The Public Sphere in the Field of Power

In this article I ask (1) whether the ways in which the early bourgeois public sphere was structured—precisely by exclusion—are instructive for considering its later development, (2) how a consideration of the social foundations of public life calls into question abstract formulations of it as an escape from social determination into a realm of discursive reason, (3) to what extent "counterpublics" may offer useful accommodations to failures of larger public spheres without necessarily becoming completely attractive alternatives, and (4) to what extent considering the organization of the public sphere as a field might prove helpful in analyzing differentiated publics, rather than thinking of them simply as parallel but each based on discrete conditions. These considerations are informed by an account of the way that the public sphere developed as a concrete ideal and an object of struggle in late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century Britain.

Distinction of society from the state was basic to the early modern development of liberalism. Society itself was understood as further differentiated into several spheres: family, religion, economy, and so forth. While these
were related, they were held to be largely autonomous. None of them exercised complete authority over the others. This was at once an actual process of social differentiation and a hegemonic understanding of how society ought to be organized. The image of differentiation informed policies that secured real differentiation, but it also led people—including theorists—to imagine that spheres were more autonomous than they were, to underestimate how each was influenced by activity in others, and to neglect how the terms of this very differentiation were shaped by culture and social structure, protected and influenced by the state, and challenged by social movements.

It is instructive to situate the idea of the public sphere in this context. This gives the influential account of Jürgen Habermas its central pathos: the public sphere arises as part of civil society, incorporating adults who have gained maturity and intellectual autonomy in another of its parts, the family. It is oriented to forming rational-critical opinion on matters of universal interest to citizens, and through this to informing state policy. But it is debased and corrupted when the state-society division collapses amid bureaucratization, organized interest-group politics, and mass society in the twentieth century (Habermas 1989).

In Habermas’s account, the political public sphere has distinctive importance as an institutional formation—and an ideal—underpinning democracy. It is marked off from material exercise of political power, from other discursive arenas, and from the economy and what might be considered the “functional” reproduction of society. The political public sphere is thus an arena of rational-critical discourse among individuals and is distinct from invocations of superior entitlement on the basis of inherited status, enforced party loyalty, the use of money to sway opinion, and social movement mobilization. It is also distinct from other public spheres in which citizens may develop capacities for effective public discourse. Habermas stressed the culture-forming literary public sphere; others have rightly emphasized the importance of public discourse focused on religion.

But though these other public spheres might prepare people for effective participation in the political public, Habermas conceptualized the latter as distinct. It was committed to rational-critical public discourse about matters of the public good and distinctively identified, therefore, with the state that helped identify and bound the nation as the collective beneficiary of that good and also established the possibility of conscious collective action to pursue that good. The political public was also understood to work precisely by
virtue of its simultaneous autonomy and openness: it was open, in principle, to all and was free from determination of arguments by social status.

The ideal has proved powerful and promising but fraught with complexities and questions. Despite its ostensible openness, it seems to exclude from participation many kinds of voices, arguments, and views that are not expressed in forms of argumentation regimented as properly rational-critical. As Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge (1993) argued soon after Habermas’s book appeared, this includes many potential contributions that reflect the experience of workers and other subordinated groups. The theme was later developed, with regard to gender bias, most especially, but also race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, religion, cultural style, and other dimensions. This encouraged reliance on the idea of “counterpublics,” which contested the hegemonic construction of dominant publics. And while many of these arguments were developed with an eye on social movements and participatory politics in and after the 1960s, many also were engaged to rethink understandings of late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century public life that shaped Habermas’s original formulation.

The Public Sphere and Ostensibly Neutral Reason

The notion of the political public sphere centered on the idea that private persons might come together through reasoned communication to consider public issues and inform public policy. Because the parties would be well-formed individual persons, and because their discourse would be both rational and critical, the resulting public opinion would be a productive resource for guiding society, not the lowest common denominator of popular passions. The public sphere, in this sense, depended crucially on its being understood as part of the private realm, of civil society rather than the state. At least ideally, it provided participants with a means of overcoming the differences of status that otherwise divided them and made their opinions sectional rather than truly public. As Habermas (1989: 131) put it, in a book influentially articulating the eighteenth-century ideal, the best version of the public sphere was based on “a kind of social intercourse that, far from presupposing the equality of status, disregarded status altogether.” It worked by a “mutual willingness to accept the given roles and simultaneously to suspend their reality.”
Throughout the modern era, new ideas about public discourse were complemented by development of new communications media, by rising literacy and education levels, by growth of the state, and by expansion of popular political participation. In this process, the distinction of public and private took on new importance and complexity.

First, the realm of public interaction expanded; cities were the primary setting for this, especially cosmopolitan trading and capital cities. Public spaces appeared literally with coffeehouses, parks, theaters, and other places where people who were not bound by private relations gathered and communicated. They also grew metaphorically with printed sermons, pamphlets, newspapers, books in vernacular languages, journals that reviewed them, and other media of public communication.

Second, the state also expanded and with it the range of res publica, public things that included property held in common and matters of concern to the whole polity. Publicness took on a dual sense, referring both to openness of access and interaction and to collective affairs as managed by the state. The public referred both to the collective subject of democracy—the people organized as a discursive and decision-making public—and to its object, the public good.

The two dimensions were linked in the notion that political debate among responsible citizens was a way to arrive at a sound understanding of common affairs. This depended on notions of participation in debate that developed in the realms of science, religion, and literature as well as politics. Processes of rational-critical debate were held to cultivate educated public opinion as distinct from other forms, such as the “representative publicity” of monarchs appearing before their subjects or the “mere opinion” of uneducated masses. Interest in such public opinion grew alongside civil society as a self-organizing realm of social relations and especially with the rise of democracy. But over the same centuries there was also a third expansion, in the scale and intensity of social organization accomplished by markets and formal organizations outside the state. Whether understood as structures of capital accumulation, economic systems “steered” by money rather than discourse, or an organizational revolution, these changes split the notion of civil society. The “social” came to incorporate (1) the project of meaningful discourse to establish the terms of life together, (2) the production and reproduction of social relations through impersonal markets, and (3) the creation
of large-scale organizations intervening with varying degrees of power and resources into both discourse and markets.

