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Pierre Bourdieu

CRAIG CALHOUN

The most influential and original French sociologist since Durkheim, Pierre Bourdieu was at once a leading theorist and an empirical researcher of extraordinarily broad interests and distinctive style. He analyzed labor markets in Algeria, symbolism in the calendar and the house of Kabyle peasants, marriage patterns in his native Béarn region of France, photography as an art form and hobby, museum goers and patterns of taste, modern universities, the rise of literature as a distinct field of endeavor, the reproduction of masculine domination, and the sources of misery and poverty amid the wealth of modern societies. Bourdieu insisted that theory and research are inseparable parts of one sociological enterprise.

In this Bourdieu was more like the great classical sociologists Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Karl Marx than are those who write commentaries about them without engaging empirical explanation at the same time. His work reflected a Durkheimian view that human life is all deeply social, Weber's concern for status hierarchies and the differentiation of spheres of social life, and Marx's emphasis on power, domination, and inequalities in the material conditions of life. Bourdieu also learned significantly from Marcel Mauss (who connected Durkheimian sociology to a more critical analysis of historical struggles), Erving Goffman (who approached social life as a matter of social dramas combining performance and communication), phenomenology (particularly through Maurice Merleau-Ponty but also ethnomethodology), structuralism (particularly through Claude Lévi-Strauss), and the history and philosophy of science through Gaston Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem, and Jules Vuillemin (shapers of a distinctive French analysis of the historical character of epistemology – the production and validation of knowledge). Of all Bourdieu's famous contemporaries the one with whom his work has the most affinity is probably Michel Foucault, a friend from his student days and throughout his life.

Bourdieu's most original contributions to sociological theory center on a conceptual framework for bridging the divide between (a) structural theorists like Durkheim, who emphasized that social facts are "external, enduring, and coercive," simply part of objective reality and (b) interactionist or constructivist theorists like George Herbert Mead who focused on subjective perceptions and the way social relations are constructed out of individual action and communication. In line with this approach, he urged sociologists to be "reflexive," to study and analyze the conditions of their own work and how these might shape their perception and even their theories.[1]

TAKING GAMES SERIOUSLY

A former rugby player, Bourdieu was drawn to the metaphor of games to convey his sense of social life. But by "game" he did not mean mere diversions or entertainments. He meant the serious athlete's sense of being passionately involved in play, engaged in a struggle with others and with our own limits, over stakes to which we are (at least for the moment) deeply committed. He meant intense competition. He meant for us to recall losing ourselves in the play of a game, caught in its flow in such a way that no matter how individualistically we struggle we are also constantly aware of being only part of something larger – not just a team, but also the game itself. It is worth knowing that rugby is one of the world's most physically intense games. When Bourdieu spoke of playing, he spoke of putting oneself on the line.[2]

Social life is like this, Bourdieu suggested, except that the stakes are bigger. It is always a struggle; it requires constant improvisation; yet it is organized according to an enduring structure. Bourdieu was inspired by the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1967) who saw language itself as a game since it is structured by rules but using it effectively requires more than just following the rules. Learning a language is constant training in how to improvise "play" in social interaction. The same goes for cultural participation more generally. Play is not simply a diversion from some more basic reality but a central part of the activity by which forms of life are constituted, reproduced, and sometimes transformed. No game can be understood simply by grasping the rules that define it. It requires not just following rules, but having a "sense" of the game, a sense of how to play.[3] This is a social sense, for it requires a constant awareness of and responsiveness to the play of one's opponent (and in some cases one's teammates). A good rugby (or soccer or basketball) player is constantly aware of the field as a whole, and anticipates the actions of teammates, knowing when to pass, when to try to break free. A good basketball player is not simply one who can shoot, but one who knows when to shoot. If sports metaphors don't clarify this for you, think of telling a joke or playing music. Timing is crucial.

This sense of timing is a product of what Bourdieu termed a "habitus," the capacity each player of a game has to improvise the next move, the next play, the next shot – and to do so with intuitive awareness of what other players are doing. We may be born with greater or lesser genetic potentials, but we are not born with a habitus. As the word suggests, this is something we acquire through repetition, like a habit, and something we know in our bodies not just our minds. A professional basketball player has shot a million free throws before he steps to the line. Some of these have

come in practice sessions, designed to allow the player to work on technical skills free from the pressure and chance of a game. But the player's practical experience – and learning – also came in real games, in front of crowds, with the hope of victory and the fear of letting down his teammates on his mind. Whether he has developed a relaxed confidence in his shot and an ability to blot out the noise and waving hands of the arena is also a matter of previous experience. It is part of the player's habitus. And the difference between a great athlete and a mediocre also-ran is often not just physical ability but a hard-to-pin-down mix of confidence, concentration, and ability to rise to the occasion.

The confidence that defines greatness is largely learned, Bourdieu suggests. It is learned in a thousand earlier games. On playgrounds, in high school, and in college, basketball players imagine themselves to be Michael Jordan – but they also learn that they are not. They do not jump as high or float as long; their desperate shots miss when his amazingly often went it. Indeed, our very experience of struggling to do well teaches us to accept inequality in our societies. We internalize the experience of not succeeding and avoid those "games" but in some cases – like the "games" of success in school – the result may keep us away from good job options. The reasons some succeed and others don't may not be effort or innate ability but inequalities in the help we get from families. It is not just bank accounts that distinguish the middle class from the poor but often things like whether parents read with children and provide access to educational computer games. Kids with those advantages will tend to do better in school – but they may draw false conclusions that the middle-class kids are just naturally more talented or more self-disciplined.[4] We learn and incorporate into our habitus a sense of what we can "reasonably" expect – even at the level of gauging our chances for a relationship with a man or woman we like. Our desire for the stakes of the game ensures our commitment to it. But we do not invent the games by ourselves; they are the products of history, of social struggles and earlier improvisations, and of impositions by powerful actors with the capacity to say this, and not that, is the right way to make love, create a family, raise children.

To understand any social situation or interaction, Bourdieu suggested, we should ask what game (or games) the actors are playing. This means not just their individual strategies or what they think they are doing, but within what social framework they are pursuing their goals, what unconscious learning informs their actions, what constraints they face, and what others are doing. What is at stake in their play? The stakes determine what will count as winning or losing. The game may be literature, for example, and the players seek reputation and immortality (defined as inclusion in the canon of recognized great works). The game may be business, and the players seek wealth. It may be politics and they pursue power. The stakes of different games also shape the ways in which players who are sometimes competitors also cooperate – for example to make sure their game is respected. Precisely because they care about their literary reputations, therefore, authors of serious books are at pains to distinguish their field from "mere journalism" (Bourdieu, 1996).

Science too is a game, in this only partly metaphorical sense. It is strategic. It has winners and losers. It depends on specific sorts of resources and rules of play. And science has stakes, most notably, truth. Scientists do not pursue truth out of simple altruism. It is an interest, not a disinterest. Commitment to truth – and to the specifically scientific way of pursuing truth (e.g. by empirical research rather than

waiting for divine inspiration) – defines the field of science. But the participants in this field do not simply share peacefully in truth; they struggle over it. They seek to control who gets hired in universities and research institutes, which projects get funded by national science foundations, which kinds of work are published in the most famous journals. They advance competing theories; they attempt to advance competing careers. This selfishness and competition is not all bad, according to Bourdieu (2004), because the field of science only allows people to succeed by advancing the truth. Expecting scientists – or anyone else – simply to be altruistic is bound to lead to disappointment and to a misunderstanding of the actual workings of science. Science achieves an effect that is in the general good – advancing truth – by harnessing the self-interests as well as the ideals of scientists. Science works as a field devoted to truth because it provides players with organized incentives for pursuing their rewards – their victories in the game – by discovering and communicating genuine knowledge. It also offers organized disincentives for lying, failure to use good research methods, or refusing to communicate one's discoveries.

The rules of each game are both constraints on the players and the ways in which players get things done. Players usually have to treat them as fixed and unchanging, but in fact they are historically produced. They have origins, and they can change, but most of the time they are reproduced. That is, they are used because that is how things get done, and so they become habitual; they seem necessary; they are even enforced by rulebooks. Think of basic language rules as an analogy: every time we speak we rely on grammar, syntax, and semantics. For example, we expect words to have the same meaning they did yesterday and before that. But there are changes. A computer did not always mean a machine; it previously meant a person who did computational work. A manuscript historically meant a handwritten text; now we use the term for a text printed by a computer. When we improvise actions, we respond both to the social and cultural structures in which we find ourselves and to our own previous experiences. We meet new needs mostly by trying new uses for actions we've tried before (like using an old word for a new computing machine). We are able to act only because we have learned from those experiences, but much of what we have learned is how to fit ourselves effectively into existing cultural practices. We are constrained not just by external limits, in other words, but by our own internalization of limits on what we imagine we can do. We cannot simply shed these limits, not only because they are deep within us, but also because they are part of our sense of how to play the game. In other words, they are part of the knowledge that enables us to play well, to improvise actions effectively, and maintain our commitment to the stakes of the game.

Bourdieu uses the concept of practice to identify the interdependence of structure and action. *Practice* is doing things, practical activity, which always reflects the combination of conscious and unconscious intentions and the interaction of actors with social and material conditions outside themselves. Bourdieu shows action to be always shaped by learning (habitus), social contexts (including fields), and structural conditions (including distributions of capital) as well as choice and creativity. Bourdieu emphasizes that it is an illusion to think of individual action as pure freedom and social structure as pure constraint. Social structure is internalized in what we learn from experience and thus how we generate action as well as an external

matter of resources and obstacles. The "logic of practice" calls attention to two paradoxes: (1) doing anything depends on processes of which we are not usually conscious and do not usually rationally control (like the way we move our mouths to make sounds while speaking but also our choices of words and even when to speak); (2) individual actions appear as though they were consciously strategic even when they are not because they are given the effect of direction by the larger social field (as for example kids who go to elite colleges get elite friends and elite artistic tastes that turn out to help them in later careers even if they are not thinking much about how friends become social capital or artistic knowledge becomes cultural capital).[5]

The social structures that enable and constrain our action may seem unchanging, but they are not. What appear to be fixed structures in social life are (a) the product of historical action that creates them, (b) never completely finalized but always subject to either reinforcement or change, and (c) usually more reproduced than changed, even when people try to change them. Those with greater resources have greater capacity to make the structure serve their interests, but even those with minimal resources are usually drawn into reproducing the existing culture and social structure as their only ways of achieving anything and as defenses against various threats.

