


Nationalism Matters

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Nationalism is easily underestimated. To start with, in its most pervasive forms it is often not noticed. Analysts focused on eruptions of violence, waves of racial or ethnic discrimination, and mass social movements fail to see the everyday nationalism that organizes people's sense of belonging in the world and to particular states and the methodological nationalism that leads historians to organize history as stories within or of nations and social scientists to approach comparative research with data sets in which the units are almost always nations. It is important not to start inquiries into nationalism by selecting only its most extreme or problematic forms for attention. Equally, it is important not to imagine it as exceptional, about to vanish, a holdover from an earlier era lacking in contemporary basis; it is hardly good scholarship to wish nationalism away.

On the contrary, nationalism is a discursive formation that gives shape to the modern world.¹ It is a way of talking, writing, and thinking about the basic units of culture, politics, and belonging that helps to constitute nations as real and powerful dimensions of social life. Nations do not exist “objectively” before they exist discursively. Equally, however, nations conjured out of talk and sentiment are also “real” material structures of solidarity and recognition. To say that nationalism is part of a social imaginary is not to say that nations are mere figments of the imagination to be dispensed with in more hardheaded analyses. As a discursive formation, nationalism (like, say, individualism) generates ever more discussion because it raises as many problems, aporias, and questions as it resolves.

There have been long and generally fruitless debates about the antiquity and origins of nationalism. Attempts to resolve them turn in large part on definitions, each of which is tendentious. Is nationalism essentially political and linked to the emergence of the modern state? Elie Kedourie writes that

nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of power

in the state, and for the right organization of a society of states. Briefly, the doctrine holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government.²

But one might as well argue that nationalism is essentially cultural and as old as fellow feeling among members of linguistic and ethnic communities. Or, more moderately, one might suggest that modern nationalism is a transformation wrought on such ancient ethnic identities by the new circumstances of modernity, including not only states but popular literacy, and with it newspapers and novels, mass educational systems, museums, and histories. Though their arguments are in other important ways opposed, two of the most prominent contemporary analysts of nationalism, Anthony Smith and Benedict Anderson, seem to agree on this, with the former stressing continuity with the past and the “reality” of ethnic traditions and the latter stressing imaginary construction, the novelty of mass media, and the role of the state.³

In this context it is perhaps instructive to note that we draw the word “nation” from ancient Roman usage, in which nations were preeminently subject peoples and barbarians. Romans understood these nations to be organized in terms of common descent and ways of life rather than properly political institutions. The Romans themselves, thus, were not in an important sense a nation, at least not from the mature Republic on. Nor was nationality as such the basis for political community, though it was a basis for exclusion. One might then locate the origins of nationalism—or at least of Europe’s characteristic nations—in the dissolution of the Roman Empire and the development of a variety of different politico-cultural groupings in medieval Europe.⁴ This has the advantage of reminding us that there is nothing “natural” about either the link between community and cultural commonality and the development of nationalism or the nation-state, either as actual (in varying extent) or as idealized in doctrine. As a way of organizing political life and cultural or ethnic claims (themselves commonly political), nationalism grows neither in primordial mists nor in the abstract. It grows in relationship to other political, cultural, and ethnic projects.

Nationalism is pervasive in the modern world because it is widely *used*, not merely found, but it is used in different projects—claiming or contesting the legitimacy of governments, demanding reorganization of educational curricula, promoting the elimination of ethnic minorities in the pursuit of cultural or racial purity. Its meaning lies in the interconnections among these various uses, not in any one of them. There is no common denominator that precisely defines the set of “true” nationalisms or “true” nations by virtue of being shared by all and by no other political or cultural projects or formations. Yet nationalism is real and powerful. Nationalism matters because it is a vital part of

collective projects that give shape to the modern world, transform the very units of social solidarity, identity, and legal recognition within it, and organize deadly conflicts.

Nationalism flourishes in the wake of empires but also in active relationship to empires, including Austro-Hungarian, Spanish, Portuguese, British, French, German, and non-European empires. It flourishes also in competition among ostensible nations. It organizes both domestic and international struggles and indeed the very distinction of domestic from international. It matters more because it matters in so many different contexts. This gives added resonance and life to the rhetoric of nationalism even while it renders definitions problematic.

Theoretical and historiographical arguments about nationalism are heavily reliant on European examples as well as European political projects and debates and European misunderstandings. This collection of new studies of nationalism in the Americas is welcome because it contributes to a better recognition of the ways in which nationalism matters and the mutability of the ways in which the category of nation is deployed. In particular, it may help overcome not only a Eurocentric selection of examples but also biases and blind spots built into theory by thinking in terms of certain prototypical European arguments and categories. These are deeply integrated into the theory and historiography as they have developed throughout European modernity. This is not to say that there are not comparable confusions in studies of the Americas or in the use of “nation” as a category in American political projects or academic research, and indeed many of these come in large part from importing European analytic perspectives too uncritically. Merely fitting the New World examples into an Old World framework won’t help and indeed may add confusion by reproducing the opposition of old to new and with it the implication that nationalism emerges as a process of maturation, the collective *Bildung* of peoples as they gain the capacity for sovereignty and with it the overcoming of older political forms like empire (or, relatedly, that further “maturation” overcomes nationalism itself in the production of cosmopolitan politics and identities).

European nationalism has from early on been deeply invested in three misrecognitions that different constructions of European history and politics helped to embed in more general theories of nationalism. The first of these is that nations are relative equals. The second is that nation and empire are sharply opposed and incompatible political formations. The third is that nations are always already available only to be called forth in new mobilizations for action or discourses of legitimacy. Some analysts of Europe have recognized how each of these assertions misleads. Nonetheless, they have been important themes in the discursive formation by which nationalism is reproduced in and among European countries and, indeed, elsewhere.

The New World has lessons to teach on each of the themes about which European self-understanding has been misleading. Let me evoke these briefly with reference mainly to Europe, leaving the development of or contestation over the New World cases to the other chapters in this book. I shall then turn to a review of general themes and debates structuring theories of nationalism. It is important, I think, for studies of nationalism in the New World to engage these debates well, grasping the overall range of arguments and positions and putting these ideas to use in a new empirical context. But it is important too for scholars to be skeptical of the ways in which many issues and debates are posed in the dominant literature on nationalism. Among other things, for a scholarly literature it has been unusually caught up with praising or—recently much more often—debunking the objects of its study.

Three Misrecognitions

European nationalism developed simultaneously as an account of internal integration and legitimacy of rule and external differentiation and sovereignty. It had ancient roots but took its dominant forms in a modern era shaped by inconclusive wars and economic competition. It is important to see the shaping influence of a Europe in which many different states had long existed without any attaining domination over the whole. That Germany's Third Reich came closer than any previous project of Continental integration since the dissolution of the Roman Empire only reveals the primary historical fact of a plurality of powerful states. But more on empire in a moment. Here we should note the relatively unusual character of Europe and its major influence on thinking about nationalism.