This transformation of civil society, not surprisingly, complicated the idea of the public sphere as the part of civil society devoted to open, ostensibly neutral and rational-critical formation of opinions on matters of public concern. Habermas addressed this through an account of the degeneration of the public sphere produced by a collapsing of the public-private distinction and the intervention of large-scale organizations. Others argued that the Habermasian ideal was flawed because it failed to allow for a multiplicity of publics—and sometimes counterpublics—reflecting different social circumstances, collective identities, and political choices, and because it was framed too much in terms of the setting aside of disparate social identities and experiences rather than their thematization as bases for public discourse. For this reason, critics suggested, Habermas saw as degeneration later developments that in fact included new opportunities. In the present article I argue that the critics are largely right except insofar as (1) they, like Habermas, frame this in terms of later developments rather than seeing it in the very construct of the “classic” public sphere, (2) they see emphasis on parallel or counterpublics as a satisfactory substitute for direct engagement with the issue of inclusion in the more general public sphere, and (3) they approach the issue in terms of the public articulation of experiences or interests based in different private circumstances rather than as the shaping and reshaping of identities in politics and public life.

Complementing the growth of the public sphere from the outset were new senses of the private. In relation to both “private property” and the “privacy” of the family, new usages gave a positive sense to privacy in place of a notion that it signaled deprivation by virtue of exclusion from public life. The virtues of private family life were affirmed in novels, religious and moral discussions, and social inquiries into the “problems” of the lower classes. But they were also reflected in the gendered character of the public sphere. Women and children were increasingly sequestered in private homes, especially among the bourgeoisie (and precisely through an era when child labor would demonstrate class difference as well as, for some, society’s moral failure). Habermas’s account of the public sphere incorporates the modern idea of the individual as nurtured in private as preparation for action in public. The issue here is not simply that this applied initially only to men, however,
but that it presented participation in public as an activity for fully formed individuals whose identities and rational capacities for setting aside personal interests were achieved in advance. This was recurrently a basis for exclusion, not just in terms of gender but also in terms of education and images of the lack of discipline among workers and other nonelites (who were constantly subjected to disciplinary measures).

At the same time, economic activity was increasingly moved out of the household. In one sense, therefore, going to work meant going out into public, being exposed to the public gaze. In another sense, however, property relations continued to be understood as private, in that they were to be managed by individual persons and not by the state. The eventual rise of business corporations, political parties, trade unions, and other large-scale organizations further complicated the distinction. Habermas focuses on the ways in which these entities used their control of resources and, to some extent, their members to influence public opinion, thereby distorting rational discussion. Of business corporations I would add that the dominant understandings of them intrinsically challenged the public-private distinction. They held property as artificial private persons but operated as collective, public actors, especially when shares of ownership were openly available on the market rather than closely held within families.

As the example of corporations and private property suggests, the distinction between public and private was sometimes difficult to sustain. This undermined the classical notion of the public sphere, at least as Habermas (1989: 175–76) describes it: “The model of the bourgeois public sphere presupposed strict separation of the public from the private realm in such a way that the public sphere, made up of private people gathered together as a public and articulating the needs of society with the state, was itself considered part of the private realm.” Corporations became public actors while still claiming the status of private property. At the same time, states intervened ever more in civil society and even intimate life. These trends joined with the rise of mass media, and especially of professions and institutions devoted to the manipulation of public opinion through mass media (advertising, public relations), to undermine the conditions for the effective operation of the public sphere as a source for educated public opinion.

This is an account of modern history up to the 1950s. It is an account that left Habermas pessimistic at the end of his book and inclined in his later work to locate the potential for a rational learning process in commu-
nicative action and human psychological potential rather than in such historically and institutionally specific conditions. In and after the 1960s there was a renewal of public life that included greater participation for women, greater recognition of legitimate diversity within nations, and greater public prominence of social movements. That many of these were “new social movements” linked to specific identity claims raised questions about the integration of democratic struggles. This contributed to enthusiasm for the idea of counterpublics and doubts about the idea of a more integrative public sphere. As I have argued elsewhere, the new social movements of the 1960s and after were not unprecedented. A variety of religious, spiritual, gender, sexual, moral, racial, and other identities animated social movements in the early nineteenth century as well (Calhoun 1993). Jon Klancher (1987) points to a similar “fragmentation” of the public sphere in late-eighteenth-century England. This was, we should remember, a public with room for William Blake as well as Thomas Paine and for both Mary Wollstonecraft’s reply to Paine on behalf of women and her daughter’s romantic reconsideration of progress in *Frankenstein*. The notion of abstracting from particular statuses to constitute the ideal participants in the public sphere was always problematic.

