinary agendas. Although interest in area studies fields is currently being renewed, the future remains challenging. My hope is that all those interested in international studies may approach this future as collaborators more than rivals.

A Three-Way Division of Labor

In the wake of each of the two great World Wars of the twentieth century, intellectuals and public leaders argued that Americans paid too little attention to the international diversity of peoples, cultures, states, markets, media, and conflicts that

shape the world. Universities responded with both curricular changes and new institutional structures for research and scholarship.

Three broad approaches emerged: disciplines, area studies fields, and professional schools. These can briefly be summarized as (1) the pursuit of innovation and cumulative knowledge based on analytic perspectives that disaggregate complex social phenomena into potential general variables, relationships, and causal mechanisms and usually minimize attention to context (a mainly disciplinary approach in the social sciences); (2) the attempt to gain a comprehensive view of social life in specific contexts, connections, and/or concrete complexity (especially in the area studies fields, though also, to some extent, in history and at least certain older styles of anthropology); and (3) the development of approaches to professional practice or public problems informed by knowledge from different disciplines and interdisciplinary fields.

Disciplinary departments were already gaining strength as the primary organizational units of American universities before World War I. This has continued, complemented but never really challenged by growth of interdisciplinary fields within the arts and sciences. The growth of professional schools has been a substantial development not always considered in discussions of academic international studies.

The founding of professional schools started after World War I. Georgetown's School of Foreign Service was founded in 1919, and its very name signals the emphasis on training for diplomatic service that dominated in this period. The University of Southern California followed in 1924, Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School in 1930, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts in 1933. All had similar initial emphases. They were creatures of private universities engaged in training elites for public service, especially in diplomacy.[1]

Area studies took its modern form in the era after World War II. The University of Chicago was perhaps the most important early center for area studies, but several state universities, such as the University of Michigan, were also among the leaders. The development of area studies was closely shaped by foundation philanthropy and by the mediation of interdisciplinary committees organized through the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS). At the same time, several academic disciplines strengthened their engagements in international research—from comparative politics to development economics.

The primary institutionalization of international studies in the postwar era was thus a tripartite division of labor. The parties to this division of labor were disciplines in the social sciences and humanities, the emergent area studies fields, and a growing number of professional schools. The terms of the division of labor were never clear, and relations among disciplines, area studies fields, and professional

schools have changed over time. Especially from the 1970s, many social science disciplines pursued different agendas at the expense of interdisciplinary area studies. Unlike the professional schools, the area studies programs seldom had control of autonomous faculty appointments.

By the 1950s, the basic structure of area studies fields and professional schools of international affairs that remains central today was in place. New fields were added and some fields were redefined—as, for example, studies of the U.S.S.R. grew prominent in programs previously structured as Slavic studies. Crises during the 1960s and 1970s brought more critical lines of analysis, not least in Southeast Asian studies. Calls for renewal in international studies after the Cold War shifted the balance away from area studies and brought in more studies of globalization as such. At the same time, interdisciplinary international studies emerged as a rapidly growing field of undergraduate study. Perhaps most important, area studies lost favor with many funders; the structure of centers and programs commonly remained in place, but with diminished resources. At the same time, professional schools of international affairs grew significantly and international studies in other professional schools such as business, law, and public health grew even more.

Area Studies

There is, of course, a prehistory to the development of area studies programs after World War II. European engagements with various definitions of "the Orient" stretch back centuries. The early twentieth century popularity of Orientalist inquiries led to the founding of Chicago's Oriental Institute and a range of other anticipations of area studies. However, these were for the most part structured with an emphasis on the ancient. Colonialism brought the formation of new kinds of knowledge focused on the contemporary lives of non-Western peoples.[2] Missionary work was another source of ethnological inquiry. The combination of humanistic and social science inquiry, however, was basic to the new area studies fields.

Together with the National Academy of Sciences, the SSRC (representing the social sciences) and ACLS (representing the humanities) launched an exploratory Committee on World Area Research at the end of World War II. This was the proximate source for the creation of a more or less comprehensive program of regionally focused committees to set agendas and sponsor training. Some of these had older roots; the SSRC had launched a Committee on Latin America in 1941 and run projects on China since the 1920s. The SSRC was active in the development of the modern fields of international relations and comparative politics. The SSRC and ACLS worked largely as mediators between the growing world of foundation-administered philanthropy (and sometimes government programs) and academic researchers.

In 1950, the Ford Foundation began the Foreign Area Fellowship Program, but soon turned its administration over to the joint SSRC-ACLS committees on different world areas. Ford put nearly $300 million into this project, and in due course it was joined by other foundations and by the U.S. government, which made major investments in foreign language teaching and foreign area research. Today, many social scientists regard this as largely an investment in the humanities. Social scientists were, however, central to the area studies project. It is only in the past thirty-some years that area studies programs have tilted toward humanities fields. This is largely the result of secession by social scientists, not conquest by humanists.

The area studies fields differed from each other in the extent to which research and teaching focused on contemporary politics or civilizational history, and different disciplines accordingly figured more or less prominently. None escaped the influence of the Cold War, but this was, not surprisingly, most definitive for Russian and East European studies, including the demarcation of the region itself. South Asian studies certainly confronted political issues, but concentrated more on civilization and culture. In addition, there were other characteristic thematic foci in different area studies fields. Economic development was front and center for Latin American studies, thus, as were later questions about dictatorship and democracy. The formation of "new nations" was a key theme for African studies. Middle East studies could never escape the problems of Palestine and Israel, although questions about nationalism, political institutions, and religion appeared in other forms as well.

During the postwar period, despite their differences, all the area studies fields shared a broad intellectual orientation associated with the idea of modernization.[3] Economic development, political reform, and the creation of new national institutions, transformation of social institutions, expansion of literacy and consequent cultural production, and even change in psychological attitudes were all seen as parts of a common process. If modernization described what was shared in this process, different histories and cultures shaped distinctive patterns in each region. This connected work in the area studies fields to disciplinary agendas.

The connection, however, came unstuck. There was a fault line as old as the *methodenstreit* and the very distinction—always contested—between social sciences and humanities.[4] Leaders in many social science disciplines (not so much anthropology or history, which had strong humanistic sides) understood themselves to pursue generalizations. The area studies fields, in contrast, seemed to be particularizing, focused on the specifics of local conjunctures of history, culture, politics, and even environment. Social science knowledge was widely held to be nomothetic, abstracting from such specifics to establish more universal laws.