In few other regions of the world, if any, were several comparably powerful states forced to coexist with each other in relative equality without the peacekeeping and integrating influence of an overarching or at least central empire. Where empire was absent, either state making was modest or state projects collided in wars, conquests, and expansion. The latter was indeed Europe's pattern, and who is to say that it is not still—that the peace produced after World War II in part by projects of European union will not ultimately result in a supra-European state, whether imperial or national or in some sense more novel?

European nationalism reflected, however, the relative stalemate in which a variety of different states could achieve relative independence and pursue distinctive policies. This was not simply an inheritance from feudalism, which did indeed produce diverse polities but not the boundaries or domestic integration of modern states. On the contrary, it was only in the early modern period that this mode of political and social organization took shape. Through most of the

nineteenth century patterns of procreation and family life varied more within states than among them.⁵ As late as the middle of the nineteenth century the majority of French citizens spoke regional languages, not the standard French that first the royal court and then the revolutionary Republic was concerned to perfect.⁶ In other words, before the nineteenth century states organized less of social life and coincided less with cultural integration. Just as important, the Peace of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years War in 1648 established a principle of independent sovereignty and mutual recognition that became basic to the flourishing of nationalism. A variety of relatively small countries gained recognition in the Peace or, later, on the terms it outlined; most prominent initially were the Netherlands and the Swiss Confederation. The latter of these reminds us that the principle established at Westphalia was not yet that of the nation-state but of the autonomous or sovereign state for which nationalism could grow in importance as a discourse of domestic legitimacy and external recognition. The principle, moreover, was hardly the empirical actuality. And of course borders could be made more and more salient—not just by making them harder to cross but by building infrastructure and institutions that offered people benefits but stopped sharply at their edges.

The idea of nationalism, and indeed theories of nationalism, have been enormously shaped by the extent to which the big European states reached a balance of power and through alliances and wars managed almost despite themselves to sustain it. The importance of Spain faded after the Thirty Years War, and the long process of constructing countries out of the Holy Roman Empire and eventually the other Hapsburg dominions began.⁷ France was especially strong at first, and it is arguably at the moment of the French Revolution of 1789 that all the most frequently evoked elements of nationalism were first fully and clearly in play on the European Continent.⁸ But France was never strong enough to dominate, Napoléon notwithstanding. Germany was long locked into a struggle to catch up in political integration and military might but with increasing clarity became the Continental counterweight to France. If Germany was initially the negative example in ideas of nationalism because it lacked France's central state, its very projects of integration and their philosophical articulations (notably, e.g., by Johann Gottlieb Fichte during the early nineteenth century) became extremely influential. The contrasts between France and Germany loomed extremely large in the development of nationalism in theory and practice and to this day structure basic conceptual divides such as the overblown contrast between civic and ethnic nationalism. England, still in the early stages of integration or transformation into Britain, became a third exemplar of a powerful nation-state.

Of course, there were a number of smaller European states, and the number grew as various former Hapsburg dominions gained or struggled for indepen-

dence. For at least three hundred years, though, the crucial fact was the absence of an integrating Continental power. The issue for smaller states, then, was not so much to gain shelter under one or another empire as to gain recognition as a sovereign state. While there was always a lot of *realpolitik* to this, it was always bound up with the capacity to project identity as a nation. It is worth noting that this has remained a powerful factor in the politics of international recognition. When Slovenia and Croatia announced their independence from the former Yugoslavia, the United States (and Germany, leading the European powers) immediately recognized their sovereignty. When Bosnia-Herzegovina did the same, recognition was withheld, apparently on the grounds that it did not represent a “real nation,” despite a longer history of territorial integrity and civic life, including five hundred years of peace.

Doctrines of nationalism long included the notion of the equivalence of each nation, at least each “real” or “historical” nation (and debates over what to do about “nationalities” that fell short of that constitute another story). This doctrine was influenced by and paired with that of individualism. The nation was conceptualized in part as a person, including a legal person on the model of kings as sovereigns. And as domestic law came increasingly to recognize human persons as equals, so international law recognized national persons as equals. But of course they weren’t. East Timor and the People’s Republic of China, Luxembourg and the United States are all recognized members of the United Nations and sovereign equals before international law. Yet it takes a rather grand leap of imagination to consider them equal in other senses. This act of imagination was made possible significantly by a specific phase of European history. It was extended by the processes of decolonization that ended European overseas empires through the production of putative nation-states conceived on the model of such equivalence.⁹

The second misrecognition to which I pointed was the sharp contrast of nation to empire. We have already seen one source of this in the Peace of Westphalia. Though there was no clear-cut military triumph in the Thirty Years War, to a considerable extent the war marked the defeat of empire—represented by Spain and the Holy Roman Empire—by powers that would increasingly style themselves and organize themselves as nations, notably France and Sweden. During the ensuing period European social theorists wrote extensively about foreign empires and the instructive lessons they offered to European countries. Montesquieu’s *Persian Letters* (1721) is only one of the most famous such treatises to mark out the alleged contrast between the tyranny of empire and the liberties of European political arrangements. Of course, many of these works, including Montesquieu’s, were written at least as much to point out bits of tyranny at home as to criticize those abroad. But the fact that empire became so basic a foil was influential. It was in this discourse, for example, that the Ottoman

Empire became (in European eyes) paradigmatically non-European and non-Western, with implications to the present day. To an important extent the same is true of Russia, and certainly China, Japan, and others were not merely exoticized but analyzed specifically as empires (and it is a somewhat tendentious question whether this was the right category to use in all cases).

The most important misrecognition in all of this was that it helped underwrite two hundred years of European discourse in which discussions of national identity and citizenship were constructed in contrast to other “bad” empires without being much troubled by the fact that the emerging national states were themselves imperial powers. Even France in its most republican phases was also an empire. Think only of the repression of Haiti’s revolution or note that though republican France set up nominally republican institutions in Egypt it was still a conqueror. One of the challenges for current analysis of European history is coming to terms with the extent to which the forging of European national states was never purely a domestic affair or even simply a combination of domestic affairs with European international relations. It was importantly tied up with the development of colonial empires. If this is true for France, Britain, and Germany (as it certainly is), it applies with equal force in the different cases of Spain and Portugal. The case of Britain is complicated also by the extent to which the British Empire began with English rule over the Celtic countries of Scotland, Ireland, and Wales. These were formally treated as imperial dominions before they were integrated into any project of British nationalism.

The extent to which nationalism should be recognized as almost always interwoven with empire may seem self-evident in some ways in some parts of the New World. If so, this is a good thing, for this recognition could help produce a necessary corrective. But it is not always self-evident in all ways, as the very image of the United States as a republic suggests. It is hard for U.S. citizens to grasp either westward expansion or overseas conquests like the Philippines as part of an imperial history. And in the context of contemporary U.S. projections of global power pundits commonly describe as something new the notion that the United States might act like an empire.