Bourdieu emphasizes reproduction, partly because he thinks that people often overestimate how easily structures change. Nonetheless, structures are incomplete; at one point Bourdieu ([1971]1991) describes all structures as in fact more or less advanced processes of "structuration" (an idea Anthony Giddens took up and made a cornerstone of his sociological theory). The other side of the coin is, of course, the ways in which tensions and internal contradictions create vulnerabilities to social structures. Bourdieu argues that most of the time, even when people seek change, the forces leading to reproduction are stronger.

Nonetheless, transformation sometimes takes place. Bourdieu's work reflects on four major examples. First, French colonialism and market capitalism disrupted traditional peasant life in Algeria, leading to both violent conflict and a different effort to create new structures. Second, late nineteenth-century authors created a literary field distinct from journalism, protected by its cultural prestige against direct reduction to market forces, and potential a source of intellectual critique of French society more generally.[6] Third, after the Second World War economic growth and the building of European welfare states were expected to bring a more egalitarian society in France. Instead, new forms of inequality arose. More students were able to go to secondary school, thus, but what grades they received, where they went, and what they studied became newly influential. It was harder to inherit social status directly, but family influences on how well children did in school and widespread use of that reinforced such distinctions made education more an agent of reproduction than of change (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1964, 1970). Fourth, in the 1990s the project of freeing market capitalism from state constraints encouraged it to colonize different social fields, reducing their autonomy and undermining social democracy. The second case showed a positive account of social change; the others (reflecting Bourdieu's critical orientation) showed either outright destruction, or the illusion of change in the face of powerful tendencies toward reproduction.

Person and Career

Bourdieu was born in 1930 in a rural village in the mountainous Béarn region of Southwest France.[7] This is the rough French equivalent of coming from Appalachia or a remote part of Idaho. The regional dialect was strong and distinctive; the Béarnaise have resisted homogenizing efforts of the French state for generations. Both brilliant and hard-working, Bourdieu gained admission to a special, highly selective regional high school, then to one of Paris's most famous secondary schools, and finally to the École Normale Supérieure (ENS) – the most elite of the Parisian grandes écoles, in 1951. Simply gaining admission to the ENS was a guarantee of membership in France's intellectual power-elite. Students were treated as members of the civil service from the moment they entered, taught to think of themselves as what Bourdieu (1989) later termed "the state nobility." Some who started as outsiders simply assimilated; Bourdieu excelled and also resisted. So did his ENS contemporaries Jacques Derrida (philosopher and literary scholar, founder of "deconstruction") and Michel Foucault (intellectual historian and cultural theorist). All three became famous, but all three also challenged existing intellectual frameworks. Bourdieu's very accent marked him as an outsider in elite Parisian academic life and he resented the status hierarchy. Yet he was so famous that a popular film was made about him (Carles, 2001). When he died in 2001 France's leading newspapers delayed publication to run the story on the first page. Since his death, Bourdieu's work has grown even more influential around the world.

After completing his undergraduate education, Bourdieu briefly taught high school then was ordered to do his military service in the French colony of Algeria. Appointed to a desk job in the air force, he had the time to explore the country. He bought a Leica camera and a number of notebooks to record what he saw. The education was complicated, since Bourdieu had to learn both about Algerian culture and about French colonialism, the brutality and problems of which had not been openly admitted in France. He traveled all over Algeria, eventually writing a book on its different major cultures (Bourdieu, 1960[1958]). Bourdieu's formal education had been in philosophy, but in Algeria he remade himself as a self-taught ethnographer (Honneth, Kocyba, and Schwibs, 1986: 39). He learned to ask questions that would elicit deeper information than surface ideologies, to take copious notes and carefully watch the practices of everyday social life, agricultural production, household organization, and ritual. As an aid to his memory and analysis he took more than a thousand photographs. Bourdieu recorded – with an elegant realist style – ways of life and the sometimes abrupt changes they were undergoing – as in a picture of a veiled woman on a motorcycle or another in traditional dress before a store window showing Western clothes.

Bourdieu initially surveyed Algeria as a whole, but came to concentrate on the region known as Kabylia.[8] Kabyle is the Arabic word for tribe, and the Kabyle were Berber-speaking peasants seen as backward not only by the French but by Algeria's Arabic-speaking urban elite. They were doubly dominated. By itself anti-colonial revolution wouldn't fix this, even though it might get rid of a hated outside power. Kabylia resonated with Bourdieu's knowledge of his own home region, the Béarn, and the limited opportunities the French Revolution and centralizing modernization

brought to it. This was a powerful influence as he came to learn how ritual, a sense of mutual obligations, and aspects of traditional culture permeated what were also economic relationships (but never just economic, a reduction at odds with Kabyle culture). He studied participation in the new cash economy advanced by colonial rule and economic development, and he studied both how this threatened and changed Kabyle society and how labor migrants moved between two worlds, using money earned in the cities to pay for weddings back home but feeling they did not fit fully either place (Bourdieu and Sayad, 1964). He studied the difficult situation of those who chose to work in the modern economy and found themselves transformed into its "underclass," not even able to gain the full status of proletarians because of the ethno-national biases of the French colonialists (Bourdieu, 1973; Bourdieu, Darbel, Rivet and Seibel, 1963). And during the time of his fieldwork, Bourdieu confronted the violent French repression of the Algerian struggle for independence. The bloody battle of Algiers was a formative experience for a generation of French intellectuals who saw their state betray what it had always claimed was a mission of liberation and civilization, revealing the sheer power that lay behind colonialism, despite its legitimation in terms of progress.[9]

When Bourdieu left Algeria, he received a fellowship to the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton and followed it with a stay at the University of Pennsylvania. While in the US, he met the American sociologist Erving Goffman – another theoretically astute sociologist who refrained from abstract system building in favor of embedding theory in empirical practice. Goffman had begun to develop a sociology that followed Durkheim's interest in the moral order, but focused on the ways this was reproduced in interpersonal relations by individuals with their own strategic investments in action. Rather than treating individuals as either autonomous or simply socially constructed, for example, Goffman (1959) introduced the element of strategy by writing of the "presentation of self in everyday life." His point was similar to that Bourdieu would stress: to show the element of improvisation and adaptation, rather than simple rule-following, and to introduce agents as dynamic figures in the social order. Where Bourdieu's favorite metaphor was games, Goffman's was drama, but they shared the sense of social life as a performance that could be played better or worse, and which nearly always tended to the reproduction of social order even when individuals tried to make new and different things happen in their lives.

Goffman encouraged Bourdieu to take a position at the University of Pennsylvania, but Bourdieu felt that if he stayed in the US he would be unable to develop the kind of critical sociology he wanted to create.[10] It was not simply that he wanted to criticize France rather than the US, but that he wanted to benefit from inside knowledge while still achieving critical distance. This would present a challenge, but the challenge was itself a source of theoretical insight:

> In choosing to study the social world in which we are involved, we are obliged to confront, in dramatized form as it were, a certain number of fundamental epistemological problems, all related to the question of the difference between practical knowledge and scholarly knowledge, and particularly to the special difficulties involved first in breaking with inside experience and then in reconstituting the knowledge which has been obtained by means of this break. (Bourdieu, 1988: 1)

Bourdieu returned to France with a sense of the intellectual project that would guide his life's work. This was to grasp the material conditions people faced, the practical strategies they employed, the culture through which they understood their choices and the patterns and limits it imposed, and the ways in which people's pursuit of their own ends nonetheless tended to reproduce objective patterns which they did not choose and of which they might even be unaware.

This project was a profound intervention into Bourdieu's intellectual context. French intellectual life in the 1950s and 1960s produced two powerful but opposed perspectives in the human sciences: structuralism and existentialism. The former emphasized the formal patterns underlying all reality (extending ideas introduced to sociology by Durkheim and his followers); the latter stressed that meaning inhered in the individual experience of being in the world and especially in autonomous action. The two greatest and most influential figures in French intellectual life of the period were Claude Lévi-Strauss (the structuralist anthropologist) and Jean-Paul Sartre (the existentialist philosopher). Bourdieu's theoretical tastes were closer to Lévi-Strauss, but he saw both as one-sided. If existentialism greatly exaggerated the role of subjective choice, structuralism neglected agency. In a sense, Bourdieu developed an internal challenge to structuralism, incorporating much of its insight and intellectual approach but rejecting the tendency to describe social life in overly cognitive and overly static terms as a matter of following rules rather than engaging in strategic practice.

Bourdieu saw theory as best developed in the task of empirical analysis, and saw this as a practical challenge. Rather than applying a theory developed in advance and in the abstract, he brought his distinctive theoretical habitus to bear on a variety of analytic problems, and in the course of tackling each developed his theoretical resources further. The concepts developed in the course of such work could be transposed from one setting to another by means of analogy, and adapted to each. Theory, like the habitus in general, serves not as a fixed set of rules but as a characteristic mode of improvising (Brubaker, 1993). In an implicit critique of the dominance of philosophy over French social science, Bourdieu held that the real proof that a sociological project has value is to be demonstrated in its empirical findings, not in abstract system building.