This was always a caricature of area studies research, and perhaps a misunderstanding of what social science disciplines themselves achieved. It is easy to mock

either side: the psychologist who thought human nature could be found in experiments involving only white, middle class, male American undergraduates; the anthropologist who responded to every assertion of a more general causal pattern with "well, it's not exactly so on the island I studied." There is a point of more basic significance, however.

The area studies projects, at their best, were not so much about idiographic particulars as about the various different ways to be human, to be social, to be political, and even to have markets—and therefore suggested that the pursuit of more general knowledge required working with attention to specific historical and cultural contexts and patterns. Such knowledge could be of broad application without being abstractly universal. Indeed, the area studies fields contributed to major analytic perspectives that far transcended their initial sites of development. Benedict Anderson's account of nationalism as a matter of imagined communities was informed by Southeast Asian studies, thus, but not contained by it.[5] The same is true of James Scott's effort to understand states, the ways state leaders saw societies, and projects of central planning.[6] Dependency theory, shaped by the UN's Economic Commission on Latin America, as well as work in Latin American universities, developed as an effort to understand specifically Latin American problems, as did Albert Hirschman's work on development assistance and unbalanced growth.[7] The "world systems theory" of Immanuel Wallerstein and colleagues was deeply shaped by African studies as well as by Braudelian global history and Marxist political economy and, indeed, the earlier Latin American dependency theories.[8]

Each of these examples became part of interdisciplinary discussions—of development and underdevelopment, class and power, power and knowledge, states and nations. Of these, only development studies really became an academic field of its own—and in the United States it developed relatively weakly, dominated by disciplinary economics and narrowed to questions about growth; it is institutionalized more substantially in Britain and some other settings. Marxism was for a time a vital interdisciplinary discussion, with strong social movement links, but never with strong academic institutionalization (outside the communist countries, where Marxism was itself an academic discipline). Wallerstein's Fernand Braudel Center at Binghamton was influential but not widely imitated. If political economy remains a topic or perspective that many social scientists would claim, its base of intellectual reproduction is not well established. Indeed, a renewal of interdisciplinary political economy that is neither sectarian nor narrowed simply to questions of growth may be one of the attractive prospects on the current agenda.[9]

This points to a more general challenge for interdisciplinary work. When it lacks institutional conditions of reproduction, it is at the mercy of disciplines that many either claim it or ignore it or—most often—incorporate some ideas from

interdisciplinary projects without providing ways of sustaining the intellectual ferment that produced them.

The area studies fields demonstrate the force of this. In the 1950s and 1960s, the area studies fields were relatively well financed and often able to offer support to students not funded by their disciplinary departments. There was a new infusion of students—many drawn to their future areas of study by missionary, diplomatic, or Peace Corps service. More generally, while the university system expanded, there were jobs for the political scientists and sociologists with area studies emphases (without much taking away from opportunities for those engaged in disciplinary work that was de facto North American area studies).

Whereas a few universities set up autonomous departments of Latin American or East Asian studies, many more set up interdisciplinary committees or centers. These have had enough institutionalization—and enough external demands for the kinds of knowledge they produce and determination by committed scholars—to survive lengthy periods of disinterest or hostility from the core social science disciplines. Regional studies associations have been important. Despite the strong and influential work rooted in area studies in the later 1960s and 1970s, however, these fields never gained enduring capacity for autonomous reproduction. Area studies programs seldom ran the PhD programs in which future faculty were trained, and they needed the cooperation of disciplinary departments to make new hires and to award tenure.

Pivotal Change in the 1970s

Academic expansion slowed in the 1970s. A shortage of faculty jobs brought sharp tightening of tenure standards and disciplinary departments exercised discipline by rewarding intradisciplinary achievement. Graduate students felt new pressures to demonstrate disciplinary publications before entering the job market. These pressures were generally more acute higher in the academic pecking order, and in programs focused more on training future professors than producing applied researchers, but they were present throughout. In much of the social sciences, there was growing emphasis on quantification and the pursuit of context-independent knowledge.

Area studies programs saw their proportionate funding—and influence—decline, partly because of a structural shift. Area studies programs had long been an attractive source of funds for graduate students—few of whom had dependable financial assistance from their departments. When undergraduate enrollments began to grow faster than faculty recruitment, especially after the 1970s, teaching assistantships became increasingly important. These were administered mainly by

disciplinary departments. By the 1980s and 1990s, efforts to shrink cohorts and provide multiyear funding packages further consolidated disciplinary control.

Of course, other factors were at work during the same period. Many area studies programs suffered during the conflicts of the 1960s and early 1970s. There was high student interest, but a younger generation challenged older faculty members (including many associated with modernization theory). The Vietnam War was enormously influential, but the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the coups against democratic governments in Latin America, and the Iranian revolution also intensified disputes over different kinds of U.S. government engagements and funding. Senior area studies faculty members were attacked from the left for complicity with American counterinsurgency programs (that sometimes turned into counterdemocracy programs). They were attacked from the right for being too critical and for emphasizing too much the point of view of those they studied. Area studies programs remained sites of political controversy—sometimes intellectually productive, but commonly problematic for their capacity to maintain standing within universities. They nurtured critical intellectual perspectives, but their bases for academic reproduction were undercut. By the 1980s, business school enrollments were rising, there was a backlash against activist social science, and as the decade wore on disciplines turned away from engagements with context-specific knowledge as well as a variety of core political questions.

During the 1970s, the very idea of development—and especially development assistance and planned interventions in support of development—was increasingly challenged. Initially critiques came largely from the left, but by the 1980s, a neoliberal market alternative was clearly in the ascendancy. There was a critique of how much development funding was tied to support of domestic industries in donor states. There was a critique of the high cost of expatriate consultants. There was a critique of dependency, and not just the extent to which some developing countries became stuck in a dead-end economics of aid dependency but also the political problems created by close relationships with some developing country elites and international donors. There was a critique of the way notions of unilinear progress (following Western European or American trajectories) were smuggled into much thinking about development (and modernization). Perhaps most basically, there was the argument that the issues were structural, and that development assistance could not overcome the inequalities of the world system.

The recession of 1973–1975 played at least as big a role as arguments in political economy. Non-oil-producing developing countries felt the impact of OPEC's price increases directly.[10] But the recession also contributed to a backlash against foreign aid, and this dovetailed with growing hostility to a variety of government spending programs. This began an era in which there was an ironic confluence of left-wing

and right-wing hostility to the state—anti-authoritarian 1960s rebels and Hayekian individualists were never allies, but were both suspicious of big government. So, when Margaret Thatcher pioneered what eventually became know as neoliberalism in Britain and Ronald Reagan followed suit in the United States, opposition was more muted and less coherent than it might have been.