The third misrecognition is perhaps most easily stated, though it is hard to deal with theoretically. This is the notion that nations are always already available to political projects as their prepolitical grounds. Put another way, the idea of “nation” is basic to the idea of “the people” as the source of political legitimacy. Far from being clearly opposed to democracy, national identity is in many ways one of its conditions. The idea of nation does work for democratic political theory (and practice) that it is hard for most democrats to acknowledge openly. For example, it answers the question of why particular people in a particular place benefit from the putatively universal rights identified by democratic theorists. Let me take just a moment to explicate the significance of this for liberal

theory, partly because it matters not just theoretically but because of the extent to which liberal theory suffuses modern state practices and the construction of international relations.

Relying at least tacitly on the idea of “nation” to give an account of why particular people belong together as the “people” of a particular state has historically done the double work of explaining the primary loyalty of each to all within the state and the legitimacy of ignoring or discriminating against those outside the state. Liberal discussions of citizenship and political obligation relied on the background presumption of common nationality to minimize troubling questions about ethnic or other intermediate solidarities (or relegate these to treatment as special cases). Moreover, liberal theory allowed the differentiation of domestic from international affairs on the basis of the same background assumptions. So long as the fiction of a perfect match between nations and states was plausible, liberalism faced relatively few problems of political identity or the constitution and significance of groups, though it meant liberal theory was sociologically impoverished.

Most reasoning about justice, political obligation, and other problems thus assumed the context of “a society,” while reasoning about international relations addressed relations among such societies. It is instructive to see how John Rawls, the most important liberal theorist of the current era, addressed these issues. Rawls’s classic theory of justice presumed an individual state as the necessary context of analysis.¹⁰ A well-ordered society, Rawls insisted, was precisely not a community or an association: “We have assumed that a democratic society, like any political society, is to be viewed as a complete and closed social system. It is complete in that it is self-sufficient and has a place for all the main purposes of human life. It is also closed, in that entry into it is only by birth and exit from it is only by death.”¹¹ Rawls knew, of course, that this was in some ways a fiction, but he initially thought it plausible, since his major focus was on what made “a” society just. Accordingly, he postponed examination of relations among states and transnational phenomena to a later step in analysis. Social changes of the 1990s—commonly summed up under the notion of intensified globalization—forced him to undertake that examination. Rawls’s own approach was to retain the notion of “peoples” or discrete societies and then to propose a “law of peoples” regulating relations among them.¹²

Jürgen Habermas also responded to the same social changes that were making it hard to presume nation-states as the automatic contexts for democracy, rights, or political order. His reflections were informed not only by German and global affairs but by the project of European integration. Debates over whether Europe needed a constitution became the focus of many of his analyses.¹³ Introducing his concept of “constitutional patriotism,” he stressed the idea of political loyalty to a constitutional arrangement as such, an idea important both

as a commitment to procedures that would limit loyalties to substantive social groups (nations or ethnicities) and as a referent for public discourse in which the public itself assumes some of the legitimating function otherwise assigned to nations.¹⁴ Habermas insists that within all modern societies, and thus even more in international amalgamations such as the European Union, there will necessarily be multiple different substantive conceptions of the good life, and these will often be associated with different social groups (though he does not stress the latter point). Constitutional patriotism does not underwrite any of these in their specificity but is instead a general commitment to justification of collective decisions in terms of fairness. It thus allows for debate over how to balance direct reference to universal rights and procedural norms with more specific political culture. But, insisting on a more “comprehensive” rights-based theory of justice, Habermas is unwilling to accept the extent of variation among quasi-autonomous political cultures that Rawls’s theory allowed.¹⁵ Habermas’s approach is more “cosmopolitan” in clearly favoring a global institutionalization of the sort of system of rights that has so far been institutionalized mainly (and often still incompletely and problematically) within individual states. Accordingly, Habermas approaches relations beyond nation-states in the same way as he approaches domestic affairs within states: as a matter of achieving a comprehensive, universalistic set of procedures and then motivating political loyalties to them that transcend all substantive identities or groupings without prejudice for or against any.

Rawls and Habermas are only two among a wave of liberal theoreticians to propose solutions to the problems of identity, belonging, and sovereignty in the context of the growing globalization of the post-1989 era. Many of these theoreticians have assumed the label “cosmopolitan.” To a considerable extent this cosmopolitanism has involved trying to apply what had been basically “domestic” liberal theory to tackle more global questions. To their credit, the various theorists of a new cosmopolitan liberalism recognized that it was no longer tenable to rely so uncritically on the idea of nation. Many realized that their presumption of the internal integration and external singularity of “societies” did not match reality well. This was, of course, not just a result of social change. Nations had never been as sharply bounded as nationalism suggested. And nationalism itself was always produced in international affairs. In the Americas nationalism was a product of inter-American relations and relations with Europe; it was never entirely domestic.

One of the problems with the proposed cosmopolitan solutions is that they do not give adequate weight to the work done by notions of nationalism (and other projects of collective identity) in enabling people who are not well empowered to participate in global affairs as individuals to participate through collectivities. I have argued this point elsewhere, criticizing in particular the

extent to which cosmopolitan thought exemplifies the “class consciousness of frequent travelers.”¹⁶ But here what I would stress most is the extent to which such cosmopolitan thinking, and liberal theory in general, approaches nations as inheritances rather than creations. If nationalism is approached as a new product, it is generally debunked as an “invented tradition” or denigrated as a manipulation by opportunistic political entrepreneurs. But this underestimates the extent to which national identities have always and everywhere been created through a variety of historical projects. Nationalism has been implicated in the structure of the discipline of history organized as so many national histories, thus generally implying the prior existence of the object studied. But of course the writing of national history has also been part of the creation of nations. Nationalism as a project has been seen under the problematic heading of “late nationalism,” especially the ethnonationalisms of Europe’s East. And the idea of founding nations rather than discovering them has been left to other parts of the world and poorly integrated in the theoretical self-understanding of European theory.

Nationalism and Social Theory

Social theory has approached nationalism first as a political ideology structuring relations of power and conflict. It has focused on nationalism’s relationship to ethnic violence and war, on the production of beliefs that one’s own country is the best, and on the invocation of national unity to override internal differences. It has seen nationalism first through bellicose international relations and second through projects by which elites attempt to mobilize mass support. This has been an influential view both among scholars of nationalism and among general social theorists who have tended to see nationalism largely as a problem to be overcome.¹⁷

A second strain of social theory associated with modernization theory and anticipated by both Max Weber and Émile Durkheim has seen nation building as a crucial component of developing an effective modern society, one capable of political stability and economic development. Nationalism, as the ideology associated with such nation building, is thus an important part of one phase in the process of becoming modern and is also a normal reflection of industrialization and state formation.¹⁸ But however normal to this phase, it is also deeply implicated in power relations and conflicts and is prone to problematic manipulation by state elites.¹⁹ Accounts of non-European nation building have generally assumed a “natural” European model (though there are important exceptions, like Anderson’s *Imagined Communities*).