**The “Classical” Public Sphere**

Habermas recognized that the public sphere necessarily depended on social foundations—clubs, coffeehouses, newspapers—and that these were both supports and limits. The openness of the public was based partly on markets in which commodity exchange was not limited by prescriptive identities. A market basis implied access limited to those with money, of course, even though the idea of market openness could encourage valuing openness more generally:

However exclusive the public might be in any given instance, it could never close itself off entirely and become consolidated as a clique; for it always understood and found itself immersed within a more inclusive public of all private people, persons who—insofar as they were property and educated—as readers, listeners, and spectators could avail themselves via the market of the objects that were subject to discussion. (Habermas 1989: 37)
The “print capitalism” that Benedict Anderson (1983) argued played an important role in enabling national consciousness was thus also important to the public sphere. Still, there was a tension from the outset between the ideal of openness and the reality of closure. Habermas (1992: 425) accepted the criticism that he initially approached the public sphere mainly as a category of bourgeois society and neglected the parallel development of a plebeian or proletarian public sphere:

A different picture emerges if from the very beginning one admits the coexistence of those processes of communication that are excluded from the dominant public sphere. . . . The exclusion of the culturally and politically mobilized lower strata entails a pluralization of the public sphere in the very process of its emergence. Next to, and interlocked with, the hegemonic public sphere, a plebeian one assumes shape. As Nancy Fraser (1992: 116) argued more forcefully, “We can no longer assume that the bourgeois conception of the public sphere was simply an unrealized utopian ideal; it was also a masculinist ideological notion that functioned to legitimate an emergent form of class rule.” Also is a key word in this passage, for the fact of gender and class exclusion did not entirely vitiate the more inclusive ideal. Indeed, that there was an ideal of the public sphere encouraged efforts to secure its realization. These came not only from within but especially from those excluded from and often dominated by the hegemonic public sphere. While Fraser (ibid.: 123) stresses that women, workers, and other subordinated social groups often found it “advantageous to constitute alternative publics,” we should be clear that they often did so in disappointment and with an enduring commitment to reforming the dominant public or creating a new one that would be more inclusive.

Building on Negt and Kluge, Fraser (ibid.) called these “subaltern counterpublics” “in order to signal that they are parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate countercdiscourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs.” The idea of counterpublics then joined the core idea of the public sphere to inform a wave of new historical analyses of late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century England, the setting of which had been so central to Habermas’s original formulation (see, e.g., Klancher 1987; Epstein 1994; Clark 1995; Gilmartin 1996; McCann 1999). Indeed, in a historiogra-
The idea of counterpublics has proved fruitful, but it commonly remains embedded (as in the last passage quoted from Fraser above) in a formulation of “parallel publics.” Even though the goal is to bring out contestation, this implies more autonomy and less struggle than history reveals.

With this in mind, Geoff Eley points to the virtue of thinking in terms of hegemony. A hegemonic public is always engaged in struggle to maintain perpetually fragile ascendancy and to adapt to new circumstances. It is not only counterpublics that are contentious or less than universal. As Eley (1992: 306) puts it: “Habermas . . . misses the extent to which the public sphere was always constituted by conflict. The emergence of a bourgeois public sphere was never defined solely by the struggle against absolutist and traditional authority.” Different political public spheres developed not separately from and parallel to each other but rather in a field of contestation. Indeed, in the 1790s and the early nineteenth century there was enough open contestation that the notion of hegemony, with its implication of power sustained by cultural saturation rather than by material force, may not be entirely apt. Class division was important and made more important by government use of material force to exclude radical authors and their readers from the public sphere. In this context, social movements provided social bases for many, just as coffeehouses and salons did for others.

Bourgeois intellectuals and political actors struggled to win social space from aristocratic domination but also to exclude plebeian and proletarian voices from the public sphere they helped create. This was a matter not only of excluding “the mob” (“the mobility,” as elites saw ostensibly rootless non-elites mobilized for public action) but also of expelling more radical intellectuals, shopkeepers, and artisans. Many of the latter were active in eighteenth-century public debates, notably from the 1760s to the 1790s. Elites were always ambivalent and often hostile (Rudé 1962; Thomas 1962). But there was a new closure in the shifting political context occasioned by the French
Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. This was closure precisely against new
democratic claims, like that signaled by the London Corresponding Society,
with its principle that “the number of our members be unlimited.”
Expulsion of those without sufficient property, or connections, or respect for established institutions, led to a delimitation of the “legitimate” public sphere on
the bases of ideology and class. It became the specifically bourgeois public
sphere by virtue of this exclusion as much as by virtue of bourgeois leadership in the struggle against aristocratic status claims.

This may have reflected bourgeois confidence that popular voices were
no longer needed to counteract aristocratic domination. It certainly reflected
anxieties about radical voices and popular collective action. This was not just
a matter of men of property afraid of mobs, though it certainly was informed
by that straightforward fear. Nor was it only an anxiety formed after the
French Revolution had turned bloody. Nor was it only conservatives who
feared the direct entry of the multitude into politics. Even many elite Radicals were worried by the “undisciplined” character of popular collective
action. The libertarian radical and founding theorist of anarchism William
Godwin thus held that speculation on “an order of society totally different
from that which is now before our eyes” should be among “the prerogatives
only of a few favored minds” partly because reform needed to proceed by
“slow, almost insensible steps, and by just degrees” (quoted in Keen 2007:
165). He sought a harmonious, gradual expansion of enlightenment through
the community. One reason for the emphasis on prior enlightenment and
gradual reform was that late-eighteenth-century elites had an image already
in mind of the dangers of religious enthusiasm based on the notion of direct
access to revealed truth rather than disciplined by learning, reflection, critical discourse (and of course, for some, property). In any case, some of what
would later seem the “conservatism” of an Edmund Burke was actually more
widely shared among leading voices in the late-eighteenth-century public
sphere, including others who would be claimed as ancestors of an opposing
“liberal” tradition. The division of conservative and liberal camps—within a
more encompassing liberalism—was in fact produced partly in this context
(it also ensured nineteenth-century struggles). But the disciplinary ideal was
integrated into elite notions of an enlightened public debate from early on
and was incorporated into Habermas’s account—partly as encapsulated by
the notion of the formation of individuals in private life, especially within the
bourgeois family, as a necessary preparation for their entry into the public sphere.