In many social science disciplines, academic initiative turned away from theory (including more or less critical theory) and context-specific research (including small-N comparisons as well as case studies) and toward more or less formal methods.[11] Economics effectively seceded from the area studies interdisciplinary fields as it relied increasingly on mathematical models and on approaches (some lumped together as neoliberal) that stressed more or less universal microfoundations. Economists who retained strong area interests often wound up outside economics departments (and thus disciplinary reproduction). Many were based in interdisciplinary programs—not just area studies but also urban studies, policy analysis, development studies, and, indeed, business schools (which were interested in countries like China even when mainstream economics departments were not); others worked for the World Bank, the UN, or other nonacademic institutions. More unevenly, political science followed the lead of economics, increasingly emphasizing formal methods such as game theory and rational choice analysis and their application in context-independent ways (although, in principle, they could be combined with case-specific analysis). The pattern was less clear-cut in sociology, but it was influenced by the same trends.[12] During the same period, psychology moved more and more toward experimental research and toward closer links to biological and cognitive sciences. Even though they had perhaps never been at the core of area studies, cross-cultural research and research on psychological correlates of "modernization" had made for stronger connections in an earlier period, and these dwindled.[13]

The result was that social science engagement with area studies declined sharply during the last third of the twentieth century. Some political scientists and sociologists continued to do international field research, but their numbers dwindled. Anthropology was better represented in area studies, but also grew closer to the humanities and less connected to other social sciences. This is not a pattern limited to area studies; these fields are simply among those most deeply influenced by the rift between the humanities (and "soft" social sciences) and those social sciences that have conceived themselves as purveyors of hard, objective knowledge and more or less formal models. Connections between the humanities and social sciences peaked at the end of the 1970s, and already many in the humanities had begun a "cultural turn." This was often informed by poststructuralism, whereas many in the social sciences took a formalist, quantitative turn. History, which

straddled the division of social sciences from humanities, reasserted its humanistic identity after an era when "social science history" was ascendant.

Funding Issues

Along with other interdisciplinary fields, area studies have confronted recurrent funding challenges. Flourishing during a general expansion of academia does not guarantee staying power during a retrenchment. Interdisciplinary programs often offer intellectual stimulation and the excitement of innovation in flush times, but the tools of disciplinary control are strengthened by recession. This happened in the 1970s. In straitened circumstances, disciplines competed more effectively for scarce funds. Moreover, inside some disciplines—especially in the social sciences—there was a consolidation around "core" disciplinary agendas that reduced the space and support for area studies. Decline during the 1980s was mostly a matter of attrition (and the targeting of other fields) in tight job markets.

As the SSRC and ACLS had been pioneers of area studies, events at each epitomized the crisis.[14] Both the Ford and Mellon foundations withdrew their support for area studies committees. Neither abandoned international studies, however. Mellon, for example, continues to fund a large SSRC–ACLS fellowship program for international fieldwork. Ford gives international grants and runs offices around the world (although some have been closed in the wake of the 2008–2009 market crisis and amid shifting priorities). But academic area studies no longer seemed to most foundation funders to be an effective structure through which to encourage the international knowledge formation they wanted.[15]

With less drama and more complexity, and over a somewhat longer term, U.S. government funding also was reduced. Through the 1950s and 1960s, a range of programs had been founded that brought international students to study in the United States—programs that were central to the education of two generations of academics, professionals, and public leaders. Other programs supported U.S. academics in research abroad or helped to build linkages between American institutions and foreign counterparts. This work was focused especially on the developing countries. Much was organized through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), although there were separate programs in a range of government departments and agencies, from Agriculture through Commerce and State as well as Education—and the Defense Department and intelligence agencies. A wide variety of universities participated, but especially important were the land-grant universities—Michigan State, Penn State, Iowa State, Wisconsin, Ohio State, Maryland—in which academic area studies programs could enjoy a synergy with professional schools and applied research

programs, and where a disproportionate number of international graduate students received education.

Loss of the broad modernization-development consensus brought increasing quarrels within academic area studies fields and between them and more discipline-oriented social scientists. It also meant that there was no longer a tacit agreement between the academics and those who funded area studies, or between researchers and those engaged in practical action. The modernization-development framework may have been only loosely related to the work of many area studies scholars, but it provided a basis for congressional appropriations and foundation grants that was never replaced. The rhetoric of "internationalization" and "globalization" that has flourished for the past thirty years has never had a comparable theoretical underpinning, has never suggested as clear a relationship to improving human living conditions or, melioration of social problems, and has never been clear about the importance of context-specific knowledge as distinct from the global circulation of allegedly universalistic knowledge or best practices.

Some of the programs that started in the 1950s and 1960s survived all this and remain important. The Title VI program is a flagship among them. But some did not survive and many were diverted away from universities and away from the too-often critical humanities and social science faculties in universities. Think tanks and independent, nonacademic research organizations flourished, becoming something of a buffer between academic research communities and government and other policy makers. An organization such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is indicative. Founded at the height of the Cold War in 1962, CSIS was initially based at Georgetown but became a free-standing organization in 1971. Over time, it incorporated the Pacific Forum and other organizations and hired a variety of specialists on different regions of the world as well as different policy issues. It continues to be organized with regional programs complementing programs on strategic issues and remains oriented to a combination of policy makers and diplomats. CSIS and many other nonacademic centers are reputable and serious; there are also a range of organizations more closely tied to government-funded applied research (and sometimes called "Beltway bandits"). But even the best such organizations have had the effect of reducing the synergies between government-funded applied research and academic area studies, reducing the extent to which universities are a resource for policy makers, diplomats, and others and reducing the extent to which critical voices and dissident perspectives are able to inform policy and public debates. At the same time, although there is more international work based in professional fields, the links to academic area studies are weak—and accordingly their practical concerns are often pursued without strong contextual knowledge.

Foundation support partially compensated for lost or redirected government funding for a time. Ford, Mellon, and others were major supporters of academic area studies during the 1970s and 1980s. But this concealed a vulnerability, for foundations as a group tend to dislike being long-term sustainers of fields and other projects: They seek to help launch new ventures, to be supporters of young and growing efforts, and then to withdraw as these projects become sustainable on other bases. The same goes for the SSRC, which supported area studies through the joint committees about three times as long as it ever supported any other program. Thus, when the foundations reduced their support and tried to orient it away from core funding to specific projects, this was devastating for the area studies fields. It changed the role of Title VI, which became much more often a primary source of funding instead of a complement to other resources. Behind this was the failure of universities to develop secure long-term bases and funding streams for academic area studies and the fraught relationship between these interdisciplinary programs and disciplinary departments.