These first two lines of theory both emphasize politics and the state and treat nationalism mainly as a feature of the modern era. A third strain of social theory

recognizes the role of nationalism in politics and conflict but stresses also its more positive contributions to the production of culture, the preservation of historical memory, and the formation of group solidarity. Many of the most influential theorists in this group also place much greater stress on the sources of nationalism in ancient ethnicities that provide the basis for identities prior to any specific political mobilization.²⁰ A related point is that nationalism ought not only to be approached through its most extreme manifestations but also grasped in its more banal forms—in a variety of ceremonial events, for example, and the organization of athletic competitions.²¹ These contribute not only to specific group loyalties but also to the reproduction of the general view that the world is organized in terms of nations and national identities.

Here the study of nationalism as a topic of social theory intersects with the more reflexive question of how nationalism has shaped a crucial unit of analysis in social theory, that of society. While “sociality” may be universal to human life, the idea of discrete, bounded, and integrally unitary “societies” is more historically specific. It appears in strong form as one of the characteristic, even definitive, features of the modern era. This form reflects political features as, for example, both state control over borders and intensification of state administration internally help to produce the idea of bounded and unified societies and as arguments for political legitimacy increasingly claim ascent from the people rather than descent from God or inherited office.²² It also reflects cultural features, though many of these are not ancient inheritances but modern inventions or reforms, such as linguistic standardization, common educational systems, museums as vehicles of representation, and the introduction of national media. Anderson, in one of the most influential studies of nationalism, has described it as productive of “imagined communities.”²³ By this he means that nations are produced centrally by cultural practices that encourage members to situate their own identities and self-understandings within a nation. Reading the same news, for example, not only provides people with common information and common images of “us” and “them” but helps to reproduce a collective narrative in which the manifold different events and activities reported fit together like narrative threads in a novel, interweaving them all with the life of the reader. Practices and institutions of state administration are central to this production of nations as categories of understanding and imagining, but they are not exhaustive of it, and those who wield state power do not entirely control this production.

To simplify the field, then, we can see four main themes in theories of nationalism, which may be combined in different ways by different authors: (1) nationalism as a source or form of conflict, (2) nationalism as a source or form of political integration, (3) nationalism as a reform and appropriation of ethnic inheritance, and (4) nationalism as a new cultural creation. These themes are deployed in debates over “civic” versus “ethnic” nationalism and over the

“modernity” or “primordially” of nations. But before we turn to debates within the field we should consider further the underlying problem of nationalism as a source and a shaper of the notion of society itself.

Nationalism and the Production of Societies

Human beings have always lived in groups. The nature of these groups has, however, varied considerably. They range from families and small bands through clans and other larger kin organizations to villages, kingdoms, and empires; they include religions and cultures, occupational groups and castes, nations, and, more recently, even global society to the extent it knits all humanity into a single group. In most of these cases the self-understanding of members has been crucial to the existence of the group: a kingdom, a religion, or a caste is both an “objective” collection of people and pattern of social organization and a “subjective” way in which people understand how they belong together and should interact. This clearly is true of the idea of nation. Without the subjective component of self-understanding, nations could not exist. Moreover, once the idea of nation exists, it can be used to organize not just self-understanding but categorizations of others.

The most basic meaning of nationalism is the use of this way of categorizing human populations both as a way of looking at the world as a whole and as a way of establishing group identity from within.²⁴ In addition, nationalism usually refers not just to using the category of nation to conceptualize social groups but also to holding that national identities and groups are of basic importance (and often that loyalty to one’s own nation should be a commanding value). Nationalism is thus simultaneously a way of constructing groups and a normative claim. The two sides come together in ideas about who properly belongs together in a society and in arguments that members have moral obligations to the nation as a whole, perhaps even to kill on its behalf or die for it in a war.

Nationalism, then, is the use of the category “nation” to organize perceptions of basic human identities, grouping people together with fellow nationals and distinguishing them from members of other nations. It is influential as a way of helping to produce solidarity within national categories, as a way of determining how specific groups should be treated (e.g., in terms of voting rights or visas and passports), and as a way of seeing the world as a whole. We see this representation in the different colored territories on globes and maps and in the organization of the United Nations. At the same time, clearly the boundaries of nations are both less fixed and more permeable than nationalists commonly recognize.

Central to nationalist discourse is the idea that there should be a match between a nation and a sovereign state; indeed, the nation (usually understood as

prepolitical and always already there in historical terms) constitutes the ground of the legitimacy of the state. This is Kedourie's point in the passage I quoted near the beginning of this chapter. Ernest Gellner likewise avers that nationalism is "a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent."²⁵ Yet nationalism is not merely a "political principle," and its reproduction is a matter of banal practices (Olympic competitions, pace Michael Billig) and imaginative construction (museums, censuses, and habits of reading, pace Anderson) as well as political ideology.²⁶ Moreover, whether or not ethnicity explains nationalism (or the origins of nations, pace Smith), common language and culture facilitate national integration and identification.²⁷ And whether nationalism was born first as a doctrine or as less articulated practices or indeed born in Europe rather than, say, Spain's American colonies is also subject to dispute.

A variety of claims are made about what constitutes "proper" nations. For example, they are held ideally to have common and distinct territories, common and distinct national cultures (including especially languages), and sovereign states of their own. It is very difficult to define nations in terms of these claims, however, since there are exceptions to almost all of them. To take language as an example, there are both nations whose members speak multiple languages (Switzerland) and languages spoken by members of different nations (Spanish, Portuguese, English). Likewise, nationalist ideologies may hold that all members share distinctive common descent, constituting in effect a large kin group, but this is not definitive of nations in general. Nations are organized at a scale and with an internal diversity of membership that transcend kinship. No definition of nation (or of its correlative terms such as nationalism and nationality) has ever gained general acceptance.²⁸

This is why I have argued that nationalism is better understood as a "discursive formation."²⁹ It is a way of speaking that shapes our consciousness, but it is also problematic enough that it keeps generating more issues and questions. As a discursive formation nationalism is implicated in the widespread if problematic treatment of societies as bounded, integral wholes with distinctive identities, cultures, and institutions. Charles Tilly has referred to the "pernicious postulate" that societies are bounded and discrete; Rogers Brubaker has similarly criticized "groupism"; Brubaker and Frederick Cooper have called for a relational approach in contrast to ideas about clear collective identities; and Michael Mann has similarly argued for seeing social life in terms of multiple and overlapping networks rather than discrete societies.³⁰ Their critiques have hardly ended the problematic usage, partly because it is so deeply embedded in the way we speak and think. This is not an unmotivated error by social scientists; it is a participation, perhaps unwitting, in the nationalist rhetoric that pervades public life and contemporary culture.