Long-nurtured ideas about how enlightenment might inform social change and about the virtues of gradualism combined with more immediate panic over events in France and the coming of war to encourage a new “security regime,” in which measures were taken to exclude both radical and popular voices from the public sphere. This was enforced both by directly repressive measures—from censorship to the ransacking of printshops and the destruction of stock to legal intimidation—and by the use of taxes to raise the price of publications and thus manipulate the market to produce a directly class-structured exclusion. It was this exclusion that created the context in which several radical journalists and intellectuals took up new connections to artisans, workers, and others outside the propertied elite and new orientations to collective action itself (Calhoun and McQuarrie 2007).

This produced a division between the “entitled” public sphere and a disenfranchised or subaltern and often insurgent one. This was at least as important as the differentiation of liberal and conservative positions within the entitled public, and it did not map precisely onto the liberal-conservative spectrum. To be sure, there were relatively consistent liberals, empowered voices in the dominant public sphere who nonetheless supported not only the ideal of greater freedom but the actual work of excluded radicals. Jeremy Bentham thus distinguished himself as a consistent advocate for press freedom and an ally of excluded radicals like T. J. Wooler. In any case, it is a mistake to see the bourgeois public sphere as defined unambiguously by openness. On the contrary, it became the specifically bourgeois public sphere precisely by work of exclusion in which most of its protagonists colluded.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the ideal of openness often was articulated more forcefully by those whom the bourgeoisie and the government sought to exclude. As Wooler (1819: 695) put it in the Black Dwarf, “It is only the union of numbers, and the concentration of opinion, which has any weight in checking the mischievous views of a wicked administration.” Like other radical journalists who found their readers largely among artisans and workers, he did not immediately embrace the idea of a proletarian or plebeian public sphere. On the contrary, he called for public communication embracing the nation as a whole, identifying “the people” with the legitimate public. As Eley (1992: 306) remarks, “The classic model was already being subverted at
the moment of its formation, as the actions of subordinate classes threatened to redefine the meaning and extent of the ‘citizenry.’” At his trial in 1817, for example, Wooler addressed the mostly middle-class members of the jury as “members of the community—subjects of the country,” co-opting them into his vision of an inclusive citizenry competent to “act as judges on questions of general policy.”14 Indeed, nationalism was articulated in the appeals of popular radicals to the rights of all Englishmen, not just in the more reactionary (and commonly manipulated) slogans of Church and King mobs. They may have found themselves helping to constitute a counterpublic, but they did it only reluctantly (Calhoun and McQuarrie 2007). Their exclusion from the more elite public sphere, moreover, was effected by means of government policy and economic restriction: censorship, newspaper taxes, seizure of stock, and arrests. It revealed the limits of the liberal ideology dividing state and society into separate spheres. And in this it suggests some of the reasons that social movements, not only conventional political speech, may be vital to democracy.

The Limits to Elite Radicalism

Elite Radicals were more radical in the eighteenth century, when the issue of liberty was approached as purely political (or occasionally religious) and hardly connected with industrialization and class inequality. The primary narrative in Habermas’s account presents change after the French Revolution as the beginning of the debasement of the ideal formulation of the public sphere by a long structural transformation that made it more open but less rational. Habermas suggests that this process reveals a contradiction between the ideals of openness and reason. Yet though Habermas’s book ends with a pessimistic account of the 1950s, its overall performative stance is one of optimism. He recovers the ideal of publicness precisely to encourage a renewal of open public discourse about matters of state in response to the silences of Germany’s Adenauer era and more generally the closures of postwar politics.15 With this more optimistic reading in mind, we may ask whether the closure of the late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century public sphere was not an early instance of a pattern of political failures rather than simply a working out of a dialectic in which openness and the rise of large-scale organizations undermined reason. Rather than see the public sphere as initially bourgeois, we should see it as having been made bourgeois by the expul-
sion of dissident voices. This expulsion, moreover, was on grounds of their political radicalism as well as of their class position. The closure of the public sphere supported the distinction of a realm of legitimate but also limited politics.

We can see the issue in terms of the fate of Paine’s ideas and reputation. His writings were touchstones of political radicalism for decades. He supported democracy and thought that an age of reason necessarily challenged religion. He was never a voice with which elites in general felt comfortable. But elite political radicals—and less radical figures like Burke—read and engaged with Paine in the eighteenth-century English public sphere. Conversely, many “populists” like William Cobbett (writing as Peter Porcupine) attacked Paine in the late eighteenth century, only to transform into his devotees in the early nineteenth century.

Following the French Revolution and with increased force during the Napoleonic Wars, followers of Paine were prominent among those excluded from the dominant—or entitled—public sphere. This reflected both closure against political radicalism—not least because Paine embraced and was embraced by the French revolutionaries—and closure on class bases. In other words, it was a failure to live up to the ideal of openness, not a result of increasing openness, that produced the initial structural transformation of the public sphere and set in process a series of struggles in which political resistance to openness—and to radical voices—would have as much impact as expanding scale in undermining the ideal relationship of wide participation to rational discourse. Precisely by excluding political radicals as individual voices, “legitimate politics” made itself into a politics of entitlement and pushed those political radicals into an alignment with the development of organized social movements (Tilly 1998). It was political closure of the dominant public sphere that made movements the necessary way to put challenging new issues on the agenda for political discussion. Movements might remain focused on discourse alone, or they might bring to bear material force so as to demand attention from elites or the government. This is one meaning, for example, of the long discussion of “moral force” versus “physical force” in Chartism. Physical force might not mean violent insurrection, but even as a matter of strikes it introduced nondiscursive elements into the struggle for public attention.