I will not try to reproduce the whole story of either the 1990s crisis or changes in funding. But material conditions are important today as reasons for innovation rather than attempted restoration in international studies. Most foundations and most government funders focus mainly on trying to address practical problems in the world. Their support for the renewal of area studies will not come mainly from valuing them in themselves but rather from valuing their contributions to other, especially problem-focused, inquiries. Neither disciplinary pursuit of generalizations nor purely problem-focused inquiries can substitute for necessary context-specific knowledge, but neither will area studies be self-justifying.

As a broad pattern, foundation leaders have always sought to improve the human condition. They once believed that investing in social science generally, and area studies in particular, was a terrific way to do this. By the 1990s, few believed any more that this was efficient, even if they still thought social science or area studies to be good in themselves. Today, most prefer to try to work directly to pursue change, usually without any lengthy detour through attempts to improve knowledge. They prefer to work on specific problems—AIDS, women's education, small-business support—but not necessarily on the larger contexts in which those problems are embedded. Moreover, foundations' favored partners are not academics (who are seen as expensive, slow, and motivated by self-interest—every academic report ends by calling for more research, not enabling action). They are at least as often nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), service providers, and community organizations. This is especially true of newer foundations. Even among the old, though, the Mellon Foundation is distinctive for its continuing commitment to academic humanities scholarship and related work in the social sciences. In

general, foundations want to be close to the action and they like the new, not the continuing. Each wave of new presidents and program directors brings calls for change and, indeed, grant renewals and the duration of grants have both declined.

Of course, many other issues—too many to cover here—also made for change in area studies. Shifts in the Peace Corps reduced what had been an important recruitment path.[16] Some other voluntary action programs remain important sources of student interests in other places, although increasingly this is channeled into professional or quasiprofessional programs, not area studies. At the same time, students from the various world regions who were native speakers of local languages came to figure more and more prominently in area studies. This enriched them with new connections to the different regions. Students spending less time studying languages often learned new methods and brought active theoretical engagements into area studies fields. At the same time, however, this shifted the context for those who needed language study.

Not least, there was the difficulty many in area studies fields had in coming up with a strong forward-looking account of the value of their fields when they were attacked. This was partly because the leaders in the 1980s and 1990s, were children of the 1960s. They had spent much of their careers attacking previous orthodoxies and power structures. As David Szanton remarked, when funders began to rethink their support, "Area Studies was under attack from scholars in several fields who in general argued that Area Studies had been an invention of the Cold War [and] reflected US political interests and Eurocentric prejudices."[17] These attacks often came from area studies scholars. In fact, the critiques themselves were part of a transformation of those fields, and when crisis came in the 1990s the Cold War heritage was much attenuated. But self-critique was not a persuasive sales pitch. More generally, after being thrown onto the defensive, area studies researchers found it difficult to articulate positive and proactive agendas. Many spent too much time restating the importance of the regions they studied, the scarcity of expertise, and the difficulty of the skills they had spent years acquiring (none of which countered the charge of particularism). All the points were sound, but they did not in themselves clarify to funders what area studies scholarship was good for. And, of course, under, members of different area studies communities often defended their particular regional concerns rather than making effective common cause.

With further irony, the end of the Cold War encouraged a dramatic expansion in international work conceived as directly global—that is, about what might in principle happen everywhere— rather than as context-specific. Attention to globalization came at the expense of attention to the specific regional and other contexts through which globalization was refracted and in which it took on different meanings. Professional schools of international and public affairs were beneficiaries not

only of the focus on globalization but also of the desire of many young people to make a career of practical engagement with global issues—human rights, emergency relief, development, or working conditions, to name a few.

Professional Schools

Many discussions of international studies have been framed in terms of conflicts between disciplines and area studies fields. These conflicts have been real and remain important, but focusing only on them neglects two other significant phenomena: (1) the actual growth in universities (and much of the growth in international studies) has occurred largely outside arts and sciences departments—in professional schools and problem-focused research centers;[18] and (2) the ecology of academic fields has changed, making the places of both "disciplines" and "area studies" less clear. Differences in analytic approaches have opened divides among social science disciplines, between some social science disciplines and the humanities, and within some social science and humanities fields. New interdisciplinary clusters have also been created—notably around decisions and rationality, around formal modeling, and around neuroscience and cognition.

It is also noteworthy that during the same time period, university dominance of knowledge building and public discourse on international affairs first waxed and then, to some extent, waned. It waxed mainly as universities grew (and with them university presses and university-operated public television and radio stations). It waned, especially in and after the 1970s, not only as academic growth slowed but also as a whole field of think tanks and NGOs emerged and new communications media flourished. Relations to both journalism and policy makers shifted and the place of nonpartisan intellectual inquiry was challenged.

Inside the universities, the biggest change began earlier, during the era of expansion, but it became fully apparent only in the late twentieth century as growth in arts and sciences faculties slowed, whereas that in professional schools continued. Before World War II, arts and sciences faculties were dominant in almost every dimension of academic life. The late nineteenth and early twentieth century rise of the PhD and development of the corresponding undergraduate major took place within arts and sciences faculties (or, indeed, in many cases, as part of the creation of arts and sciences faculties). The main academic disciplines were those of the arts and sciences, and the interdisciplinary projects that tried to keep them connected to each other from the 1920s forward were also mainly arts and sciences projects. The mid-twentieth century flourishing of interdisciplinary area studies, and eventual tensions with disciplines, both took place inside arts and sciences faculties.

By the late twentieth century, however, the big growth in universities was in professional schools. These had been drawn into universities during the same late nineteenth and early twentieth century period when the arts and sciences fields were recast as research-based disciplines. More recently, though, professional schools had not only grown but also developed major research enterprises of their own. They also increasingly internalized intellectual and educational agendas once associated overwhelmingly with the liberal arts, from "critical thinking" to international studies.

A wide variety of professional fields began to embrace more international dimensions to both research and practice. In some cases, this meant merely international connections among professors in professional schools, as, for example, professors of various specialties in academic medicine might meet international counterparts. But in many cases, international studies flourished as a content area in professional training and in research. Public health schools, for example, became pioneering centers of international research, from epidemiology to health policy. Somewhat later, business and law schools followed suit. International business education grew especially large and active with strong connections to other fields, such as international finance and marketing, and to executive education. In some universities—such as Georgetown—this was closely connected to professional schools of international affairs; seldom was it closely integrated with area studies. Law schools did not match the scale but the field of international law, and international inquiries and partnerships more generally, both grew. Research about and training of professionals for rapidly growing fields such as human rights and transitional justice, for example, flourished in law schools. International or comparative education became a topic in at least the more research-oriented education schools. Whereas faculty for these ventures came initially from the arts and sciences disciplines, sometimes with area studies training, the professional schools increasingly began to train future faculty members in their own doctoral programs.