Moreover, something of the same problem has long been apparent in studies of nationalism. Author after author has slipped from showing the artificially constructed and sometimes false character of national self-understandings and histories into suggesting that nations are somehow not real. Traditions may be no less real for being invented, however, or even for incorporating falsehoods. The critique of these claimed histories—and especially claims that they justify contemporary violence—is important. But it is a sociological misunderstanding to think that the reality of nations depends on the accuracy of their collective self-representations.³¹

Ethnic and Civic Nationalism

The category of nation has ancient roots. As we saw, both the term and two of its distinctive modern meanings were in play in the Roman Empire.³² For the Romans the term referred to descent groups, usually understood to have a common language and culture as well. But the Romans commonly used such ethnic categorizations to designate those who were not Roman citizens. National origins, in this sense, were what differentiated those conquered by or at war with the Romans from those fully incorporated into the Roman state, not what the Romans claimed as the source of their own unity. But in the very distinction we see two sides that have become part of the discourse of nations ever since: first, an attribution of common ethnicity (culture and/or biological descent) and an idea of common membership of a state (citizenship and, more generally, respect for laws and standards of behavior, which can be adopted, not only inherited).

These two sides to the idea of nation shape an enduring debate over the extent to which a legitimate people should or must be ethnically defined or can or should be civically constituted and what the implications of each might be. Ethnic nationalist claims based on race, kinship, language, or common culture have been widespread throughout the modern era. They sometimes extend beyond the construction of identity to the reproduction of enmity, demands that members place the nation ahead of other loyalties, and attempts to purge territories of those defined as foreign. As a result, ethnic nationalism is often associated with ethnic violence and projects of ethnic cleansing or genocide. However, ethnic solidarity is also seen by many as basic to national identity as such and thus to the notion of the nation-state. While this notion is as much contested as defended, it remains influential.

In such usage ethnic nationalism is commonly opposed to civic nationalism.³³ The latter is understood as the loyalty of individual citizens to a state based purely on political identity. Habermas has theorized this as constitutional patriotism, stressing the extent to which political loyalty is to a set of institutional arrangements rather than to a prepolitical culture or other extrapolitical

solidarity.³⁴ Ethnic nationalism in such usage refers precisely to rooting political identity and obligation in the existence of a prepolitical collective unit—the nation—that achieves political subjectivity by virtue of the state. The legitimacy of the state in turn is judged by reference to the interests of the nation.

The contrast of ethnic to civic nationalism is heavily influenced by that of Germany to France.³⁵ The contrast has been enduring and has resulted in different understandings of citizenship. France has been much more willing, for example, to use legal mechanisms to grant immigrants French citizenship, while Germany—equally open to immigration in numerical terms—has generally refused its immigrants German citizenship unless they are already ethnic Germans.³⁶ Other countries vary on the same dimension (and in Europe the European Union is developing a mainly civic, assimilationist legal framework), but it is important to recognize that the difference is one of proportion and ideological emphasis.³⁷ As Smith has remarked, “All nations bear the impress of both territorial and ethnic principles and components, and represent an uneasy confluence of a more recent ‘civic’ and a more ancient ‘genealogical’ model of social cultural organization.”³⁸ Not all scholars accept the distinction or hold it to be sharp; those who do use it often attribute ethnic nationalism to countries that are “late modernizers.”³⁹

Central to the idea of civic nationalism is the possibility for citizens to adopt national identity by choice. This is most commonly discussed in terms of the assimilation of individual immigrants into nation-states; civic nations can in principle be open to anyone who agrees to follow their laws. Citizenship in the state is seen as primary rather than prior membership in a descent group or cultural tradition. The distinction is fuzzy, though, as a rhetoric of civic nationalism and citizenship can mask underlying commitments to particularistic cultural or racial definitions of what counts as a “proper” or good citizen. Thus (in a recently prominent example) even law-abiding Muslims may not seem sufficiently French to many; conversely, the French state may pass laws ostensibly enforcing neutrality on religion but in fact expressing particular ethnocultural mores. It is particularly difficult to frame rationales for limits on immigration in civic nationalist terms without falling back on ethnic nationalism.

At the same time, the civic nationalist tradition contains another thread. This is the notion that the nation itself is made, is a product of collective action. This is symbolized by revolutions and the founding of new states (which may include more or less successful efforts to call forth national solidarities). The idea of choice here is not simply that of individual membership but of collective determination of the form and content of the nation itself—the effort to take control of culture as a historical project rather than merely receiving it as inheritance. When the revolutionary French National Assembly reformed the calendar and systems of measurement, it was engaged not merely in administration of the

state but in an effort to make a certain sort of nation, one with a more modern, rational culture. And, of course, the tension between attempting to make a new culture and preserve an old one has been played out in the educational system ever since.

While much nationalist ideology has claimed definitive ethnic roots, social scientists are divided on the question, and most prominent twentieth-century analysts of nationalism have sought to challenge the explanation of nationalism by ethnicity. Hans Kohn and Hugh Seton-Watson stress the crucial role of modern politics, especially the idea of sovereignty.⁴⁰ Eric Hobsbawm treats nationalism as a kind of second-order political movement based on a false consciousness that ethnicity helps to produce but cannot explain because the deeper roots lie in political economy, not culture.⁴¹ The dominant approach in contemporary scholarship views nationalism largely as an ideological reflection of state formation.⁴² Gellner emphasizes industrialization and also stresses the number of cases of failed or absent nationalisms: ethnic groups that mounted either little or no attempt to become nations in the modern sense.⁴³ This suggests that even if ethnicity plays a role it cannot be a sufficient explanation (though one imagines that the nineteenth-century German romantics would simply reply that there are strong, historic nations and weak ones destined to fade from the historic stage). Carlton Hayes argues for seeing nationalism as a sort of religion. Michael Hechter analyzes it in terms of strategic individual action aimed at maximizing mostly economic and political benefits. Kedourie approaches nationalism as an ideology and attempts to debunk nationalism by showing the untenability of the German romantic cultural-ethnic claims. Indeed, in their different ways all these thinkers have sought to debunk the common claims nationalists themselves make to long-established ethnic identities.⁴⁴

Against this backdrop Smith acknowledges that nations cannot be seen as primordial or natural but nonetheless argues that they are rooted in relatively ancient histories. Smith argues that the origins of modern nationalism lie in the successful bureaucratization of aristocratic *ethnies* that were able to transform themselves into genuine nations only in the West. In the West territorial centralization and consolidation went hand in hand with a growing cultural standardization. Nations, Smith thus suggests, are long-term processes, continually reenacted and reconstructed; they require ethnic cores, homelands, heroes, and golden ages if they are to survive. "Modern nations and nationalism have only extended and deepened the meanings and scope of older ethnic concepts and structures. Nationalism has certainly universalized these structures and ideals, but modern 'civic' nations have not in practice really transcended ethnicity or ethnic sentiments."⁴⁵