The tension between discourse and action was long-standing. In the 1790s, for example, a prominent English anti-Jacobin, John Bowles, argued
that Paine’s writings should not shelter under the notion of “fair and candid discussion”: “Under the mask of discussion, they really point to action” (quoted in Keen 2007: 168). This was the issue in the trial of John Thelwall, a founder of the London Corresponding Society, who was charged with treason and sedition. Thelwall sought to distinguish himself from Robespierre and other French revolutionaries precisely in the terms of discourse versus action. “Daggers and guillotines are not arguments; massacres and executions are not arguments,” he wrote. “There can be no freedom in the world but that which has its foundations in the increased knowledge and liberty of mankind” (quoted in Claeys 1995: 95, 368). Thelwall (1795) insisted that “peaceful discussion, and not tumultuary violence [was] the means of redressing national grievances” (cited in Keen 2007: 172). The government claimed that Thelwall’s writings were nonetheless an incitement to violence, though to the consternation of anti-Jacobins he was acquitted. But despite the failure of this prosecution, the government and anti-Jacobins applied enormous pressure on radicals who sought to express challenging ideas in public—and to nonelite readers and listeners. To “straddle the world of letters and that of popular agitation” was all but prohibited (Thompson 1999: 163).

The issue was not just violence. It lay also in the distinction between two images of a legitimate public sphere. One imagined a reading public composed of dispersed private individuals, each reading in the privacy of his study, perhaps joining—but calmly—in coffeehouse discussion. The other emphasized a more active notion of the public—for example, as assembled in meetings. Not surprisingly, the latter also involved a wider notion of the kinds of people who might legitimately participate in public life.

For many in the elite, popular meetings were by definition mobs, not publics. Radicals saw this otherwise. This had partly to do with reaching less literate audiences, people moved more by speeches than by texts. Precisely as radical journalists were excluded from the “entitled” public sphere, they had additional incentive to look for other audiences. But if this was a tactical necessity, for many radicals it was also a virtue. Indeed, many came to see it as a virtue precisely as they associated further with the social movements of workers and others in the early nineteenth century.

Wooler, for example, was always first and foremost a writer. He started out focused on a reading public, and he always insisted on the importance of texts and reading. But he increasingly appreciated the virtues of public meetings. Public meetings created a distinctive performance of publicness, call-
ing an image of the people into being. The experience of gathering in large crowds but acting in disciplined ways helped constitute a sense of the people as public that was appropriate to a democratic society. Wooler (and other radical authors) pointed out the orderliness, decorum, and discipline with which large crowds could be gathered. There was great pageantry to protests but also proof that gatherings of unpropertied people should not be understood simply as unthinking mobs. For Wooler (1819: 695), the people constituted themselves as the public in collective actions such as mass meetings:

It is only in public meetings that the real voice of the people is ever heard. On such occasions, venality is ashamed, fear loses its influence, and party is banished from the discussion. The assembled multitude loses all sight of private interest, and every heart beats only for the general good. The spark of patriotism runs with electric swiftness from pulse to pulse, until the whole mass vibrates in unison.

In Wooler’s view, the constitution of the people as a public was aided by the experience of gathering together. Craft organizations, churches, and social movements provided not only ideas and material social foundations but also experience, which shaped both learning and creative adaptation. When radicals made and remade their own public sphere in response to new circumstances, therefore, this was a matter not simply of choosing new tactics but of improvising on the basis of the accumulated learning—often tacit or embodied, not fully discursive—from previous action. Far from being an indication of mere determination by social conditions or material objectives, this process of improvisation and embodied learning is precisely how political speech is socially achieved.

Such peaceful collective action was made necessary by unreasonable attempts to exclude popular radicals and their political claims from the political public sphere. The people of England had the right to read whatever they wanted without government interference and to assemble in public to discuss issues of the public good. If the public sphere was distorted, it was precisely by the governments’ actions. The government had used taxes, prosecutions, and intimidation to delimit the public sphere by material force. And it persisted in electing members of Parliament in arbitrary ways that denied fair representation to the people. For the people to respond by means of dramatic public gatherings was an appropriate way of pressing for a more rational, more open, more inclusive public sphere.
Elites always saw the threat of violence in efforts to mobilize nonelites. And of course the efforts of popular radicals to contest their exclusion from the “legitimate” public sphere included strikes and at least threats of armed insurrection. As such, popular radicals in the early nineteenth century were already engaged in the sort of intrusion of organized action into the public sphere that Habermas saw becoming dominant in the 1950s with negotiations among interest groups and competition between the public-relations machinery of corporations and trade unions. But then, so were elites, and so was government. And the starting point was precisely the constitution of the “bourgeois” public sphere on the basis of economic exclusion backed up by political power.

Yet there was pathos to the situation of intellectuals who sought to join and help lead a popular uprising. In the first place, many had as much in common with participants in the more “respectable” public discourse as with those who mobilized on traditional community lines. Had they not been excluded from the elite public sphere—as much for their opinions and their willingness to take risks as for their economic positions or family backgrounds—they might not have become the protagonists of a partly separate, plebeian public sphere. The crucial class division that shaped the distinction of public and counterpublic was not between the upwardly mobile former artisans like Place and Wade and the recurrently impoverished Carlile and Wooler. It was between the reading public that could not possibly afford to pay for stamped and “legitimate” periodicals and that, not coincidentally, was deeply concerned with immediate material questions as well as politics, on the one hand, and the public that could subscribe to the Westminster Review, on the other. Bentham and Place made honorable attempts to bridge the gap, notably with the creation of University College and the Mechanics Institute, but for the radicals displaced by the industrial revolution, no agenda of more gradual self-improvement could be adequate.