The growth of international research, education, and practice was important in nearly every field of professional study. Most relevant for present purposes, however, is the expansion of professional education directly in international affairs. After World War II, the older professional schools were joined by several new ones. Many added graduate programs, usually centered on politics and economics. The School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins (founded in 1943) and the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia (founded in 1946) were graduate schools from the start. Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School added graduate programs in 1948. Many of these schools of international and public affairs included some level of area-specific training in their programs, and correspondingly they either ran area studies centers or employed faculty who participated in

university-wide area centers. There was another wave of foundings in the late 1950s and 1960s, linked to the broader expansion of the university sector. American University's School of International Service (1957–1958) and Denver's School of International Studies (1964) were among the leaders. Still more have been added, and they have been joined in an Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (APSIA).

Most of these schools offered undergraduate as well as graduate programs, often to large enrollments. But they specialized in professional master's programs (roughly analogous to MBA degrees). Like other professional schools, however, they employed faculty members with research agendas and they became increasingly engaged in training their own future faculty. This was especially important in the field of international relations (IR), which maintained a hybrid character between an arts and science discipline (or subdiscipline of political science) and a professional field oriented to informing foreign policy. IR was in fact a new quasidiscipline forged in the post–World War II era, shaped partly by German immigrants, and situated as one of the social sciences.[19] Oriented mostly to "realist" analysis of relations among nation-states, IR turned away from both diplomatic history and area studies.

Although some of the APSIA schools hosted area studies programs, there was in fact a growing division between the thematic content of area studies research and the intellectual projects of the "core" APSIA school faculty, which was composed mainly of international relations specialists and secondarily of other political scientists, economists, and, occasionally, sociologists. The heritage of realism lived on, even where debated by constructivists. It informed emphases on directly political and economic factors in international relations and security studies, and neglect of the mediating influence of culture. Although by the late twentieth century a growing proportion of students intended to pursue careers in the nonprofit sector, faculty research remained centered on state relations. Certain topics—perhaps, most prominently, religion—were neglected in the APSIA schools, and were seen as associated with humanities scholarship and area studies (as will be discussed later). This is only one of a number of lacunae in attention opened by a problematic disciplinary division of labor. Area studies scholarship is crucial to remedying such weaknesses in connection with both disciplines, but especially relating to other interdisciplinary ventures, such as professional programs.

Connections, not Containers

Important paths for the renewal of international studies today involve opening collaborations across regions and among different disciplinary and professional

approaches. Think of the way study of global cities can combine the work of area specialists with political economists, network analysts, architects, and designers. Or, think of issues such as transitional justice that bring together questions of law, culture, and social change. Or, consider how culturally specific inquiries into ideas of moral obligation and the category of the human inform the study of human rights and humanitarian action. Creative new projects are indeed breaking some old molds. Younger scholars are willing to think outside some of the boxes and quarrels of their elders. There are strong desires to understand real-world phenomena that demand the knowledge created in different long-standing academic fields but that cannot be contained by any of them.

There is even (in some quarters, not everywhere) willingness to suspend debates over the right label for the enterprise so as not to derail its renewal. New intellectual agendas could be grouped together as international, interregional, transnational, transcultural, global, area, or comparative. "International" is convenient because the label is already commonplace and institutionally recognized. A moment's etymological and genealogical reflection, however, reveals its initial focus on relations among nations and, implicitly, nation-states. It is foundational to international relations as a field, but not as precisely apt for understanding, say, transnational religion or the circulation of musical styles or even markets (although we still collect statistics on international trade). Some such combination of limits can be raised for any of the other potential umbrella terms as well. A label is needed, but it is doubtful that a perfect one will be found.

This points to a more basic issue. We have trouble speaking about the domain under consideration here partly because it has been constructed negatively. The "international" has been approached as the "foreign." More precisely, most of the humanities and social sciences have been constructed on the basis of nation-states, with a primary focus on the "domestic." Thus, history has been primarily national histories (with each country most interested in its own). Literatures have been national literatures, although they are sometimes compared. Sociology constructs society first and foremost on the model of the nation-state. Political science is about politics within states—usually emphasizing one home state but also including comparisons of domestic politics. Economics has looked at national markets and economic policy tools and even tried to grasp the non-national on the basis of national statistics.

Not every field has been as centrally organized on national lines (not classics, for obvious reasons, although it has not been free of the national influence either). Many fields have long incorporated interests not only in what is "foreign" from any one vantage point but also in shared lineages (Romance languages and literature, for example, or English or Francophone literature as distinct from that of England

or France). To an impressive degree, however, the social sciences and humanities developed as fields implicitly defined by nations and national projects. Research and teaching were both oriented disproportionately to either the domestic affairs or national policies of individual states. The focus was sometimes explicit (for instance, American history or American politics) and sometimes implicit (for example, sociology or economics taught as general but taking most examples from the United States). This reinforced defining the rest of the world as the "other," so that even efforts to break out of the national container appeared as looking abroad, at the foreign. Moreover, the rest of the world was commonly approached as either (1) the study of similarly "internal" phenomena in other places (comparative politics, comparative literature), or (2) the study of the relationships among these national monads (international relations).

This is changing. Not only is there dramatically increased attention to world history, but there is also an exciting project of internationalizing American history.[20] Not only are Europeanists paying attention to the literatures or politics of former colonies, but they are also recognizing the extent to which Europe itself was shaped by its colonial projects and relations with people elsewhere. Not only are sociologists studying societies other than their own, but they are also trying to break down the assumption that societies are sharply bounded and internally coherent units modeled on the ideal type of nation-states, and therefore they are attempting to study the flows and connections across borders. None of this means that the national ceases to be important. Indeed, it may be the explicit object of study but thereby precisely not the tacit, taken-for-granted frame of study.