Back in France Bourdieu took a position in the European Center for Historical Sociology headed by Raymond Aron, then France's leading sociologist. An important early supporter of Bourdieu's, Aron made him a deputy in the administration of the Center and helped him secure a teaching appointment in Section VI of the École Pratique des Hautes Études. Later Aron also helped Bourdieu secure the Ford Foundation funding that enabled the establishment of the Center for European Sociology. The two were never close collaborators, despite initial mutual respect, and they came into increasing conflict as Bourdieu became more critical of French higher education. Aron was a moderate conservative politically, and Bourdieu was aligned with the left. Perhaps more importantly, Aron was a defender of French academia and Bourdieu criticized its role in preserving class inequality (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1964). Things came to a head when student revolt broke out in 1968. Aron suggested that the problem lay primarily with the students and sought to limit – rather than expand – their involvement in the life of the university. Bourdieu was sympathetic to the students, though he thought them naively voluntaristic and

inattentive to the deep structures that made for the reproduction of class inequality and the university as an institution (see Bourdieu and Passeron, 1970).[11]

Though Bourdieu's writings on the problems of French higher education influenced the student protests of the 1960s, he was not himself centrally involved in the activism. His approach to politics was more to intervene through producing new knowledge, with the hope that this would help to demystify the way institutions worked, revealing the limits to common justifications and the way in which power rather than simple merit shaped the distribution of opportunities. His views of the educational system reflected the disappointed idealism of one who had invested himself deeply in it, and owed much of his own rise from provincial obscurity to Parisian prominence to success in school. As he wrote in *Homo Academicus*, the famous book on higher education that he began amid the crises of 1968, he was like someone who believed in a religious vocation then found the church to be corrupt. "The special place held in my work by a somewhat singular sociology of the university institution is no doubt explained by the peculiar force with which I felt the need to gain rational control over the disappointment felt by an 'oblate' [a religious devotee] faced with the annihilation of the truths and values to which he was destined and dedicated, rather than take refuge in feelings of self-destructive resentment" (Bourdieu, 1988: xxvi). The disappointment could not be undone, but it could be turned to understanding and potentially, through that understanding, to positive change.

Educational institutions were central to Bourdieu's concern, but both his sense of disappointment and his critical analyses were more wide reaching. All the institutions of modernity, including the capitalist market and the state itself, share in a tendency to promise far more than they deliver. They present themselves as working for the common good, but in fact reproduce social inequalities. They present themselves as agents of freedom, but in fact are organizations of power. They inspire devotion from those who want richer, freer lives, and they disappoint them with the limits they impose and the violence they deploy. Simply to attack modernity, however, is to engage in the "self-destructive resentment" Bourdieu sought to avoid. Rather, the best way forward lies through the struggle to understand, to win deeper truths, and to remove legitimacy from the practices by which power mystifies itself. In this way, one can challenge the myths and deceptions of modernity, enlightenment, and civilization without becoming the enemy of the hopes they offered.

Bourdieu assembled a remarkable group of collaborators including Luc Boltanski, Jean-Claude Passeron, and Monique de Saint Martin. Together, this group (and new recruits) conducted a wide range of empirical studies. Themes ranged from photography as an art form and hobby (Bourdieu *et al.*, [1965]1990), to museum goers and patterns of taste (Bourdieu and Darbel, [1966]1990; Bourdieu, [1979]1984, schooling and social inequality (Bourdieu and Passeron, [1964]1979, 1971), modern universities (Bourdieu, [1978]1988, [1989]1996), the rise of literature and art as a distinct fields of endeavor (Bourdieu, [1989]1993, [1992]1996), and the experience of poverty amid the wealth of modern societies (Bourdieu *et al.*, [1993]2000). These put the perspective Bourdieu had developed to use in analyzing many different aspects of French social life. In 1975 Bourdieu and his collaborators also founded a new journal, *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales*. In its pages they not only took up different empirical themes but also developed and tried out new ideas and

theoretical innovations. *Actes* also translated and introduced work from researchers with cognate interests in other countries.

The approach of the Center was developed simultaneously in research projects and seminars. It is reflected in a kind of manual for doing sociology (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron, [1968]1991). This differed from typical textbooks in presenting not a compilation of facts and a summary of theories, but an approach to sociology as an ongoing effort to "win social facts." Entitled *The Craft of Sociology*, it bypassed abstract codification of knowledge and endeavored to help students acquire the practical skill and intellectual habitus of sociologists. Soon after, Bourdieu published his most influential theoretical statement (though characteristically in a book also rich in empirical analyses, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, [1972]1977). Bourdieu later rewrote this study as *The Logic of Practice*. Soon after, he published his celebrated study of French cultural patterns, *Distinction* ([1979]1984). This remarkable corpus of work was the basis for his election to the chair of sociology in the Collège de France.

In sum, Bourdieu's own educational experience at once gave him fantastic resources – a command of the history of philosophy, multiple languages, and skills in critique and debate – and alienated him from the very institutions that helped, as it were, to make him a star. The resources were not limited to intellectual abilities but included the credentials, connections, and sense of the game that enabled him not just to become famous but also to create new institutions. The alienation gave Bourdieu the motivation and emotional distance to pioneer a critical approach, rather than a simple affirmation of the status quo.

Bourdieu saw critical social science as politically significant, but he was careful to avoid "short-circuiting" the relationship between scholarly distinction and political voice. Until late in his life, he resisted trading on his celebrity, and kept his interventions to topics where he was especially knowledgeable, such as education or the situation of Algerians in France. In the 1990s, he became furious at the ways in which market logic was being introduced into cultural life ([1996]1999) and at the weak response even of the political left. He wrote a best-selling polemic about television ([1995]1998) but began to use it more as he tried to reach a broader public on issues from undocumented workers to funding for education. His typical goal was to demystify the ways in which seemingly neutral institutions in fact make it harder for ordinary people to learn the truth about the state or public affairs. He called for an "internationale" of intellectuals (to replace the old *internationale* of the working class movement). In this spirit, he founded a review of books and intellectual debate, *Libère*, which appeared in half a dozen languages (though, curiously, not English). He also overcame a long-standing resistance to making public declarations of conscience by signing petitions. For example, he worked with other leading figures to suggest in the midst of the Yugoslavian wars that there were other options besides passivity and massive high altitude bombing. The media and the state seemed to suggest, wrote Bourdieu and his colleagues, that there was a simple choice between the NATO military campaign and ignoring the horrors of ethnic cleansing that Milosevic and others had unleashed. Not so, they argued, for there were other possible approaches to stemming the evils, including working more closely with Yugoslavia's immediate neighbors. And it was worth seeing that NATO's intervention had actually increased the pace of ethnic cleansing. As Bourdieu (1999) argued, the categories

with which states "think" structure too much of the thinking of all of us in modern society; breaking with them is a struggle but an important one.

More generally, Bourdieu's mode of intervention was to use the methods of good social scientific research to expose misrecognitions that support injustice. A prime example is the enormous collective study of "the suffering of the world" produced under his direction (Bourdieu, 1993). This aimed not simply to expose poverty or hardship, but to challenge the dominant points of view that made it difficult for those living in comfort, and especially those running the state, to understand the lives of those who had to struggle most simply to exist. The book thus included both direct attempts to state the truths that could be seen from social spaces of suffering, and examinations of how the views of state officials and other elites prevented them from seeing these truths for themselves. The misrecognition built into the very categories of official knowledge was thus one of its themes. Bourdieu and his colleagues entered the public discourse not simply as advocates, therefore, but specifically as social scientists.

Not least, Bourdieu worried that the possibilities for free intellectual exchange were being undermined. The work and social value of artists, writers, and intellectuals depends on such free exchange – an unhampered and open creativity and communication. It thus depends on maintaining the autonomy of the artistic, literary, and scientific or intellectual fields. Boundaries need to be maintained between serious intellectual pursuit of truth and discourses – however smart – that seek only to use knowledge instrumentally. In this, he has stood clearly against those who would censor intellectual or cultural life in favor of their standards of morality or political expediency (see Bourdieu and Haacke, [1994]1995).

MISRECOGNITION, SYMBOLIC DOMINATION, AND REFLEXIVITY

Social life requires our active engagement in its games. It is impossible to remain neutral, and it is impossible to live with the distanced, detached perspective of the outside observer. As a result, all participants in social life have a knowledge of it that is conditioned by their specific location and trajectory in it. That is, they see it from where they are, how they got there and where they are trying to go. Take something like the relations between parents and children. As participants, we see these from one side or the other. They look different at different stages of life and other different circumstances – as for example when one's parents become grandparents to one's children. Our engagement in these relationships is powerful, but it is deeply subjective, not objective. We know a lot, but what we know is built into the specific relationships we inhabit and into specific modes of cultural understanding. Much of it is practical mastery of how to be a parent or a child. This is a genuine form of knowledge, but it should not be confused with scientific knowledge.

Bourdieu's perspective and approach were both shaped crucially by his fieldwork in Algeria. In trying to understand Kabyle society he shaped his distinctive perspective on the interplay of objective structures and subjective understanding and action. The experience of fieldwork itself was powerful, and helped to shape Bourdieu's orientation to knowledge. As an ethnographer, Bourdieu entered into another social and cultural world, learned to speak an unfamiliar language, struggled to understand

what was going on while remaining necessarily in crucial ways an outsider to it. This helped him to see the importance of combining insider and outsider perspectives on social life. To be altogether an outsider to Kabylia, to try to know it only through "objective" facts, was certainly to fail to understand it, but in order to grasp it accurately the ethnographer also had to break with the familiarity of both his own received categories and those of his informants. His job is neither to impose his own concepts nor simply to translate those of the people he studies. He must struggle, as the philosopher Bachelard put it, to "win" the facts of his study.

One of the most basic difficulties in such research, Bourdieu came to realize, is the extent to which it puts a premium on native's discursive explanations of their actions. Because the anthropologist is an outsider and starts out ignorant, natives must explain things to him. But it would be a mistake to accept such explanations as simple truths, not because they are lies but because they are precisely the limited form of knowledge that can be offered to one who has not mastered the practical skills of living fully inside the culture (1977: 2). Unless he is careful, the researcher is led to focus his attention not on the actual social life around him but on the statements about it that his informants offer.

> The anthropologist's particular relation to the object of his study contains the makings of a theoretical distortion inasmuch as his situation as an observer, excluded from the real play of social activities by the fact that he has no place (except by choice or by way of a game) in the system observed and has no need to make a place for himself there, inclines him to a hermeneutic representation of practices, leading him to reduce all social relations to communicative relations and, more precisely, to decoding operations. (1977: 1)

Such an approach would treat social life as much more a matter of explicit cognitive rules than it is, and miss the ways in which practical activity is really generated beyond the determination of the explicit rules.