Through the early nineteenth century problems of industrialization and capitalism divided those claiming common ancestry in Paine. Members of the middle classes and the aristocracy were more readily radical on issues that did not touch directly on economic power in Britain, such as parliamentary reform, policy toward revolutionary America, or William Wilberforce’s campaign against slavery. Radical ideas made elite figures like Henry Brougham sympathetic to those excluded from the conventional parliamentary public. Brougham, a powerful lawyer as well as an MP, defended many
in radical opposition to the government. But his conception of legitimate radicalism centered on Parliament and the courts, not on mobilizations in the streets or challenges to the property rights of employers. Increasingly during the nineteenth century, the old Radicals became moderates, advocates for the new middle class and for a more efficient government serving the cause of economic growth. They could support the Reform Acts that gave some workers the vote in the Victorian era, but they could not support the more insurgent popular protests of the early nineteenth century. Nor, for the most part, did they wish to extend republicanism into democracy. A few—most famously John Stuart Mill—did take up positions farther to the left. Mill embraced a version of socialism and, perhaps even more radically for the time, took a strong position on the rights of women. Nonetheless, he spoke in moderate tones for a reasoned transition, not a radical insurgency. Some of the old Radicals were ancestors of Fabian socialism as well as of individualistic liberalism. Most directly, though, the Radicals helped inform the genesis of the British Liberal party (the same use of Radical survives in the name of several Continental liberal parties).

If this usage had remained dominant, Bentham (and perhaps Friedrich Hayek) might be considered the great modern influence in radical political thought, not Paine or Marx. Indeed, in important ways Bentham really was radical, though many of his followers backed away from this. James Mill tried to stop Bentham from publishing his Church of Englandism. When John Bowring published Bentham’s collected works, he omitted not only that work but also Not Paul but Jesus. The Radical tradition was being incorporated into the new liberal mainstream and domesticated in the process.

Even as the old elite Radicals became mere liberals, however, the lowercase use of radicalism spread ever more widely to describe protests and rebellions of London craftsmen seeking a voice in politics, outworking weavers from the northwest of England seeking to halt the use of machinery to undercut the market for their skills, Irish Catholics demanding full citizenship rights, antimonarchical republicans, publishers of the penny press, factory workers trying to form unions, and opponents of industrialization and big government who hoped to restore traditional English liberties and villages. The elite Radicals sometimes sought to portray themselves as the “safe” way for government to head off these more radical challenges. At other times, they viewed the popular radicals as an annoying distraction from their more rational reform projects—or as an outright danger.
Public and Counterpublic in the Field(s) of Radical Politics

Already in the late eighteenth century, there were in fact multiple discursive communities—multiple publics, if you will—taking up different visions of England’s past, present, and future. These were never sharply distinct but, in varying degrees, overlapped each other. Blake and Swedenborgians, Bentham and Paine, Burke and Godwin had overlapping readerships. And those who spoke for and to each—whether preachers or journalists or artists—varied in the extent to which they aspired to reach the broader, more encompassing public that combined them. Some aimed their cultural production at the more “restricted market” of fellow participants in a religious community or political movement; others sought to become voices in the larger (or more widely recognized) world in which newspapers like the Times and the Morning Chronicle (and eventually elite periodicals like the Edinburgh Review and the Westminster Review) were dominant.21

The conflicts between competing claims to the public sphere deepened during and after the Napoleonic Wars first and foremost because of intensified exclusion, based on lines not only of political loyalty but of property. Moreover, political prosecutions and restrictions made it harder for those who had to earn a living from their writing to sustain their periodicals and even their livelihoods in related trades like printing. Even when they did produce for the broader public, they inevitably occupied dominated positions within it. Nonetheless, many writers struggled to write both for a social movement readership and for the broader, “authorized” public.

This was always a challenge and often frustrating. The divisions grew sharper and the overlaps fewer in the early nineteenth century. Not only property but also education and other markers of “proper” preparation for public discourse shaped the distinction of the legitimate public from those cast as a counterpublic. Stylistic conventions and lack of personal connections excluded many from the “entitled” public sphere. These barriers blocked especially the participation of autodidacts, like the many artisans and small business owners who sought public voice. But the barriers were not insuperable, as the examples of Place and Wade suggest.

Place improved his position from that of a poor leather worker and tailor to become a wealthy cloth merchant. He was also a leading Benthamite Radical and for several years ran an influential bookstore from the back of
his shop. There he met Wade, initially a wool sorter, who became his protégé. Place persuaded Bentham to help finance the *Gorgon*, Wade’s Radical newspaper (see Wade 2003). Wade supported the Manchester cotton spinners’ strike in 1818 and John Gast’s organization of the London dock workers in 1819 (see Prothero 1979). Over time, though, both he and Place became more conservative about economic and especially class issues. Wade joined the staff of the *Spectator* and eventually received a stipend from the Palmerston government. Place disapproved of trade unions from the outset (and supported repeal of the Combination Acts in the belief that this would hasten their disappearance, though of course it led to their growth). He continued to advocate popular suffrage as a “moral force” Chartist, but his most controversial stance was advocacy of contraceptives.22

Both Place and Wade knew popular radicalism closely and were infuriated with its populist leaders. Wade called Cobbett a “fool,” John Cartwright “crazy,” and Henry Hunt a “brazen-faced booby.” Both Place and Wade worked conscientiously to maintain their respectability and a more “rational” analysis. If to some extent they spanned the divide between more popular and more elite Radicals, they (and a number of others) stayed clearly in the orbit of “respectable” politics, offering policies but—especially after the 1820s—not really partnership to those protesting and resisting the industrial revolution. They were concerned with fair treatment of workers in industrial capitalism and with ensuring opportunities for their advancement. Place, for example, devoted much of his attention in the 1820s to projects like the Mechanics Institute, which sought to nurture self-improvement, giving more workers a chance to move up as he himself had done. And he advocated birth control as a way to eliminate the pauperization caused by an excess of children to feed and of labor supply. Cobbett and Hunt promoted an agenda not of upward mobility but of greater prosperity for people who stayed put in both class and community terms. Cobbett not only did not support Place’s efforts at population control but specifically argued that, as he looked at England, *depopulation* seemed a real threat; in the *Register*, and later in *Rural Rides*, he described once-prosperous villages that had lost their economic base and too many of their people. Of course, neither Cobbett nor Hunt aspired to be part of the elite Radical public sphere; each clearly felt entitled to respect as a person of substance but identified with England’s traditional constitution more than with rationalist critique.
Matters were different for Carlile and Wooler. They were probably the two most important voices of popular radicalism after Cobbett and Hunt, and for a time in the late 1810s and early 1820s they were even more influential. But their ideological orientations, their trajectories in the public sphere, and their social roots were different. For one thing, they were urban. Both Carlile and Wooler came from provincial roots, but both became resolutely London-based. Carlile, the son of a shoemaker, was apprenticed as a tinplate man in Plymouth before moving to London. Short-time work helped lead him to radical meetings and then to become a publisher. Carlile was arguably downwardly mobile, and his publishing business never provided him with financial security, let alone wealth. He published *The Rights of Man* and other works by Paine in pamphlet rather than book form—an innovation good both for marketing and for evading the censors—and later launched the *Republican*. Carlile became a key radical publisher, sometimes making money enough to begin to feel secure but equally often losing it to government prosecutions (and bad management).