The intellectual shift is challenging. Take the struggle of international relations scholars who have recently, somewhat reluctantly, had to figure out how to take religion seriously. The problem arose because religion had been assigned to the "domestic" realm and ruled out of the international in an ideology dating back to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. This was absorbed into the very constitution of the field of international relations.[21] It is changing only slowly and only in response to dramatic pressure after 2001. As Robert Keohane explains, "the attacks of September 11 reveal that all mainstream theories of world politics are relentlessly secular with respect to motivation. They ignore the impact of religion, despite the fact that world-shaking political movements have so often been fueled by religious fervor."[22] Researchers seeking to change this face problems not only with reigning theories but also with lack of knowledge and institutional and intellectual distance from those with more knowledge—often area studies specialists and researchers from the humanities and fields such as history that straddle humanities and social science. This, of course, also reminds us that the area studies fields are of value not simply because of an abstract desire to "cover" world regions, but also because of

real-world engagements with other contexts and configurations of social life and culture. Although the leaders of area studies often articulate the rationale of "coverage," the demand for area studies is more commonly focused on pressing social concerns. Part of the importance of area studies fields is realized only in better connections to other fields not defined by area.

Doing substantially better with international studies means more than simply increasing the amount of attention to the "other." It requires rethinking the very frames of reference of the humanities and social sciences. It is accordingly as much about the disciplines as about interdisciplinary programs. Diasporas and migrations offer a simple example. National borders are crossed, and national policies are clearly at issue as are national economic futures. However, the process is hardly contained by the national (as though immigration could be understood without attention to the rest of migration or to the societies and cultures from which migrants come and which, to some extent, they carry with them). Moreover, migration flows connect not only "sender" and "receiver" societies but also circuits of sites of diasporic settlement. Sikhs in Toronto are connected to Sikhs in London as well as those in the Punjab and, for that matter, Yuba City, California. Understanding Sikh communities and connections is thus not only a matter for South Asian studies any more than Islam is only a matter for Middle Eastern studies. However, trying to understand Sikh communities abroad without having a serious knowledge of Sikhism in South Asia is silly, as is trying to understand Muslims in Europe without paying attention to both Islam's historic roots and its long-standing transnational connections.

But do not let the example mislead. It is not just that there are some new phenomena that make national frames of reference problematic now. When was the United States not a migrant society? Was the Methodism central to the antislavery movement simply American Methodism? Was not the very transformation of the American university, led in the late nineteenth century by Johns Hopkins, Chicago, and Cornell, part of an international transformation of intellectual institutions? There may be more and stronger transnational connections now than in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century heyday of nation-state projects. But the social sciences and humanities internalized a great deal of that nineteenth- and twentieth-century orientation to a world structured by nation-states and international relations. Nations and states remain important in contemporary global structures, but making them intellectual presuppositions actually gets in the way of making them objects of analysis and studying contemporary social and cultural relations that cross national boundaries.

The opportunity in the present era lies not in simply changing the balance but in getting away from the idea of a Manichean division between the national and

everything beyond, outside, or cross-cutting it. We can reduce the extent to which disciplines emphasize the first and relegate the second to interdisciplinary programs.

It is not only the implicit nation-centeredness of the humanities and social science disciplines that is problematic. It is also the extent to which efforts to complement this with area studies and other interdisciplinary programs produced partial mirror images. One of the problematic features of area studies programs was the extent to which many were constituted as collections of specialists on different nation-states within various areas. Few scholars in East Asian studies programs, for example, actually studied East Asia; most studied China, Japan, or Korea.

The prospect before us is to strengthen the ways in which we attend to contexts—not by reifying certain contexts as necessary, but by making a comparative and historical concern for context part of all knowledge-forming projects. When we do this, we see that the area studies fields are structures for organizing valuable resources, but not in and of themselves definitive of relevant contexts. This is made evident by (1) the many historical and contemporary patterns of connection across areas, not only at frontiers but also over long distances; (2) the prominence of certain regions that are omitted from or situated on the frontiers of area studies fields (most prominently, Central Asia); (3) the development of new (or renewed) transnational networks and fields associated with a range of activities and issues, from markets to environment and to religion; and (4) projects of integrating regions such as Eastern and Western Europe or greater Asia, or the Mediterranean or the Pacific.

Regions are thus as important as ever, but they are being redefined. This suggests both the limits of old containers for knowledge and the virtues of studying new connections. These inquiries depend on knowledge developed in area studies, but also on opening area studies fields to more cross-cutting inquiries and new forms of integration with other perspectives.

This is an important agenda for undergraduate education as well as research programs. Since the 1980s, undergraduate international studies programs that connect different disciplines, regions, and problem-oriented approaches have proved attractive and grown large. They frequently have good students; some restrict entry. Not surprisingly, these programs have often faced resistance, given the substantial enrollments at stake and internal competition in universities, especially in an era of slow growth. Area studies programs have often seen a tension with their own majors and their claims to autonomous curricular importance. Political science departments have sometimes tried, for example, to maintain that "international studies" was not a field in its own right and that student interests were better met by the study of international relations (perhaps combined with comparative politics). However, the effort to "hoard" majors may have been counterproductive even

where it succeeded, because it was the interdisciplinary, integrative programs that were most attractive to undergraduates.

Interdisciplinary undergraduate programs provide an important base for area studies that is sometimes neglected in research-centered discussions. Student demand translates (albeit not perfectly) into a potential financial basis.

The biggest catch for area studies programs and for other interdisciplinary scholars is that there has not yet been a reorganization of doctoral teaching or research fields to match the breadth of the undergraduate interdisciplinary studies majors (or, indeed, professional master's programs). These majors have remained collaborations among people whose primary intellectual homes and academic jobs are elsewhere; they have commonly amounted to curricula composed of courses offered in separate departments and area programs. Yet, area studies faculty and, indeed, disciplinary faculty neglect such programs at their peril.

Over the past thirty-five years, growth in university finances has favored science, technology, and professional schools. The liberal arts—particularly the humanities and social sciences—subsist much more on tuition or on the enrollment-driven parts of state contributions. Current financial upheavals are only exacerbating this trend.[23] Student demand for context-specific teaching can support faculty positions, but this student support will be expressed less through area studies majors—which are tiny—than through courses that fit into other programs. Obsessing over competition between area studies and disciplines is a distraction. Disciplinary majors are also likely to shrink. The growth areas are professional and preprofessional studies and broad interdisciplinary fields, often focused on public issues. The latter include not only transregional international studies, but also environmental studies, development studies, communications studies, and policy studies, among others. These will be much less intellectually serious and practically useful if they neglect deep context-specific knowledge, but to thrive in connection with them, area studies fields need to open themselves to more transregional and problem-oriented teaching.

Prospects

Context-specific knowledge remains important—but which contexts matter most is shifting. The regions addressed by traditional area studies fields are more, not less, significant in contemporary global affairs—but so are other regions and connections across regions. Sustaining area studies depends on openness to new configurations.