In this respect, Bourdieu took the case of anthropological fieldwork to be paradigmatic for social research more generally. The confrontation with a very different way of life revealed the need for both outsider and insider perspectives. Not long after he completed his work in Algeria, Bourdieu challenged himself by applying the method he was developing to research in his own native region of Béarn. The task, as he began to argue didactically and to exemplify in all his work, was to combine intimate knowledge of practical activity with more abstract knowledge of objective patterns, and using the dialectical relation between the two to break with the familiar ways in which people understand their own everyday actions. These everyday accounts always contain distortions and misrecognitions that do various sorts of ideological work. The classic example is gift-giving, which is understood as disinterested, voluntary, and not subject to precise accounting of equivalence, but which people actually do in ways that are more strategic than their self-understanding allows. In the Béarn, Bourdieu analyzed how more and more oldest sons were being forced to become bachelors. Because they inherited the family farms, they had previously been the most prized marriage partners, but as farming declined in economic importance this became a less valuable asset. At the same time, more young women went to work in cities and towns. There they not only met other people, they changed

their attitudes and adopted urban standards that made the men at home seem clumsy and out of touch with social change. Even the bachelors themselves accepted this characterization, and by internalizing it undermined still further their chances of finding marriage partners (Bourdieu, 2002a).

Bourdieu makes a similar point in trying to explain how it is that women acquiesce in male domination. It is not that they find this a good thing, nor that they are entirely unaware of it, but they usually grasp their experience of it in biased cultural categories. This amounts to "symbolic violence, a gentle violence, imperceptible and invisible even to its victims, exerted for the most part through the purely symbolic channels of communication and cognition (more precisely, misrecognition), recognition, or even feeling" (Bourdieu, 2001: 1–2).

Our everyday life involvements, Bourdieu suggested, give us a great deal of practical knowledge. But because practical engagements focus our attention only on certain issues and interests and also limit the time we can spend reflecting we typically misrecognize much of what we and other people do. Misrecognition is not simply error; every recognition is also a misrecognition. This is so precisely because we cannot be objective and outside our own relations, we cannot see them from all possible angles. Which aspects of them we understand and how reflects our own practical engagement in them and also the conditions for perpetuating the games in which we are participants. As Bourdieu ([1980]1990: 68) wrote:

> Practical faith is the condition of entry that every field tacitly imposes, not only by sanctioning and debarring those who would destroy the game, but by so arranging things, in practice, that the operations of selecting and shaping new entrants (rites of passage, examinations, etc.) are such as to obtain from them that undisputed, prereflexive, naïve, native compliance with the fundamental presuppositions of the field which is the very definition of doxa.

"Doxa" is Bourdieu's term for the taken-for-granted, preconscious understandings of the world and our place in it that shape our more conscious awarenesses. Doxa is more basic than "orthodoxy," or beliefs that we maintain to be correct in the awareness that others may have different views. Orthodoxy is an enforced straightness of belief, like following the teachings of organized religion. Doxa is felt reality, what we take not as beyond challenge but before any possible challenge. But though doxa seems to us to be simply the way things are, it is in fact a socially produced understanding, and what is doxic varies from culture to culture and field to field. In order for us to live, and to recognize anything, we require the kind of orientation to action and awareness that doxa gives. But doxa thus also implies misrecognition, partial and distorted understanding. It was the doxic experience of Europeans for centuries that the world was flat. Thinking otherwise was evidence not of scientific cleverness but of madness.

The ideas of doxa and misrecognition allowed Bourdieu a subtle approach to issues commonly addressed through the concept of ideology. Marxist and other analysts have pointed to the ways in which people's beliefs may be shaped to conform with either power structures or the continued functioning of a social order. Ideology is commonly understood as a set of beliefs that is in some degree partial and distorted and serves some specific set of social interests. Thus it is ideological to suggest

that individual effort is the basic determinant of where people stand in the class hierarchy. It is not only false, but it serves both to legitimate an unequal social order and to motivate participants. Common use of the notion of ideology, however, tends to imply that it is possible to be without ideology, to have an objectively correct or undistorted understanding of the social world. This Bourdieu rejected. One can shake the effects of specific ideologies, but one cannot live without doxa, and one cannot play the games of life without misrecognition. Misrecognition is built into the very practical mastery that makes our actions effective.

Nonetheless, symbolic power is exercised through the construction of doxa as well as orthodoxy. Every field of social participation demands of those who enter it a kind of preconscious adherence to its way of working. This requires seeing things certain ways and not others, and this will work to the benefit of some participants more than others. Take the modern business corporation. It seldom occurs to people who work for corporations, or enter into contracts with them, or represent them in court, to question whether they exist. But what is a corporation? It is not precisely a material object and not a person in any ordinary sense. As the Supreme Court Justice Marshall (1819) put it famously, a corporation has "no soul to damn, no body to kick." Yet corporations can own property, make contracts, and sue and be sued in courts of law. Corporations exist largely because they are recognized to exist by a wide range of people, including agents of the legal system and the government. In order to do almost any kind of business in a modern society, one must believe in corporations. Yet, they are also in a sense fictions. Behind corporations stand owners and managers – and for the most part, they cannot be held liable for things the corporation "does." To believe in the corporation is to support a system that benefits certain interests much more than others, and yet not to believe in it makes it impossible to carry out effective practical action in the business world. This is how misrecognition works.

In addition to making misrecognition, and doxa, the objects of analysis, Bourdieu wishes to remind us of their methodological significance. It is because ordinary social life requires us to be invested in preconscious understandings that are at least in part misrecognitions that it is a faulty guide to social research. A crucial first step for every sociologist is to break with familiar, received understandings of everyday life. To "win" social facts depends on finding techniques for seeing the world more objectively. This is always a struggle, and one that the researcher must keep in mind throughout every project. It will always be easy to slide back into ways of seeing things that are supported by everyday, doxic understandings – one's own, or those of one's informants. Some of the advantages of statistical techniques, for example, come in helping us to achieve distance on the social life we study. At the same time, however, we need to work to understand the processes by which misrecognition is produced, to grasp that it is not a simple mistake. It is not enough to see the "objective" facts alone. We need to see the game in which they are part of the stakes.

We seldom grasp the whole truth about anything of importance without attending to the way cultural ideas and values and even language itself can reinforce power relations and produce injuries. Bourdieu includes insults, but he is interested especially in less obvious forms of symbolic domination. He points out, for example, that the root meaning of the word "categorize" is "to accuse" and he points out how putting people in cultural categories can have major effects. This is consistent with

other sociological theories like "labeling theory" that shows how being labeled a deviant or an underachiever can have an effect on a person. As Foucault also argued, the very idea of "normal" can be used in a way that prejudices people against whatever is considered not normal. Conversely, whatever is said to be normal is insulated from criticism even if it is unjust. Bourdieu goes further in emphasizing the way categorization works as a tool of state power, whether by classifying people as citizens or not, as eligible to vote or not, as criminals or as people whose names are suspicious enough to get them stopped in airports. When governments say that marriage can only be between men and women they are exerting symbolic domination. The legal categories male and female can be problematic for a transgendered person. So are laws that describe homosexuality as involving "unnatural acts" even if they are not enforced. Children of interracial families may experience questions that demand they choose one race or the other as examples of symbolic violence. So, of course, are stereotypes about different races or genders. When the media rely on prejudicial descriptions they may perpetrate symbolic violence – for example when they say someone who was arrested "looked like a wild animal." Indeed, just choosing a particularly unflattering photograph to publish can have this effect. Bourdieu stresses symbolic violence because it is commonly less obvious than physical violence, because its influence can be pervasive, and because when cultural norms are widely shared they can make people who are the victims of symbolic violence or unfair practices accept them as normal. But symbolic violence is made possible partly by the still more widespread reality of misrecognition, the extent to which all understanding tends to be one-sided, to understand other people or ideas from the perspective of how they might matter to our actions, not simply as objects of scientific contemplation. This is a key reason why "winning the social fact" is a challenge for science, because the everyday understanding of social phenomena is misrecognition as much as recognition.

Reflexivity is achieving the capacity to look analytically at oneself, to take an external view of one's own action. This starts with seeing oneself from the point of view of others, but it also includes seeing how objective conditions and cultural influences shape one's own actions. Sociological research is an effort to help people see how their own actions are produced and what unintended consequences they have. As Bourdieu wrote, "sociology wouldn't merit an hour's trouble … if it didn't give itself the task of restoring to people the meaning of their actions" (2002a: 128). People don't know the full meaning of their own actions partly because of the role of unconscious learning – habitus – in shaping actions; partly because structural factors like inequality of capital may not be readily observed; and partly because habits of cultural understanding not only shape what people do but limit how much they are aware of it. For example, if children are always told that success in school is simply an indication of personal merit – the combination of brains and effort – they may not see the role of class inequality. This has effects through differences in the quality of schools and the size of classes, and in the experiences and expectations that from an early age begin to shape each child's habitus. And it shapes decisions – like whether to stay in school or drop out – which have meanings beyond what is immediately apparent to those involved. These are all dimensions of meaning that sociological research clarifies so that people can better understand their own action and circumstances. But the same goes for social institutions and society as

a whole. Sociology helps teachers and superintendents see the implications of
the way schools are run, and sociology helps people see the structure of society and
the sources and implication of their own actions. This is a bit like a coach using
video to help a tennis player see her own swing and kinesiological research to under-
stand the mechanics of bodily motion. The player can then connect this objective
information to subjective experience – knowledge won't matter if she cannot change
her habits of action. The new knowledge may make her stroke more forceful or
reduce the risk of injury. Likewise, better knowledge of how society is organized and
what shapes social action can inform the pursuit of social change. But Bourdieu
emphasizes also that social research is itself a social process, made possible by spe-
cific sorts of resources, organized by the values and hierarchy embedded in a field,
and shaped by the experience and previous learning of researchers – including
learning of which they are not aware. In order to be a good "objective" researcher,
thus, a social scientist needs to understand the factors that shape his or her subjective
perception. These include background variables like gender, race, and class, but also
ways in which intellectual categories and social institutions are organized – like the
distinctions among disciplines that for example make economic issues seem more
separate from the social or psychological than they really are. A basic condition
of deeper social knowledge is a job that provides time to engage in research and
reflection – and this too shapes a view of the world not equally available to those
without that opportunity.