The ethnic similarities and bonds that contribute to the formation of nations may indeed be important and long-standing, but in themselves they do not

fully constitute either particular nations or the modern idea of nation. While some critics of ethnic explanations of nationalism emphasize the influence of state formation or other “master variables,” a number assert that nations are created by nationalism—by this particular form of discourse, political rhetoric, or ideology—and are not merely passively present and awaiting the contingent address of nationalists.⁴⁶

An emphasis on preexisting ethnicity—even where this is rightly identified—is unable to shed much light on why so many modern movements, policies, ideologies, and conflicts are constituted within the discourse of nationalism. Indeed, as Gellner has suggested, the very self-recognition of ethnicities or cultures as defining identities is distinctively modern.⁴⁷ Walker Connor uses a similar point (ironically reversing the Roman roots of the term *nation*) to distinguish ethnic groups as “potential nations” from real nations: “While an ethnic group may, therefore, be other-defined, the nation must be self-defined.”⁴⁸

Explanations of nationalism thus need to address the contemporary conditions that make it effective in people’s lives and that affect both their attempts to orient themselves in the world and their actions. Such conditions are, of course, subject to change, and nationalist constructions are apt to change with them. Thus East Indian nationalists from the nineteenth century through Nehru were able to make a meaningful (though hardly seamless or uncontested) unity of the welter of subcontinental identities as part of their struggle against the British.⁴⁹ The departure of the British from India changed the meaning of Congress nationalism, however, as this became the program of an Indian state, not of those outside official politics who resisted an alien regime. Among other effects of this, a rhetorical space was opened up for “communal” and other sectional claims that were less readily brought forward in the colonial period.⁵⁰ Similarly, the proliferation of nationalisms in eastern Europe attendant on the collapse of Communist rule involved a “reframing” of older national identities and nationalist projects; the nationalisms of the 1990s were neither altogether new nor simply resumptive of those that predated Communism.⁵¹ The opposition between primordiality and “mere invention” leaves open a very wide range of historicities within which national and other traditions can exert real force. As Ernst Renan famously stressed, nationalist histories are matters of forgetting as well as remembering, including forgetting the “deeds of violence which took place at the origin of all political formations.”⁵² At the same time, not least because academics commonly devote a good deal of energy to debunking popular nationalism, it is important to recall not only the deeds of violence but the cultural productivity that goes into nationalism—the symphonies and tangos, films and poetry.

Nationalism is partly a matter of narrative construction, the production (and reproduction and revision) of narratives locating the nation’s place in history.⁵³

As Anderson puts it, nations move through historical time as persons move through biographical time; each may figure in stories like characters in a novel.⁵⁴ This is one reason why the continuity of ethnic identities alone does not adequately explain nationalism: the narrative constructions in which it is cast change and potentially transform the meaning of whatever ethnic commonalities may exist. Ironically, the writing of linear historical narratives of national development and claims to primordial national identity often proceed hand in hand. Indeed, the writing of national historical narratives is so embedded in the discourse of nationalism that it almost always depends rhetorically on the presumption of some kind of preexisting national identity in order to give the story a beginning. A claim to primordial national identity is, in fact, a version of nationalist historical narrative.

Modernity versus Primordiality

A long-running debate in the literature on nationalism pits arguments that it is an extension of ancient ethnicity against those who argue that it is essentially modern.⁵⁵ Majority scholarly opinion tends toward the latter view, though explanations differ. “Modernists” variously see nationalism rooted in industrialization (Gellner), state formation (Tilly and Mann), the rise of new communications media and genres of collective imagination (Karl Deutsch and Anderson), and the development of new rhetorics for collective identity and capacities for collective action.⁵⁶ While many favor specific factors as primary explanations, most recognize that several causes are interrelated.

Many nationalists but few scholars see nationalism as ubiquitous in history and simply the “normal” way of organizing large-scale collective identity. Most social scientists point instead to the variety of political and cultural forms common before the modern era (e.g., empires and great religions) and the transformations wrought by the rise of a new kind of intensive state administration, cultural integration, popular political participation, and international relations. Many of these social scientists argue that nations and nationalism in their modern sense are both new. In particular, they would argue that ethnicity as a way of organizing collective identity underwent at the least a substantial reorganization when it began to be deployed as part of ethnonationalist rhetoric in the modern era. Others, however, including notably Anthony Smith and John Armstrong, argue that there is more continuity in the ethnic core of nations, though they too would agree that modernity transformed—if it did not outright create—nationalism.⁵⁷

The attraction of a claimed ethnic foundation to nations lies largely in the implication that nationhood is in some sense primordial and natural. Nationalists typically claim that their nations are simply given and immutable rather than

constructions of recent historical action or tendentious contemporary claims. Much early scholarly writing on nations and nationalism shared in this view and sought to discover which were the “true” ethnic foundations of nationhood.⁵⁸ It is no doubt ideologically effective to claim that a nation has existed since time immemorial or that its traditions have been passed down intact from heroic founders. In no case, however, does historical or social science research support such a claim. All nations are historically created.

Noting this, one line of research emphasizes the manipulation of popular sentiments by the more or less cynical production of national culture by intellectuals and state-building elites. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, for example, have collected numerous examples of the ways in which apparently definitive cultural markers of national identity can in fact be traced to specific acts of creation embedded in political (or sometimes marketing) projects rather than reflecting preexisting ethnicity.⁵⁹ The Scots tartan kilt is a famous example, dating not from the mists of primordial Highland history but from eighteenth-century resistance to Anglicization and early-nineteenth-century romantic celebrations of a no longer troubling ethnic Scottishness.⁶⁰ Likewise, nineteenth-century Serbian and Croatian intellectuals strove to divide their common Serbo-Croatian language into two distinct vernaculars with separate literary traditions. But as this last example makes clear, it is not obvious that because the “traditions” of nationalism are “invented” they are somehow less real or valid. Anderson finds the same fault with Gellner: “Gellner is so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades under false pretences that he assimilates ‘invention’ to ‘fabrication’ and ‘falsity,’ rather than to ‘imagining’ and ‘creation.’”⁶¹

Hobsbawm and Ranger imply that long-standing “primordial” tradition would somehow count as legitimate, while by contrast various nationalist traditions are of recent and perhaps manipulative creation. Many ideologues do claim origins at the dawn of history, but few scholars have doubted that cultural traditions are constantly renewed. What so-called primordialists have argued is that certain identities and traditions—especially those of ethnicity—are experienced as primordial.⁶² Sociologically, what matters is less the antiquity of the contents of tradition than the efficacy of the process by which certain beliefs and understandings are constituted as unquestioned, immediate knowledge. This has more to do with current bases for the reproduction of culture than with history as such. Tradition needs to be distinguished from the “traditionalism” of those who claim to be its authoritative representatives and who—especially in contexts of literacy and record keeping—often enforce an orthodoxy foreign to oral tradition.⁶³