Decades of intensifying globalization have made clear that growing global connections do not amount to a simple process of unification, let alone peaceful and

uniformly prosperous integration. Globalization has produced new security threats, demands for shifting structures of international cooperation, wars on several continents, and tensions among a cluster of regional powers that may foreshadow a new multilateral order replacing a brief era of unilateral U.S. dominance. It has produced electronic integration of financial markets that can both underpin a boom and speed a bust. It has produced divisions as well as connections between buyers and sellers of energy and natural resources. Global religions contribute to complex conflicts as well as advocacy for global peace. Think not only of Islam but also of the role of African and Latin American dioceses in the growing split within the Anglican Communion and the American Episcopal Church. Globalization has given impetus to a re-regionalization of global political economy with the European Union, with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and with pan-Asian integration. It has brought to the fore several regional powers, some intent on hegemony with regions they help to anchor. In some cases, such as Central Asia and Northwest China, tensions over regional hegemony have coincided with new alignments rooted in global religion.

At the same time, transnational cultural flows have hardly brought a simple global sameness. Some have indeed brought similarities within large-scale zones of circulation. Not only transnational religion but also transnational taste cultures are prominent. Some join people who are not at all spatially proximate, and thus are poorly grasped by notions of region or area even as they are far from globally universal. But transnational cultural flows are not necessarily encompassing of all or most people in the countries and regions they cross. Jazz, for example, is global even though it is a minority culture wherever it takes root. Opera is popular music in Italy and Argentina, but it attracts a narrow elite in the United States. Both jazz and opera have many fans, however, among a cosmopolitan cultural elite, they are plausible gambits for conversation in business class airline seats. The existence of a transnational elite culture is an aspect of globalization; it is sometimes support for the illusion among frequent flyers that globalization is more complete than it is; but it too is a minority culture even if far-flung.[24] The same is true of diasporic cultures that link (and sometimes change) countries that send migrants with centers in several host countries and each of these centers with each other in networks of cultural as well as marriage and economic exchange.

In short, much is missed by both the new wave of globalization studies, with its pursuit of knowledge of the world as a whole, and traditional area studies programs, with their divisions of the globe into seemingly separate regions. We need at once to see the differentiation within global interconnection and to see the ways in which each area is shaped by its connections to the rest of the world and offers distinctive vantage points on the processes and structures of globalization.

The global is misunderstood if it is approached with attention only to that which grows more similar. The regional and local are misunderstood if analysts expect all the crucial resources to be internal rather than reflections of their situation in larger contexts. Organization exists at many different scales.

Global integration produces an ecosystem in which there are subsystems with considerable capacity to maintain homeostasis and others with less of this capacity. Different regions and localities have both their distinctive patterns of internal organization and their distinctive relationships to the whole. Long-distance trading networks and diasporas each have an organization distinct from that of the regions through which they pass. The global looks different from different places, from different long-distance networks, and from positions of different resources and opportunities within each.

Thinking about the many different scales of organization and the way they interact opens up exciting intellectual possibilities. Paying attention to transregional connections and to the transformation of what seem to be regions can both reinvigorate area studies and connect regional knowledge in different ways to other projects.

Alas, this does not mean that renewal will be easy. Old grudges, resentments, and suspicions remain obstacles—not least sustaining the tensions among disciplinary, area studies, and professional school perspectives. There is a deficit to overcome, as neither government nor foundation support for international studies has kept pace with globalization over the past thirty years. Not only has the extent of global engagements and concerns outpaced the extent of international education and research in American universities, but the pattern of globalization has also created a need for studies of previously neglected regions such as Central Asia and reshaped relations across all regions. There are also practical and political questions, however, posed by certain sources of funds—such as whether scholars should embrace or resist military and Defense Department efforts to learn from social science and area studies.[25]

For fifty years, Title VI programs have played a basic role both in providing support for area studies and language teaching and in encouraging stronger public outreach and connections to professional schools. This is not and should not be episodic support tied to specific short-term agendas. It is a matter of sustaining investments that make it possible to bring knowledge to bear when new issues emerge.

The idea of national resource centers is instructive. Context-specific knowledge is a resource that can be crucial in new circumstances—when security challenges change, for example, or new environmental risks appear, or shifting migration patterns create new international connections. The needed knowledge cannot be

created on a moment's notice; it must be nurtured. Continued Title VI support for the maintenance and renewal of core intellectual resources is vital.

Those who keep reminding decision makers of the continued importance of basic scholarship will risk looking conservative. However, if American universities are to rise to the challenge of providing the international knowledge that can inform policy, educate practitioners in a variety of fields, and help citizens understand our global pressures, engagements, and opportunities, then the core tasks do include basic scholarship as well as pursuit of new lines of research. We need both basic and advanced language teaching—which can be done in innovative ways. We need serious historical knowledge—which can transcend the national structures that usually organize it. We need understanding of cultural patterns—which include clashes and creativity as well as civilizational continuities.

Important as they are, however, national resource centers by themselves are not enough. Their vitality and their value depend on connections. First of all, they depend on much better connections to each other than most, in fact, achieve. The kind of knowledge sustained in Title VI centers flourishes when connections and comparisons across regions are pursued.

Universities should build on the resources sustained by Title VI to strengthen both undergraduate and professional curricula so students understand the ways specific regional contexts and transregional connections are shaping the world today. This will require investments from universities themselves, not least in creating faculty positions. But this is vital to make sure that students gain not only a smattering of facts about different places, but also an awareness of the importance of deeper and better integrated knowledge so they can seek it when they or organizations they work in need it.

Private philanthropies also have the opportunity to invest in ways that enhance the payoff of the resource centers Title VI programs sustain. Some will seek to support individual scholars or research groups in pursuing new intellectual agendas. We can only hope that many will directly value achievements of scholarship and their effective communication. Others, probably more, will seek to enlist those with deep context-specific knowledge in collaborating with practitioners working on major problems. But whether foundations back historians shedding new light on old connections between regions or sociologists trying to make AIDS treatment programs more effective, they depend on intellectual resources often rooted in area studies programs. But they also depend on area studies specialists to be open to projects not contained by traditional regional definitions or scholarly agendas.