Bourdieu did not call for the study of the points of view of individual scientists,
or a critical uncovering of their personal biases, so much as for the study of the pro-
duction of the basic perspectives that operate within intellectual fields more broadly.
These are collective products. Identifying them is a source of insight into the uncon-
scious cultural structures that shape intellectual orientations. These may be general
to a culture or specific to the intellectual field. We saw an example in considering the
ways in which anthropologists may be prone to an intellectualist bias in describing
action in terms of following cultural rules. This follows not only from the typical
self-understanding of intellectuals, but from reliance on discourse with informants
as a way of discovering how practices are organized. Grasping how this bias gets
produced is a way to improve the epistemic quality of analyses.

Beyond uncovering such possible biases, reflexivity offers the opportunity to see
how the organization of the intellectual or academic field as a whole influences the
knowledge that is produced within it. A simple example is the way in which the dif-
ferentiation of disciplines organizes knowledge. Each discipline is predisposed to
emphasize those features that are distinctive to it, reinforce its autonomy, and give it
special advantage in relation to others. Topics that lie in the interstices may be
neglected or relatively distorted. Bourdieu attempted more systematically to analyze
the social space of intellectual work, using a technique called correspondence analy-
sis. This allows him to identify similarities in the products, activities, and relation-
ships of different intellectuals and graphically represent them as locations in a two
or more dimensional space. In his major book on the organization of universities
and intellectuals, *Homo Academicus*, he uses this technique to produce an overall
picture of social space. This is useful for grasping the battle lines over specific intel-
lectual orientations, and also the conflicts over using knowledge to support or chal-
lenge the social order. Law professors, for example, are more likely to be products of

private schools and children of senior state officials, and not surprisingly also more likely to be supporters of the state and its elites. Social scientists, more likely to be the children of schoolteachers and professionals, and graduates of Parisian public *lycées*, tend towards a more critical engagement with the state. Obviously, these are relatively superficial attributes and Bourdieu offers much more detail. Paying attention to these sorts of differentiations among the different disciplines helps us to understand what is at stake when they struggle over intellectual issues – say, whether a new field of study should be recognized with departmental status – and also when their members engage in intellectual production.

For Bourdieu, reflexivity was not aimed at negative criticism of science, but rather at improving it. He wished social science to be more scientific, but this depends not simply on imitating natural science but on grasping the social conditions for the production of better scientific knowledge. Mere imitation of natural science (as in some economics) produces objectifications which make no sense of the real world of social practices because they treat social life as though it were solely material life with no room for culture or subjectivity. Bourdieu's analysis helps not only to show the limits of such an approach but to show why it can gain prestige and powerful allies, why it attracts recruits of certain backgrounds, and how it in turn supports the state and business elites. A better social science requires, as we saw earlier, breaking with the received familiarity of everyday social practices in order to grasp underlying truths. It requires reflexively studying the objective limits of objectivism. But it also requires maintaining the autonomy of social science, resisting the temptations to make social science directly serve goals of money or power. Just as literature depends on authors gaining the freedom to produce art for art's sake – with other members of the literary field as its arbiters – so science depends on producing truth for truth's sake with other scientists as arbiters. This truth can become valuable for a variety of purposes. But just as there is a difference between basic physics and the use of the truths of physics in engineering projects, there is a difference between producing basic sociological knowledge and using this in business or politics. It is especially easy for social scientists to be drawn into an overly immediate relationship to money or power; it is crucial that their first commitment be to the scientific field, because their most valuable contributions to broader public discourse come when they can speak honestly in the name of science. At the same time, truths that social science discovers are likely to make many upholders of the social order uneasy, because they will force more accurate recognitions of the ways in which power operates and social inequality is reproduced.

HABITUS

Participation in social games is not merely a conscious choice. It is something we do unconsciously or at least pre-reflectively. We are, in a sense, always already involved. From childhood we are prepared for adult roles. We are asked what we want to be when we grow up and learn that it is right to have an occupation. We are told to sit up straight and speak when spoken to. We experience the reverence our parents show before the church – or before money or fame, depending on the parents. Out of what meets with approval or doesn't, what works, or doesn't, we develop a

characteristic way of generating new actions, of improvising the moves of the game of our lives. We learn confidence or timidity. But in either case much of the power of the socialization process is experienced in bodily terms, simply as part of who we are, how we exist in the world. This sense is the habitus, a key concept for Bourdieu to which we have been introduced through the idea of the embodied sense of how to play a game.

Habitus (an idea that goes back to Aristotle) refers to the way we intuitively, unconsciously position ourselves in the world and relate to the world. It is formed through a learning process by which experience comes to be embodied so that it shapes our action unconsciously (like having a sense of how close to stand to someone else when having a conversation, or knowing how to swim or speak). Bourdieu stresses how this not only generates repeated behavior but helps produce new actions when people try to fit the habits they have learned into new situations. He shows how culture works not just as an abstract system of values or ideas but through the generation of sensibilities that inform bodily experience and action – as for example the words honor and shame name not only ideas but powerfully orienting experiences that orient what we do (as for example we try both consciously and unconsciously to avoid shame) and how we relate to others (as for example we trust someone who seems honorable). Habitus is shaped by gender, class, and culture because these shape the experiences from which we learn. Habitus can be formed in different ecologies – desert, forest, or city. In modern society our sense of being bodily located in the world is extended by all sorts of media, as for example texting depends both on physical habits involving keys and screens and on having an intuitive mental sense of other people located in other places reading what we transmit. But despite technologies, our physically embodied relationship to the world remains basic, and our actions are shaped not just by conscious choices but by intuitive orientations that are the product of previous experience.

"Habitus" provides the embodied sensibility that makes possible structured improvisation.[12] Jazz musicians can play together without consciously following rules because they have developed physically embodied capacities to hear and respond appropriately to what is being produced by others, and to create themselves in ways which others can hear sensibly and to which others can respond. Or in Bourdieu's metaphor, effective play of a game requires not just knowledge of rules but a practical sense for the game. If this is a challenge to the static cognitivism of structuralism, it is equally a challenge to the existentialist understanding of subjectivity. Sartre created his famous account of the existential dilemma by positing "a sort of unprecedented confrontation between the subject and the world" (Bourdieu, 1977: 73). But this misrepresented how actual social life works, because it leaves completely out of the account the durable dispositions of the habitus. Before anyone is a subject, in other words, they are already inculcated with institutional knowledge – recognition and misrecognition.

The habitus appears in one sense as each individual's characteristic set of dispositions for action. There is a social process of matching such dispositions to positions in the social order (as, in another vocabulary, one learns to play the roles that fit with one's statuses). But the habitus is more than this. It is the meeting point between institutions and bodies. That is, it is the basic way in which each person as a biological

being connects with the socio-cultural order in such a way that the various games of life keep their meaning, keep being played.

> Produced by the work of inculcation and appropriation that is needed in order for objective structures, the products of collective history, to be reproduced in the form of the durable, adjusted dispositions that are the condition of their functioning, the habitus, which is constituted in the course through which àgents partake of the history objectified in institutions, is what makes it possible to inhabit institutions, to appropriate them practically, and so to keep them in activity, continuously pulling them from the state of dead letters, reviving the sense deposited in them, but at the same time imposing the revisions and transformations that reactivation entails. (Bourdieu, 1990: 57)[13]

Think of an example – say the Christian church, a product of two millennia that still seems alive to members. They experience it as alive, but they also make it live by reinventing it in their rituals, their relations with each other, and their faith. Being brought up in the church helps to prepare members for belief (inculcation), but it is also something they must actively claim (appropriation). The connection between the institution and the person is the very way in which members produce their actions.

> Each agent, wittingly or unwittingly, willy-nilly, is a producer and reproducer of objective meaning. Because his actions and works are the product of a modus operandi of which he is not the producer and has no conscious mastery, they contain an 'objective intention,' as the Scholastics put it, which always outruns his conscious intentions. (Bourdieu, 1977: 79)

To return to an earlier example, each of us reproduces the idea of corporation every time we engage in a transaction with one – owning stock, renting an apartment, going to work – even though that may not be our conscious intention.

Bourdieu emphasized that habitus is not just a capacity of the individual, but also an achievement of the collectivity. It is the result of a ubiquitous "collective enterprise of inculcation." The reason why "strategies" can work without individuals being consciously strategic is that individuals become who they were and social institutions exist only on the strength of this inculcation of orientations to action, evaluation, and understanding. The most fundamental social changes have to appear not only as changes in formal structures but also as changes in habitual orientations to action. Bourdieu sought thus to overcome the separation of culture, social organization and embodied individual existence that is characteristic of most existing sociology.

FIELDS AND CAPITAL

As we saw earlier, one of the ways in which Bourdieu used the metaphor of "games" was to describe the different fields into which social activities are organized. Each field, like law or literature, has its own distinctive rules and stakes of play. Accomplishments in one are not immediately granted the same prestige or rewards in another. Thus novelists are usually not made judges, and legal writing is seldom taken as literature. But, although the fields involve different games, it is possible to make translations between them. To explain this, Bourdieu uses the concept of capital. His analysis of the differences in forms of capital and dynamics of

conversion between them is one of the most original and important features of Bourdieu's theory. This describes both the specific kinds of resources accumulated by those who are winners in the struggles of various fields and the more general forms of capital – such as money and prestige – that make possible translations from one to the other. "A capital does not exist and function except in relation to a field" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 101). Yet, successful lawyers and success-ful authors both, for example, seek to convert their own successes into improved standards of living and chances for their children. To do so, they must convert the capital specific to their field of endeavor into other forms. In addition to material property (economic capital), families may accumulate networks of connections (social capital) and prestige (cultural capital) by the way in which they raise chil-dren and plan their marriages. In each case, the accumulation has to be reproduced in every generation or it is lost.