Ethnicity and cultural traditions are bases for nationalism because they effectively constitute historical memory, because they inculcate it as “prejudice,” not because the historical origins they claim are accurate (prejudice means not

just prior to judgment but constituting the condition of judgment).⁶⁴ Moreover, all traditions are “invented” (or at least, in a more diffuse sense, created); none are truly primordial. This was acknowledged, though rather weakly, even by some of the functionalists who emphasized the notion of primordiality and the “givenness” of cultural identities and traditions.⁶⁵ All such traditions also are potentially contested and subject to continual reshaping, whether explicit or hidden. Some claims about nationality may fail to persuade because they are too manifestly manipulated by creators or because the myth that is being proffered does not speak to the circumstances and practical commitments of the people in question.

Notions of nations as acting subjects are distinctively modern, part of a new way of constructing collective identity. This said, there is no scholarly agreement about when nationalism began. Greenfeld dates it from the English Civil War, Anderson from Latin American independence movements, Peter Alter from the French Revolution, and John Breuilly and Kedourie both from German romanticism and reaction to the French Revolution.⁶⁶ I have previously suggested that rather than trying to identify a single point of origin scholars should see nationalism as drawing together several different threads of historical change.⁶⁷ As a discursive formation it took on increasingly clear form through the early modern period and was fully in play by the Napoleonic era.

The idea of nation became a fundamental building block of social life during the early modern period, especially the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. While it is fruitless to search for a precise origin point for modern nationalism, it is possible to identify some of the social changes and conditions that helped to make it important.

First, nationalism reflected a distinctive scale of social organization larger than cities (which had previously been primary units of belonging and common culture for elites), villages, or kin groups. This was made possible partly by improved communication, which enabled larger populations to interact with greater density—a matter simultaneously of roads, the spread of literacy, and wars that brought large populations together in common military organizations and movements.⁶⁸ It was also facilitated by increased integration of trade among different regions within contiguous territories and by the mobilization of new kinds of military and state power.⁶⁹

Second, nationalism constituted a new ideology about primary identities. In this it competed not only with localism and family but with religion.⁷⁰ In fact, nationalism was often furthered by religious movements and wars (notably, in the wake of the Reformation), and national self-understandings were frequently religiously inflected (as in the Catholicism of Poland or the Protestantism of England). But nationalism involved a kind of secular faith and a primary loyalty

to the nation that was and is distinct from any religion that may intertwine with it.

Third, nationalism grew hand in hand with modern states and was basic to a new way of claiming political legitimacy. States furthered social integration among their subjects by building roads, mobilizing militaries, sponsoring education, and standardizing languages.⁷¹ But they also were shaped by a cultural change that introduced a new, stronger idea of “the people” who were both governed and served by a state. Indeed, the idea of the state as providing necessary services for the “commonwealth” was basic, and with it came the notion that the legitimacy of the state depended on its serving its people effectively and/or being recognized by them. Political legitimacy was to “ascend” from the people rather than descend from God or proper dynastic ancestry. This placed a new stress on the question of who the people might be. The notions that they were those who happened to have been born into the domain of a monarch or conquered in war were clearly inadequate. The idea of nation came to the forefront. It represented the “people” of a country as an internally unified group with common interests and the capacity to act.

The last point is crucial. The idea of nation not only laid claim to history or a common identity but purported to describe (or construct) a collective actor. As Charles Taylor has put it, statements like “We the people,” as articulated in the U.S. Constitution, are performative: they put in play a strong claim to cohesion and the capacity to act in concert.⁷² Similarly, the *levée en masse* of the French Revolution symbolized the capacity of the people not merely to act but to shape history.⁷³

The constitution of nations—not only in dramatic revolutionary acts of founding but in the formation of common culture and political identities—is one of the pivotal features of the modern era. It is part of the organization of political participation and loyalty, of culture and identity, of the way history is taught and the way wars are fought. It not only shapes practical political identity and ideology, it also shapes the very idea of society in which much social theory is rooted. If nations are obsolete, this will matter a lot. But however troubled and troubling the national organization of politics is, there is not much evidence that nations are fading from the global scene.

NOTES

1. This argument is developed at more length, though differently, in Craig Calhoun, *Nationalism* (Minneapolis, 1997). The idea of a discursive formation comes from Foucault’s account of the development of modern individualism and more generally of the ways in which knowledge and social relations were focused, produced, and reconstructed by clusters of concepts and usages that could only partially stabilize the pro-

duction of knowledge because they included enough contradictions and tensions to keep generating ever more discourse. See Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (New York, 1969) and *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977* (New York, 1977).

2. Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, 4th ed. (Oxford, 1993), 1.
3. Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford, 1986), and Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, rev. ed. (London, 1991).
4. Patrick J. Geary, *The Myth of Nations: The Medieval Origins of Europe* (Princeton, N.J., 2002).
5. Susan Cott Watkins, *Provinces into Nations: Demographic Diversity in Europe, 1880–1960* (Princeton, N.J., 1992).
6. Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen* (Stanford, Calif., 1976).
7. This is precisely the era of the formation of what Immanuel Wallerstein described as the modern world-system, with its global economic structure mediated by a characteristic political form of competing states (*The Modern World-System* [La Jolla, Calif., 1984]).
8. For example, bounded territories, indivisibility, sovereignty, legitimacy rooted in the people, a high level of popular participation in political affairs, direct individual membership (rather than mediation through intermediate associations or feudal hierarchies), common culture, ideologies of shared descent, an image of the nation in historical time, and sacralization of the “homeland.” No one of these, to reiterate, is definitive, but together they are the main themes in the discourse of nations and the basis of a family resemblance among nationalist claims. See Calhoun, *Nationalism*.
9. The equivalence is not just a legal formality. It is also reflected in the “isomorphism” of institutional structures within nation-states—the ways in which they imitate each other in the organization of government, for example, with comparably structured ministries and social service organizations. This may be even more important than the building of museums and the celebration of national folklore to gaining international recognition. See Walter Powell and Paul Dimaggio, eds., *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Chicago, 1991), especially the chapters by Meyer and Rowan and Jepperson and Meyer.
10. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971).
11. John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York, 1993), 41.
12. John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge, Mass., 1999).
13. Many of Habermas’s most theoretically developed analyses are collected in *The Inclusion of the Other* (Cambridge, Mass., 1998). But this was a theme Habermas also pursued in a variety of less theoretical political interventions. Some of these are collected in *The Postnational Constellation* (Cambridge, Mass., 2001). The theme remains current for him and for Europe, however, as shown by his leadership of a transnational effort to produce a European-wide debate about the nature of the European public itself in the context of opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. A collection of these interventions is translated in Daniel Levy, Max Pensky, and John Torpey, eds., *Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe* (London, 2005).
14. In “Belonging in the Cosmopolitan Imaginary,” *Ethnicities* 3, no. 4 (2003): 531–53,

I argued that it is important to develop the notion of “public” as itself a form of social solidarity, not just a realm of discourse based on solidarities and identities established “before” it, and also that unifying Europe suffers a lack of such a public as well as its more famous “democratic deficit.” See also the discussion of constitutional patriotism in Craig Calhoun, “Constitutional Patriotism and the Public Sphere: Interests, Identity, and Solidarity in the Integration of Europe,” in Pablo De Greiff and Ciaran Cronin, eds., *Global Ethics and Transnational Politics* (Cambridge, Mass., 2002), 275–312.