Renewal of interest in international studies comes with new topics, challenges, intellectual agendas, and practical concerns. Most of these are potentially exciting, but they bring their own frustrations. Even if funding grows, in most cases, it is not

likely to restore old budget lines. As often, what seems new and different will be favored. Some funders will be more interested in social problems than in cultural achievements. Africanists will worry that a continent rich in music, art, and religious innovation will appear only as a set of human security challenges. Sinologists will worry that an ancient and enormously complex civilization is reduced to an economic opportunity or threat. However, there is no realistic way to deal with these frustrations by resisting the idea that regional knowledge should be brought to bear on practical projects or asserting that it is simply an end in itself.

This is not merely an issue of resources. Established, even carefully cultivated knowledge needs frequently to be rethought in light of new practical problems and new intellectual perspectives. This is how it lives.

Notes

1 It is impressive to what extent the professional schools of international affairs were formed at private rather than public universities—an imbalance not matched in any other professional area. This is perhaps tied to recruitment of social elites into diplomacy. Even today, public universities are represented in the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (APSIA) mainly through schools of public policy focused primarily on domestic affairs. The School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at University of California, San Diego, and the Jackson School at the University of Washington are among the few exceptions.

2 See George Steinmetz, *The Devil's Handwriting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007) on the development of ethnological and colonial expertise in Germany.

3 For an insightful look back at the project of modernization theory, see Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).

4 See Craig Calhoun, "Explanation in Historical Sociology: Narrative, General Theory, and Historically Specific Theory," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 104, no. 3 (1998), pp. 846–71.

5 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso rev. ed. 1991, orig. 1983).

6 James Scott, *Seeing Like a State* (New Haven: Yale University Press,1998).

7 Among many, see Raùl Prebisch, *The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems* (New York: United Nations, 1950); Andre Gunder Frank, *The Development of Underdevelopment* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966); Fernando Henrique Cardozo and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and*

Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); Albert O. Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic Development* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958).

8 Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System* (New York: Academic Press, 1974) is the classic work. It is worth noting that nearly all the major protagonists of the first generation of world systems analysis—including Giovanni Arrighi, Terence Hopkins, and John Saul—were initially active in African studies, and many spent time teaching in African universities.

9 International political economy was previously strong in both political science and sociology. Its relative decline may reflect both the orientation of some area studies fields toward approaches rooted in the humanities and the failure of disciplinary departments to emphasize context-specific international research. See Rina Agarwala and Emmanuel Teitelbaum, "Trends in Funding for Dissertation Field Research: Why Do Political Science and Sociology Students Win so Few Awards?" *Political Science and Politics,* forthcoming.

10 Obviously, more was at stake in those fateful years than oil—the collapse of the Bretton Woods financial structure, the Yom Kippur War, struggles both for and against popular economic participation that helped produce Latin American dictatorships, generational struggles over the political direction of rich countries, and the impact of the Vietnam War. The 1970s crisis was not resolved, but deferred—largely through a dramatic increase in the use of credit and through attacks on state welfare spending commonly labeled neoliberalism. This contributed directly to the 2008–2009 crisis. This is relevant partly because the 1970s ushered in thirty years of shifts away from public funding of higher education, deep problems for scholars in many of the world's regions, and hard times as well for humanists and social scientists in the United States who sought to study other parts of the world.

11 See Craig Calhoun and Jonathan VanAntwerpen, "Orthodoxy, Heterodoxy and Hierarchy: 'Mainstream' Sociology and its Challengers," in C. Calhoun, ed., *Sociology in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). Ironically, this happened at the same time that largely French-inspired theory became influential in literature departments and some other parts of the humanities.

12 See Michael Kennedy and Miguel A. Centeno, "Internationalism and Global Transformation in American Sociology," in Calhoun, ed., op cit.

13 While both economics and psychology reduced their ties to other social sciences, they forged new ties to each other (including ties in the interdisciplinary field of cognitive sciences, which economics entered through interest in decision making). Moreover, economics and psychology are different from the other social sciences in having much more substantially retained their

connections to nonacademic "practitioners" and applied researchers. An economist working for the World Bank or a psychologist running a testing program for a school district remain members of the discipline that granted their PhDs to a much greater degree than, say, sociologists or political scientists working in various branches of government, the UN, NGOs, or business.

14 For a broader context, see David Szanton, ed., *The Politics of Knowledge: Area Studies and the Disciplines* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

15 One important difference between the two was that Mellon remained focused mainly on American universities, though no longer area studies, whereas Ford turned its focus increasingly to direct funding of work in the global South and to nonacademic organizations.

16 The Peace Corps had a bigger impact in the 1960s partly because it was organized to recruit more young people straight from college who then considered graduate school afterward—influenced by their experience abroad. More recently, it has placed a greater emphasis on people who already had specific skill sets often obtained through graduate degrees or significant career experience.

17 David Szanton, ed., *The Politics of Knowledge: Area Studies and the Disciplines* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), p. vii. See also two other collections responding to the 1990s crisis of area studies: Ali Mirsepanni, Amrita Basu, and Frederick Weaver, eds., *Localizing Knowledge in a Global World* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2003) and Masao Miyoshi and H. D. Harootunian, eds., *Learning Places: The Afterlives of Area Studies* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002). See also Jane Guyer's helpful account, *African Studies in the United States* (Atlanta: African Studies Association Press, 1996).

18 Even "Big Science" developed largely outside the core Arts and Science teaching departments; see Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds., *Big Science: The Growth of Large-Scale Research* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992).

19 See Guilhot, op cit.; also Robert Vitalis, "Birth of a Discipline," pp. 159–82 in D. Long and B. C. Schmidt, eds., *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2005).

20 Thomas Bender, ed., *Rethinking American History in a Global Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

21 See Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007) and Mark Jurgensmeyer, Craig Calhoun, and Jonathan VanAntwerpen, *Rethinking Secularism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). The Luce Foundation has recently launched a major program supporting efforts of APSIA schools to integrate the study of religion into their research and curricula given its manifest importance in contemporary international relations. See Timothy S. Shah, Alfred C.

Stepan, and Monica Duffy Toft, *Religion and International Affairs* (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

22 Keohane, "The Globalization of Informal Violence, Theories of World Politics, and 'The Liberalism of Fear," pp. 77–92 in C. Calhoun, P. Price, and A. Timmer, eds., *Understanding September 11* (New York: New Press 2002), p. 72. See also Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

23 Craig Calhoun, "The Public Mission of the Research University," in C. Calhoun and D. Rhoten, eds., *Knowledge Matters* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010) and R. L. Geiger, *Knowledge and Money* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004).

24 Craig Calhoun, "The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travelers: Toward a Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism," *South Atlantic Quarterly,* vol. 101 no. 4 (2003), pp. 869–97.

25 See discussion of Project Minerva at http://essays.ssrc.org/minerva/.