Capital is Bourdieu's term for resources that structure what is possible for different individuals or groups to do, and that form the "stakes" of social strug-gles. Capital comes in different forms – social, symbolic, and cultural as well as materially economic. Who you know can be a resource just like a bank account, and some people network very consciously to build social capital. Material, economic capital is especially important in modern societies – though so are edu-cational credentials. Different forms of capital are convertible, as for example rich parents can buy their children education at expensive universities. Public institu-tions (like schools or museums) and cultural values (like beauty or justice) work to limit immediate dominance of economic capital over all other kinds. Nonetheless, capitalism (in Marx's sense of a system in which accumulation of wealth based on the conversion of human labor into commodities becomes an end in itself) is for Bourdieu a tendency in modern life that threatens to dominate. But people still accumulate other sorts of capital, sometimes by explicitly rejecting economic values, as an artist may gain symbolic credit for demonstrating devotion purely to aesthetics and popularizing his work for sales. Because of the importance of capi-tal, inequalities are basic to social life. Capital is both necessary for individual action and built into the structure of collective action so that people are embedded in competition and accumulation even without conceptualizing them as such or forming conscious intentions.

Field refers to the organization of modern social life into different spheres of value and activity, each partially autonomous from others. At the same time, the term also refers to the field of play in which social interaction takes place, the action of each player influenced by positions and play of the others, or the field of force in which physical entities are organized by their relations to each other. Each field, like law or literature, has its own distinctive sorts of resources (capital) and hierarchies of pres-tige and influence. These are related to each other in a larger field of power (shaped especially by the state which both regulates and empowers) and in exchange rela-tionships (largely mediated by markets but not entirely – as members of different fields may do favors for each other). Each field demands a distinctive habitus from its members, sets of skills and predispositions that enable them to work effectively in it but also commit them to its values. Every field is unequal, organized into a hierar-chy of both cultural value and material resources or influence. Modern society is distinctive in the extent to which it is organized by a differentiation of fields. Here

Bourdieu develops an insight associated with Max Weber, who called fields "value spheres" because each maintained distinctive values – whether religious, artistic, or economic. This allows modern societies to be diverse and allows members of modern societies to "compartmentalize" their lives (focusing on religion at church or money when at the bank) more than people in less differentiated societies. Bourdieu stresses that the value associated with each field also defines a hierarchy – whether of spiritual purity and wisdom, artistic creativity and judgment, or economic wealth. Within each field members are empowered by connections, credentials, and other sorts of capital – and by habits of action adjusted to their field. They therefore tend to defend the boundaries and autonomy of their field.

There are two senses in which capital is converted from one form to another. One is as part of the intergenerational reproduction of capital. Rich people try to make sure that their children go to good colleges – which, in fact, are often expensive private colleges (at least in the USA). This is a way of converting money into cultural capital (educational credentials). In this form, it can be passed on and potentially reconverted into economic form. The second sense of conversion of capital is more immediate. The athlete with great successes and capital specific to his or her sporting field – prestige, fame – may convert this into money by signing agreements to endorse products, or by opening businesses like car dealerships or insurance agencies in which celebrity status in the athletic field may help to attract customers.

Bourdieu's account of capital differed from most versions of Marxism. It was not backed by a theory of capitalism as a distinct social formation (Calhoun, 1993). Neither was it the basis for an economic determinism. Bourdieu saw "an economy of practices" at work insofar as people must always decide how to expend their effort and engage in strategies that aim at gaining scarce goods. But Bourdieu did not hold that specifically economic goods are always the main or underlying motivations of action or the basis of an overall system. By conceptualizing capital as taking many different forms, each tied to a different field of action, Bourdieu stressed (a) that there are many different kinds of goods that people pursue and resources that they accumulate, (b) that these are inextricably social, because they derive their meaning from the social relationships that constitute different fields (rather than simply from some sort of material things being valuable in and of themselves), and (c) that the struggle to accumulate capital is hardly the whole story; the struggle to reproduce capital is equally basic and often depends on the ways in which it can be converted across fields.

In addition, Bourdieu showed that fields (such as art, literature, and science) that are constituted by a seeming disregard for or rejection of economic interests nonetheless operate according to a logic of capital accumulation and reproduction. It is common to think of religion, art, and science as basically the opposite of economic calculation and capital accumulation. Even fields like law are constituted not simply by reference to economic capital (however much lawyers may treasure their pay) but by reference to justice and technical expertise in its adjudication. This is crucial, among other reasons, as a basis for the claim of each field to a certain autonomy. This, as Bourdieu (1992[1996]: 47ff.) argued, is the "critical phase" in the emergence of a field. Autonomy means that the field can be engaged in the play of its own distinctive game, can produce its own distinctive capital, and cannot be reduced to immediate dependency on any other field.

Bourdieu's most sustained analysis of the development of such a field focused on the genesis and structure of the literary field. He analyzed the late nineteenth-century point at which the writing of "realistic" novels separated itself simultaneously from the broader cultural field and the immediate rival of journalism. His book, *The Rules of Art* ([1992]1996), focused equally on the specific empirical case of Gustave Flaubert and his career, and on the patterns intrinsic to the field as such. The emphasis on Flaubert was, among other things, a riposte to and (often implicit) critical engagement with Sartre's famous largely psychological analysis. *The Rules of Art* contested the view of artistic achievement as disinterested, and a matter simply of individual genius and creative impulses. It showed genius to lie in the ability to play the game that defines a field, as well as in aesthetic vision or originality.

Flaubert was the mid-nineteenth-century writer who, more than anyone else with the possible exception of Baudelaire, created the exemplary image of the author as an artistic creator working in an autonomous literary field. The author was not merely a writer acting on behalf of other interests: politics, say, or money. A journalist was such a paid writer, responsible to those who hired him. An author, by contrast, was an artist. This was the key point for Flaubert and for the literary field that developed around and after him. What the artistic field demanded was not just talent, or vision, but a commitment to "art for art's sake." This meant producing works specifically for the field of art.

When we set out to understand the "creative project" or distinctive point of view of an artist like Flaubert, therefore, the first thing we need to grasp is his place in and trajectory through the field of art (or the more specific field of literature as art). This, Bourdieu recognizes, must seem like heresy to those who believe in the individualistic ideal of artistic genius. It is one thing to say that sociology can help us understand art markets, but this is a claim that sociology is not just helpful for but crucial to understanding the individual work of art and the point of view of the artist who created it. Bourdieu takes on this task in an analysis simultaneously of Flaubert's career, or his own implicit analysis of it in the novel *Sentimental Education*, and of the genesis and structure of the French literary field. In doing so, he accepts a challenge similar to that Durkheim (1897) took in seeking to explain suicide sociologically: to demonstrate the power of sociology in a domain normally understood in precisely antisociological terms.

At the center of Bourdieu's analysis lies the demonstration that Flaubert's point of view as an artist is shaped by his objective position in the artistic field and his more subjective position-takings in relation to the development of that field. For example, it is important that Flaubert came from a family that was able to provide him with financial support. This enabled him to participate fully in the ethic (or interest) of art for art's sake while some of his colleagues (perhaps equally talented) were forced to support themselves by writing journalism for money. This is different from saying simply that Flaubert expressed a middle class point of view. In fact, it suggests something of why middle and upper class people who enter into careers (like art) that are defined by cultural rather than economic capital often become social critics. Their family backgrounds help to buy them some autonomy from the immediate interests of the economy, while their pursuit of distinction in a cultural field gives them an interest in producing innovative or incisive views of the world. In other words, the objective features of an artist's background influence his work not so much directly as indirectly through the mediation of the artistic field.

In this sense, the artist is not so much "disinterested" as "differently interested." The illusion of disinterest is produced by the way economic and cultural dimensions of modern societies are ideologically opposed to each other. The field of cultural production is defined as the economic world reversed (Bourdieu, 1993: ch. 1). It is one of the central contributions of Bourdieu's theory, however, to show that this is a misrecognition and the opposition is really between different forms of capital. Directly economic capital operates in a money-based market that can be indefinitely extended. Cultural capital, by contrast, operates as a matter of status, which is often recognized only within specific fields (here again, Bourdieu follows Weber).

Bourdieu situated his logic of multiple fields and specific forms of capital in relation to a more general notion of "the field of power." The field of art, thus, has its own internal struggles for recognition, power, and capital, but it also has a specific relationship to the overall field of power. Even highly rewarded artists generally cannot convert their professional prestige into the power to govern other institutional domains. By contrast, businesspeople and lawyers are more able to do this. The question is not just who is higher or lower in some overall system, but also how different groups and fields relate to each other. Fields that are relatively high in cultural capital and low in economic capital occupy dominated positions within the dominant elite. In other words, university professors, authors, and artists are relatively high in the overall social hierarchy, but we would not get a very complete picture of how they relate to the system of distinctions if we stopped at this. We need to grasp what it means to be in possession of a very large amount of particular kinds of capital (mainly cultural) that trade at a disadvantage in relation to directly economic capital. This translates into a feeling of being dominated even for people who are objectively well off in relation to society as a whole. College professors, for example, don't compare themselves to postmen so much as to their former university classmates who may have gotten lower grades but made more money in business. Similarly, they experience the need to persuade those who control society's purse strings that higher education deserves their support (whereas the opposite is much less often the case; businessmen do not have the same need to enlist the support of college professors – though sometimes it can be a source of prestige to show connections to the intellectual world). This experience of being what Bourdieu called "the dominated fraction of the dominant class" can have many results. These range from a tendency to be in political opposition to specific tastes that do not put possessors of cultural capital in direct competition with possessors of economic capital. College professors, thus, may prefer old tweed jackets to new designer suits or old Volvos to new Mercedes as part of their adaptation to the overall position of their field.

Bourdieu's most sustained analysis of such issues occurs in *Distinction* ([1979]1984), a book that attempts "a social critique of the judgment of taste." It is a mixture of empirical analysis of the kinds of tastes characteristic of people at different positions in the French class hierarchy and theoretical argument against those who would legitimate a system of class-based classifications as reflecting a natural order. In other words, Bourdieu shows tastes not to reflect simply greater or lesser "cultivation" or ability to appreciate objective beauty or other virtues, but to be the result of a struggle over classification in which some members of society are systematically advantaged. Lower classes, he contends, make a virtue of necessity while elites demonstrate their ability to transcend it. The results include working class

preferences for more "realistic" art and comfortable, solid furniture and elite prefer-
ences for more "abstract" art and often uncomfortable or fragile antique furniture.