15. See the discussion in Thomas McCarthy, “Reconciling National Diversity and Cosmopolitan Unity,” in De Greiff and Cronin, *Global Ethics*, 260–74.

16. Craig Calhoun, “The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travelers: Toward a Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism,” *South Atlantic Quarterly* 101, no. 4 (2002): 869–97.

17. For example, see Michael Hechter, *Containing Nationalism* (New York, 2000); and Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation*.

18. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford, 1983); Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, N.J., 1975); and Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Paths to Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992).

19. Michael Mann, *Sources of Social Power*, vols. 1 and 2 (Cambridge, 1986, 1993).

20. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins*; see also Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (London, 1991) and *Nationalism and Modernism* (London, 1998); John Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1982); John Hucheson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London, 1994).

21. Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London, 1995); Lynette Spillman, *Nation and Commemoration* (Cambridge, 1997).

22. Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence* (Berkeley, 1984).

23. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

24. Calhoun, *Nationalism*.

25. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 5.

26. Billig, *Banal Nationalism*; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

27. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins*.

28. Peter Alter, *Nationalism* (London, 1989); Calhoun, *Nationalism*; Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism* (Princeton, N.J., 1994); John Hall, “Nationalisms, Classified and Explained,” in Sukuman Periwal, ed., *Notions of Nationalism* (Budapest, 1995); Alexander J. Motyl, “The Modernity of Nationalism: Nations, States and Nation-States in the Contemporary World,” *Journal of International Affairs* 45 (1992): 307–23; and Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*.

29. Calhoun, *Nationalism*, following Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and Power/Knowledge*.

30. Charles Tilly, *Big Questions, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons* (New York, 1984); Rogers Brubaker, “Ethnicity without Groups,” *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 40, no. 2 (2002): 163–89; Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity,’” *Theory and Society* 29 (2000): 1–47; Mann, *Sources of Social Power*, vol. 1.

31. Calhoun, *Nationalism*.

32. Geary, *The Myth of Nations*.
33. This contrast was influentially developed by Hans Kohn in *The Idea of Nationalism* (1929; New York, 1967); see also my introduction to the new edition (New Brunswick, N.J., 2005).
34. Habermas, *The Inclusion of the Other*.
35. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*; and Alter, *Nationalism*.
36. Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, 1992).
37. Calhoun, *Nationalism*; and Saskia Sassen, *Guests and Aliens* (Chicago, 1999).
38. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins*, 149.
39. Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (Berkeley, Calif., 1964); Tom Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism* (London, 1977); John Schwarzmantel, *Socialism and the Idea of the Nation* (Hemel Hempstead, 1991).
40. Hans Kohn, *The Age of Nationalism* (New York, 1944); Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States* (Boulder, Colo., 1977).
41. Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge, 1990).
42. Tilly, *The Formation*; Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990–1990* (Cambridge, 1990); Hall, “Nationalisms”; Mann, *Sources of Social Power*, vol. 2.
43. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford, 1983).
44. Carlton J. H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York, 1931); Michael Hechter, *Containing Nationalism* (New York, 2000); Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (1960; Oxford, 1993).
45. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins*, 216.
46. Kedourie, *Nationalism*; Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1986).
47. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 8–18, 61.
48. Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, 103.
49. This happened contrary to the predictions of numerous pundits, including George Orwell, *Talking to India* (London, 1943), and is only partly contradicted by the partition that created Pakistan.
50. Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Studies in Colonial and Post-Colonial Histories* (Princeton, N.J., 1994).
51. Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge, 1996).
52. Ernst Renan, “What Is a Nation?” in Homi Bhabha, ed., *Nation and Narration* (London, 1990), 11.
53. Bhabha, *Nation and Narration*.
54. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.
55. Those who argue for the extension of ancient ethnicity include Smith, *The Ethnic Origins*; Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism*; and John Hucheson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London, 1994). Those advocating the modern nature of

nationalism include Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*; Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*; and Greenfeld, *Nationalism*.

56. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*; Tilly, *Coercion*; and Mann, *Sources of Social Power*, vol. 2; Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1966); Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Calhoun, *Nationalism*.

57. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins*; Smith, *National Identity*; Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*; and Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism*.

58. Joan S. Skurnowicz, *Romantic Nationalism and Liberalism: Joachim Lelewel and the Polish National Idea* (New York, 1981); Joseph F. Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia," in Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, eds., *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (Seattle, Wash., 1969).

59. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, 1983).

60. Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Invention of Tradition: The Highland Tradition of Scotland," in Hobsbawm and Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition*, 15–42.

61. Benedict Anderson, "Introduction," in Gopal Balakrishnan, ed., *Mapping the Nation* (London, 1996), 6.

62. Clifford Geertz, *Old Societies and New States* (New York, 1963).

63. The distinction is made by Max Weber in *Economy and Society*, trans. W. Schluchter and G. Roth (1922; Berkeley, 1968), 4. See also the discussion in Pierre Bourdieu, *Algérie 60: Structures économiques et structures temporelles* (Paris, 1977), and in Craig Calhoun, *The Roots of Radicalism* (Chicago, forthcoming).

64. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York, 1981).

65. See Shmuel Eisenstadt, *Modernization, Protest and Change* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966) and *Building States and Nations* (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1973); Geertz, *Old Societies*; Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (London, 1964).

66. Greenfeld, *Nationalism*; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Alter, *Nationalism*; John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (1982; Chicago, 1993); and Kedourie, *Nationalism*.

67. Calhoun, *Nationalism*.

68. Deutsch, *Nationalism*.

69. Tilly, *Coercion*.

70. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution*; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

71. Breuilly, *Nationalism*.

72. Charles Taylor, "Modern Social Imaginaries," *Public Culture* 14, no. 1 (2002): 91–123.

73. William Sewell Jr., "Political Events as Structural Transformations: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille," *Theory and Society* 25 (1996): 841–81.