Wooler came from a lower-middle-class background in Yorkshire and was apprenticed as a printer in London. This was a stepping-stone into publishing, but, if anything, Wooler was also downwardly mobile, though more willfully; he gave up a life of greater ease out of sheer political commitment. Like Carlile, he suffered recurrent prosecution, which drained his funds, despite the considerable popularity he enjoyed for a time. Wooler edited the *Statesman*; then in 1817, with support from the traditionalist Radical Cartwright, he launched the *Black Dwarf*. One of the most important, creative, and popular radical periodicals of the era, it filled the gap left when Cobbett fled to America after the Gagging Acts were passed and his *Political Register* lost currency.

Carlile and Wooler both had serious theoretical sides and broadly rationalist outlooks (Wiener 1983; Epstein 1994; Gilmartin 1996; Calhoun and McQuarrie 2007). They sought inclusion in the public sphere dominated by the bourgeois elites of the capital. Yet they also reached out to broader readerships (and each depended on income from sales). Wooler and Carlile were ambiguous figures in many ways, speaking sometimes in the populist register of mass meetings and popular constitutionalism and sometimes as rationalist followers of Paine. Carlile was a more ideologically systematic and committed Painite. Wooler shifted his perspective to fit the conflict at hand, being consistent only in a preference for liberty and active public debate.
Both Wooler and Carlile embraced the project of a more rational society, though they challenged the claims of the elites to have pursued reason all the way to its necessarily radical conclusions. Both aspired not only to matter in the broader public sphere but to see a public sphere constituted in terms of reasoned debate among autonomous individuals without distinctions of class; both were undermined by their precarious economic positions as well as by government prosecution; and both experienced the exclusions of the early nineteenth century both as bitter betrayals of reason and justice and as personal injuries.

Wooler edited and republished Bentham’s _Plan of Parliamentary Reform_ (with Bentham’s permission). This work, he thought, showed the necessity of radical reform, rather than the merely moderate reform for which many of Bentham’s liberal followers were prepared to settle. Yet if Wooler was a rationalist who found much to like in Bentham, he also delighted in and found popular resonance with symbolic devices like letters in which the Black Dwarf communicates with the “Yellow Bonze of Japan” about the sorry state of England. This echoed famous literary precedents, like Montaigne’s _Persian Letters_. Wooler also created imaginary discussions with such past paragons of liberty as John Hampden, John Locke, James Harrington, and William Blackstone. Most of the radicals denounced Burke’s evocative literary style—at once too fancy, too “weepy,” and too dependent on imagination rather than facts—and aspired to plain and straightforward prose. Wooler, though, was more given to rhetorical flourishes, embellishment, imaginative invention, and parody. He continued the tradition of creative heterodox symbolic production that had flourished in various guises during the eighteenth century—in John Wilkes’s parodies, for example, and, perhaps most important, in Blake’s construction of a whole mythic vision. This was rooted in a kind of “alternative Enlightenment” in which reaction against established religion did not necessarily take the character of irreligion or hostility to spirituality, and in which elements of rational-critical analysis were intertwined with mythmaking and the recasting of moral tradition. Carlile, by contrast, was more consistently hostile to organized religion, less playful in his prose style.

Neither Carlile nor Wooler was antimodern, but each emphatically challenged the idea that being up-to-date in terms of science, technology, or indeed advances in human liberties and well-being required accepting wholesale the model of modernity packaged by dominant elites. Carlile and
Wooler were, in a sense, advocates for an alternative modernity. They challenged, for example, the idea that to have the benefits of expanded markets required brutal transitions to them; they thought that it might be possible to protect the investments workers made in skill just as those in power protected the investments of capitalists in machinery. They also challenged the idea that “science” or “rationality” simply dictated the nature of production processes, pointing out that a variety of other ideas and impositions of power were bundled into specific technologies. Thus they imagined an alternative modernity in which certain traditional values would complement republicanism and other “improvements” and be pursued alongside advances in knowledge and efficiency in exchange or production.

Within the broader British public sphere, all the working-class and upwardly mobile radicals were in dominated positions. Even Place and Wade, beneficiaries of direct connections to Bentham and other luminaries, were not in the autonomous position that Bentham himself was. And in the larger field of political power, even Bentham, such well-placed followers and colleagues as James Mill and David Ricardo, and indeed rivals like Burke were members of what Pierre Bourdieu (1980, 1984) has called the dominated fraction of the dominant class.23 The dominant fraction controlled major capital or occupied senior positions in government or the parliamentary opposition.