Analyses of the objective determinants of the tastes of college professors are not
in Bourdieu's view simply an idle form of narcissistic self-interest. Rather, it is vital
for intellectuals to be clear about their own positions and motivations in order to be
adequately self-analytic and self-critical in developing their accounts of the social
worlds at large. This is the necessary basis for both public interventions and the best
social science itself. Just as an analysis can discern the combination of objective and
subjective factors that combine to produce the point of view of an author like
Flaubert, so analysis can establish the grounds on which scientific production rests.
And more generally, social science helps everyone become clearer about institutions
and the sources and results of their own action.

IMPACT AND ASSESSMENT

Bourdieu's work has had an exceptionally broad impact in sociology and this con-
tinues to grow since his death.[14] He is one of the few recent shapers of an analytical
and theoretical perspective of wide influence on research in the field and the poten-
tial to stand alongside the classics of sociology's early history. Nonetheless, under-
standing of Bourdieu is very unevenly distributed in sociology, and based usually on
reading fragments of his work and appropriating one or two concepts rather than
grasping his perspective in an integrated way.

Bourdieu's analyses of the educational structure were the first of his studies to
have major impact in sociology, and they have been basic to analysis of the role of
education in the reproduction of social inequality (Grenfell, 2004 is perhaps the best
source). James Coleman assimilated Bourdieu's concept of cultural capital to Gary
Becker's notion of human capital, and to Bourdieu's discomfort called for a social
engineering effort to enhance both (Bourdieu and Coleman, 1991). Bourdieu's
emphasis on networks as social capital is probably most familiar from the work of
Robert Putnam (1995) though in common with many Putnam emphasizes the posi-
tive aspects to the near exclusion of Bourdieu's more critical insights.[15] Research in
social stratification has continued to be predominantly highly objectivist, concerned
with descriptions of hierarchies and predictions of patterns of mobility, rather than
taking up Bourdieu's challenge to understand the nature of reproduction. This would
require a more temporally dynamic and historically grounded approach. It would
also require paying attention to cultural as well as material factors, and to the dif-
ferentiation of fields and problems of the conversion of capital.

Bourdieu's influence on empirical research has been greatest in the sociology of
culture. This stems in large part from the range and power of his own empirical stud-
ies of forms of artistic production and consumption, and especially of the pursuit of
distinction. These have, indeed, played a basic role in creating the contemporary
(and highly vibrant) subfield of sociology of culture and have also shaped the broader
interdisciplinary field of cultural studies. *Distinction* is easily the best known of
these works, and it is extremely widely studied and cited. Somewhat surprisingly,
however, there has not been much systematic cross-national research attempting to
replicate the study or establish differences in the organization of tastes in different

settings. Observers (e.g. Swartz, 1997; Fowler, 1997) have remarked that France may have an unusually tightly integrated cultural hierarchy; it remains for Bourdieu's approach to shape a series of similar empirical studies of anything resembling comparable breadth. Bourdieu himself did some comparative research on similar themes. *The Love of Art* (Bourdieu and Darbel, [1969]1990), for example, focused on attendance at museums. It is framed by the paradox that state support (and non-profit private organizations) makes the great treasures of European art readily accessible to broad populations, most of whom ignore them. The achievement of democratic access is undercut by a widespread perception that the ability to appreciate art is something ineffable, an individual gift, intensely personal. This, Bourdieu and Darbel suggest, is simply a misrecognition underpinning the continued use of art to establish elite credentials in an ostensible democratic but still highly unequal society. Their study (which looked at six European countries) was one of the earliest in a series of research projects that have established in considerable detail the empirical patterns in the appropriation of culture. Bourdieu did not limit himself to high culture, studying as well the "middlebrow" art form of photography, including that of amateurs (Bourdieu *et al.*, [1965]1990). In this and other research, he participated in a broad movement that was basic to the development of cultural studies. This was a challenge to the traditional dichotomy of high vs. popular culture. Along with others, Bourdieu helped to debunk the notion that this represented simply an objective distinction inherent in the objects themselves, the nature of their production, or the capacities required to appreciate them. While Bourdieu and other researchers revealed differences in tastes, they showed these to be created by the system of cultural inequality, not reflections of objective differences.

An overall appreciation of Bourdieu's work must resist reading it in fragments: the work on education separate from that on art and literature, that on power and inequality distinct from that devoted to overcoming the structure/action antinomy. Bourdieu's key concepts, like habitus, symbolic violence, cultural capital, and field are useful in themselves, but derive their greatest theoretical significance from their interrelationships. These are best seen not mechanistically, in the abstract, but at work in sociological analysis. The fragments of Bourdieu's work are already exerting an influence, but the whole will have had its proper impact only with a broader shift in the sociological habitus that lies behind the production of new empirical understandings.

Bourdieu's work has been criticized from various perspectives.[16] Jenkins (1992) grumbles about many points but (aside from complaints about language and French styles in theory) centers on three contentions. First, Bourdieu was somewhat less original than at first appears. This is not an unreasonable point, for Bourdieu's work was indebted to influences (like Weber, Goffman, and Mauss) that are not always reflected in formal citations. Second, Bourdieu's conceptual framework remained enmeshed in some of the difficulties to which he drew attention and from which he sought to escape. His invocations of "subjectivism" and "objectivism," for example, were made in the service of encouraging a less binary and more relational approach. Nonetheless, they tend to reinstitute (if only heuristically) the very opposition they contest. Moreover, Jenkins (1992: 113) suggests, Bourdieu's approach entails reifying social structure while developing an abstract model of it; it becomes too cut and dried, too total a system. Third, for Jenkins Bourdieu remained ultimately and

despite disclaimers, a Marxist and a deterministic one at that. His concept of misrec-
ognition is an epistemologically suspect recourse to the tradition of analyzing ordi-
nary understandings as "false consciousness." This raises the problems that (a) if
ordinary people's consciousness is deeply shaped by misrecognition, their testimony
as research subjects becomes dubious evidence, and (b) the claim to have the ability
to uncover misrecognition privileges the perspective of the analysts (and may even
function to conceal empirical difficulties). Jenkins's reading of Bourdieu is filtered
through English-language concerns, theoretical history, and stylistic tastes; though
his account is dated and partial, many English-language readers share his views.

Despite the "sheep's clothing" of his emphases on culture and action, Bourdieu is
held by many critics to be a reductionist wolf underneath. That is, he is charged with
adhering to or at least being excessively influenced by one or both of two schools of
reductionistic social science: Marxism and rational choice theory. It seems to me
clear, for reasons given above, that he was not in any strict sense a follower of either
of these approaches. He was certainly influenced by Marxism, but also by structur-
alism, Weber, Durkheim and Durkheimians from Mauss to Goffman, phenomenol-
ogy, and a variety of other sources. Bourdieu's language of strategy and rational
calculation is a different matter. It does not derive from rational choice theory but
rather from more general – though related – traditions in English philosophy and
economics. Bourdieu does think that action is shaped by interests and strategies, but
he does not think that conscious intentions fully explain either the sources or the
outcomes of action. Structural factors are important not only as external resources
and obstacles but as they are internalized through learning from previous actions.
We generate our actions not only by strategy, thus, but also through improvisation
guided by the habitus. What appear in hindsight to be strategies – say, successful
business careers – are often the effects of a combination of structural factors, habi-
tus, and actual conscious choices.

Nonetheless, Bourdieu is concerned to show that "economizing" shapes action
even in social fields that explicitly deny self-interest, calculation, and economic val-
ues. "Economizing" in this sense means acting on the basis of differential resources
to pursue interests. Actors make investments of the resources they have – which
may be time or talent or such field-specific capital as reputation – to try to enhance
their standing in their field. Standing – prestige or relative power for example – is
necessarily distributed unequally. Actors pursue what is valued in different fields –
truth or justice or beauty. But they have unequal resources to use and the distribu-
tion of field-specific rewards is unequal. There is a scarcity of positions at the
top, whether one speaks of priests becoming bishops or lawyers becoming judges or
painters getting hung in museums. One does not have to reduce the values people
pursue to money or material goods to see that actions reflect an economic logic.
Whether actors are consciously strategic or not, looking backward one can analyze
their actions and trajectories in strategic terms. This said, many readers still find
Bourdieu's empirical analyses to be reductionistic (despite his theoretical disclaim-
ers) because he leaves little place for disinterested judgment (Jenkins, 1992; Evens,
1999; Sayer, 1999).

One of the harshest critiques of Bourdieu's alleged reductionism came from
Alexander (1995). His vitriolic attack is partly an attempt to underpin Alexander's
own preferred approach to overcoming oppositions of structure and agency, one

that would grant culture more autonomy and place a greater emphasis on the capacity of agents to achieve liberation through "authentic communication." Bourdieu, Alexander suggested, tries to make the sociology of knowledge substitute for the judgment of what knowledge is true or false. That is, he thinks Bourdieu tried to make accounts of how people take positions do the work of analyses of those positions and their normative and intellectual merits. In short, he was a determinist. Moreover, somewhat in common with Jenkins, Alexander sees Bourdieu covertly accepting too much of the rationalism, structuralism, and Marxism he argued against:

> Since the early 1960s, Bourdieu has taken aim at two intellectual opponents: structuralist semiotics and rationalistic behaviorism. Against these perspectives, he has reached out to pragmatism and phenomenology and announced his intention to recover the actor and the meaningfulness of her world. That he can do neither ... is the result of his continuing commitment not only to a cultural form of Marxist thought but to significant strains in the very traditions he is fighting against. The result is that Bourdieu strategizes action (reincorporating behaviorism), subjects it to overarching symbolic codes (reincorporating structuralism), and subjugates both code and action to an underlying material base (reincorporating orthodox Marxism). (Alexander, 1995: 130)

Alexander attempts to substantiate this critique by both theoretical argument and (curiously, because he seems to exemplify in more hostile form the very position he decries in Bourdieu) by an account of Bourdieu's intellectual development and successive enmities. The latter side of the argument amounts to suggesting that Bourdieu was disingenuous about the sources of his work, but carries little theoretical weight in itself.[17] The former side, like Sayers's argument, raises a basic issue.

The strengths of Bourdieu's work lie in identifying the ways in which action is interested even when it appears not to be, the ways in which the reproduction of systems of unequal power and resources is accomplished even when it is contrary to explicit goals of actors, and the ways in which the structure of fields and (sometimes unconscious) strategies for accumulating capital shape the content and meaning of "culture" produced within them.[18] Bourdieu's theory is weaker as an account of creativity itself than of how creativity gains standing in social fields. Though he addresses deep historical changes in the nature of social life and deep differences in cultural orientation he does less to explain these than to show how they work. For example, his study of masculine domination has been criticized as examined not so much the sources of male oppression of women as the reasons for women's acquiescence to it (Bourdieu, 2001; Fowler, 2003; Wallace, 2003). No theoretical orientation provides an equally satisfactory approach to all analytic problems, and certainly none can be judged to have solved them all.

Alexander makes a false start, however, in presenting Bourdieu as simply "fighting against" two specific traditions. His relation to each was more complex, as was his relationship to a range of other theoretical approaches. From the beginning, and throughout his work, Bourdieu sought precisely to transcend simple oppositions, and approached different intellectual traditions in a dialectical manner, both criticizing one-sided reliance on any single perspective and learning from many. It is neither surprise nor indictment, for example, that Bourdieu incorporated a great deal of

structuralism; it is important to be precise in noting that he challenged the notion that semiotics (or cultural meanings) could adequately be understood autonomously from social forces and practices. Likewise, Bourdieu labored against the notion that the meanings of behavior are transparent and manifested in purely objective interests or actors' own labels for their behavior. But this does not mean that he ever sought to dispense with objective factors in social analysis.

It is appropriate to close on a note of contention, not just because Bourdieu had critics but also because his theory was and is critical. During his lifetime, it was a contentious, and evolving, engagement with a wide range of other theoretical orientations, problems of empirical analysis, and issues in the social world. Bourdieu's theory remains contentious partly because it unsettles received wisdom and partly because it challenges misrecognitions that are basic to the social order – like the ideas that education is meritocratic more than an institutional basis for the reproduction of inequality, or indeed that if the latter is true this is simply something done to individuals rather than something they – each of us – participates in complex ways. As I have suggested – and indeed, as Bourdieu himself indicated – it is also in a strong sense incomplete. It is not a Parsonsian attempt to present a completely coherent system. It does have enduring motifs and recurrent analytic strategies as well as a largely stable but gradually growing conceptual framework. It does not have or ask for closure.

Bourdieu's work has increasingly wide influence. It is shaping discussions in feminism (Adkins and Skeggs, 2004), journalism (Benson and Neveu, 2005), religious studies (Rey, 2007) and numerous other fields. In some cases this is a matter directly of work in a "Bourdieusian" perspective. But often it is a matter of drawing from Bourdieu new ideas to help in rethinking existing perspectives and conducting new empirical analyses.

Most basically, Bourdieu's theory asks for commitment to the creating knowledge – and thus to a field shaped by that interest. This commitment launches the very serious game of social science, which in Bourdieu's eyes had the chance to challenge even the state and its operational categories. In this sense, indeed, the theory that explains reproduction and the social closure of fields is a possible weapon in the struggle for more openness in social life.

Reader's Guide to Pierre Bourdieu

Bourdieu never wrote a synthesis of his own theory or an introduction to it. This makes starting to learn it a challenge. Bourdieu's most accessible writings appear in short essays. *In Other Words* (1990) contains useful texts of lectures he gave to audiences outside France. *Acts of Resistance* (1998) contains the best known of his political essays; Pierre Carles's film, *Sociology Is a Martial Art* (2001) is also a nice introduction to Bourdieu's political activism. He reflects on key concepts in his work and on influences that shaped his approach in *Pascalian Meditations* (2001). His most general statement on the sociology of culture is *Distinction* (1984); *The Field of Cultural Production* (1993) contains several seminal essays. Bourdieu's most developed text on practice theory is *The Logic of Practice* (1990). Together with his student Loïc Wacquant he turned a seminar into a book that offers a useful general orientation to his work, *Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (1992), though it is less introductory than the title suggests.

The best general introduction to Bourdieu's work and intellectual context is by Jeremy Lane (2000). Grenfell (2004) and Swartz (1997) and Robbins (1991) are useful complements written with more attention to discussions within sociology. Webb, Scirato, and Danaher (2002) is more elementary. Wacquant has also written several useful articles on Bourdieu, notably (2002, 2004; see also Calhoun and Wacquant, 2002). His edited collection on Bourdieu and democratic politics is also useful (Wacquant, 2005). Fowler (1997) and Robbins (2000) situate Bourdieu in relation to cultural theory. The essays in Calhoun, LiPuma, and Postone (1993); Brown and Szeman (2000) consider several different aspects of Bourdieu's work; Shusterman (1999) remains useful on aesthetics; Adkins and Skeggs contains notable essays connecting Bourdieu to debates in feminism; Gorski (forthcoming) offers several strong essays on Bourdieu generally and especially in relation to historical sociology.

Notes

1   Another of Bourdieu's teachers, Alexandre Koyré (1957), made a similar point about physics. The advances of abstract models, mathematicization, and experimental research mean that first-hand observation and experience and historical tradition no longer provide the crucial data about the physical world. Nonetheless, they do provide crucial data about scientific research itself, in which individual people and social institutions matter a great deal.

2   Perhaps the best recent exemplification of the relationship of habitus and bodily commitment is a study of boxing by Bourdieu's student Wacquant (2003).

3   See Taylor (1993) on Bourdieu's account of the limits of rule-following as an explication of action and its relationship to Wittgenstein.

4   See Paul Willis (1981) for a superb account of how this process works among working class kids in England.

5   Bourdieu's most developed analysis appears in a book entitle *Le Sens Pratique*. The title, a pun in French, could be translated several ways. The notion of "sense" carries, in French as in English both cognitivist and bodily connotations: to "make sense" and to "sense something." In French, "sens" carries the additional meaning of "direction," where a path leads. The English title, *The Logic of Practice*, necessarily sacrifices some of the meaning.

6   See Bourdieu ([1992]1996) and the analysis of the emergence of "intellectuals" as a source of critique by his student, Christophe Charles (1990).

7   Though Bourdieu put himself passionately into his work, he wrote relatively little about his own biography until at the very end of his life he presented a *Sketch for a Self-Analysis* (Bourdieu, 2007). The best available general discussions of Bourdieu's life and work are Lane (2000) and Swartz (1997).

8   Kabylia was also Durkheim's (1893) primary example of a segmentary society and mechanical solidarity.

9   On the war and its impact, see Le Seuer (2002) and Bourdieu's foreword to that book. On the formation of his intellectual approach see the insightful essay by Tassadit Yacine (2004), Bourdieu's former student, herself from Kabylia and Wacquant (2004). Essays in Goodman and Silverstein (2009) also address Bourdieu's work in Algeria.

10 Back in France, Bourdieu was responsible for introducing Goffman's work and arranging the translation of several of his books.

11 In this regard, Bourdieu differed from Alain Touraine, the other most prominent French sociologist of his generation and also a member of Aron's Center. Touraine embraced the student revolt more whole-heartedly and his sociology presented a much more voluntaristic cast. He also broke with Aron and formed his own center (see Colquhoun, 1986).

12 The concept has classical roots, and was revived for sociological use by Norbert Elias as well as Bourdieu; on Elias's version, see Chartier (1988).

13 Writing sentences like this was part of Bourdieu's habitus, his connection to the academic game, not least because their very complexity forces us to make the effort to hold several ideas in mind at once, resisting the apparent simplicity of everyday formations. Nonetheless, they do not translate elegantly or read easily.

14 See Wacquant's (1993) account of American social scientist's readings; also Sapiro and Bustamante (2009). Bourdieu (1998) offers his own complaints about how he has been understood in translation.

15 See the useful review of literature on social capital by Portes (1998).

16 The following describes criticisms, focusing on two more or less hostile analyses. Appreciations also include critique, of course, and there is a growing literature on Bourdieu. Lane (2000) is still the best general introduction; both Swartz (1993) and Robbins (1991) are useful complements emphasizing Bourdieu's importance in sociology; Webb, Scirato, and Danaher (2002) is more elementary. Fowler (1997) and Robbins (2000) situate Bourdieu in relation to cultural theory. The essays in Shusterman (1999); Calhoun, LiPuma, and Postone (1993); Brown and Szeman (2000) consider several different aspects of Bourdieu's work as do Grenfell (2004), Robbins (1991, 2000), Reed-Danahay (2005) and Jenkins (1992). Various articles by Bourdieu's close collaborator Loïc Wacquant provide helpful interpretation; see especially his contributions to the Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) and his discussion of Bourdieu and democratic politics in Wacquant (2005). I refer here mainly to analyses in English. Several discussions have appeared in French, polarized into attacks and defenses. Lahire (2001) combines appreciation and critique; Mauger (2005) is a major compilation of perspectives from former collaborators, students, and colleagues. See Roos (2000) for a review of the very active Nordic discussions of Bourdieu's work, many influenced by Broady's (1990) monumental study.

17 Alexander's intellectual history is tendentious and his reading of Bourdieu is not deep, but it is nonetheless much more serious that the right-wing ideological attack by Verdès-Leroux, 2001.

18 Alexander (1995: 152) terms "unconscious strategy" an oxymoron. It is true that the notion invites misunderstanding and confusion, since it is hard to distinguish when it means that results fell into place "as if" there had been a strategy at work, and when it means that actors make a million small choices that add up to a strategy of which they are never consciously aware as such. In any case, Alexander fails himself to consider either of these possibilities clearly. The former is basic to modern economic analysis; the latter is at the heart of the idea of "sense of play" which Bourdieu has argued should replace a mechanistic, rule-following approach to the production of action.

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