Following Bourdieu, one might think of a series of fields, more specific nested within more general, and with principles of evaluation reversed as one moves up or down levels.24 If wealth and political connections dominated outside the public sphere, therefore, it was important that disinterest and independence be valued inside it, because they marked its distinctive claim and contribution. Thus the emergent and soon-to-be-internally-divided public sphere was not simply “free-floating” but was itself situated in relation to other fields and in the larger field of power. The latter, in Bourdieu’s usage, is the field that encompasses all others and that is decisively formed in his theory by the rise of the modern state.

The British state, and the field of power it dominated, had become increasingly unified during the eighteenth century, after the ruptures of the Civil War and the absorption of internal colonies that made Britain a reality.25 It was still dominated by aristocrats in the late eighteenth century, and the aristocracy continued to exert power well into the nineteenth. During this period, however, industrial and commercial fortunes mattered more and more, and so did nonaristocratic political leaders. And of course there
were the so-called parties (less formal than today’s political organizations) of Whigs and Tories, with loose links to further oppositions of city to country, great families to gentry. Without suggesting that these were irrelevant, or that they can be explained away by some other factor, we can detect a distinct opposition relevant to the emergence of the public sphere. Those able to secure political influence through their formally recognized positions, wealth, or directly interpersonal connections with others—family, faction, friendship, or party—were pitted against those obliged to persuade relative strangers through public communication. The reformers were mostly among the latter group. Their “disinterested” commitment to a public sphere coincided with their interest in political influence.

Within the political field, the public sphere was itself an organized, quasi-autonomous field. But whereas in the larger field those with the most material power dominated, within the public sphere a kind of cultural power dominated. According to the ideals that Habermas reconstructs for what he calls the bourgeois public sphere, there was no power in the public sphere save the power of persuasion by rational-critical argument. Whatever the ideal, though, the actually existing public sphere was neither so egalitarian nor so rational. Some participants benefited from “cultural capital” in the form of credentials, reputation, publications, or training in the arts of rhetoric and the capacity to support their arguments with quotations in Latin and Greek. Not surprisingly (and not perfectly), these “gifts” were correlated with social-class background. Others, without these advantages, were forever trying to hold the public sphere to its ideal.

Despite its imperfections, the public sphere did empower participants in considerable part on the basis of their ability to bring forward persuasive arguments or compelling cultural creations. And it was autonomous in the sense that to enter it, and to seek to be persuasive within it, people had to try to play by its rules of reasoned argument. Of course, those with material capital used it to try to shape the public sphere: for example, paying for publications or blocking others; hiring writers to articulate their interests and views or demanding that the government censor others. But the public sphere was autonomous enough that it did not entirely collapse and forfeit its field-specific investment in reasoned discourse. Throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries there were government-supported newspapers and writers paid by the government. These influenced debate, but they never dominated it. This is why the government had to resort to
stamp taxes, outright censorship, and prosecutions for libel, sedition, and blasphemy.

The opposition of material power to cultural power—most specifically, speech—is loosely analogous to the opposition of economic to cultural capital that Bourdieu deploys. And as Bourdieu's theory would suggest, the opposition was crosscut with another based on the total volume, as distinct from the kind, of capital that different contributors to public debate possessed. Autodidacts, for example, were always at a disadvantage compared to the formally educated, even when the most disinterested reason or cultural creativity was at stake. Blake was at a disadvantage compared to artists at the Royal Academy and university-educated poets; Wade, Place, Wooler, and Carlile were all at a disadvantage compared to Bentham, even though Bentham at times befriended or defended each. This does not mean that Blake's poetry or painting was inferior, only that he started out without the advantages that others had. Being an outsider in this sense may have facilitated his creativity, freeing him from conventions that might have been stifling. But there is no guarantee that being self-taught and lacking patronage will have this effect; it can leave cultural producers seeking to conform and seeking acceptance. And if the advantages of family and education gave Bentham the chance to pursue his vocation, they do not account for his brilliance or independence of mind. The well-off could still be mediocre (and usually were).26

In the public sphere, conceived as a field, success depends on being (or at least seeming) disinterested and independent. This is easier for those who enter the field with high levels of capital, including the financial wherewithal not to need patronage or paying customers. Contributions known to be produced for material gain are intrinsically suspect. This produces the image of an "economic world reversed" analogous to what Bourdieu observed in the field of artistic production. Success in terms of the field depends usually on eschewing success in financial terms. The most prestigious poets produce for the "restricted market" of other poets, not for mass markets. Likewise, in the field of science, the production of esoteric research or theory that will be read only by a handful of other specialists is prized—if the other specialists value it—far beyond the writing of textbooks that may be sold to millions of students.

Writers who earned their living by publishing their work were in problematic positions compared to those who did not need to. The independence afforded by inherited wealth could be illusory, since the wealthy are usually
brought up in ways that ensure either class loyalty or at least a worldview compatible with inequalities of wealth. Nonetheless, radical writers like Carlile and Wooler—and to some extent Cobbett—felt acutely the need to be recognized for their independence. This is one subtext in the narratives they published of their trials and imprisonments: proofs that the ideas and arguments they produced were not for their personal interests. There is a paradox in the extent to which those with material wealth and social position could adopt impersonality as a guarantor of the disinterest required by the public sphere, while those who lived by the sales of their papers had to dramatize themselves to show their independence. As Wooler wrote: “Where money is to be obtained, though it be only a farthing, they will frame an act of parliament to seize it. And if a spark of honesty is reported to have appeared in any quarter, they will bring forth an act of parliament to crush it. They hate independence, because they know the independent detest them” (Black Dwarf, March 12, 1817, 97–98).

Cobbett, at the extreme, could never be said to leave his identity aside in order to appeal only to impersonal reason. On the contrary, his certificate of authenticity, the personal imprimatur of William Cobbett of Botley, was embedded in an ongoing narrative of his independence, from his childhood to his struggle with abusive authority in the present. He simply assumed that his readers cared about his memories of his native village, or the trees he planted, as well as about his views on political matters (and if sales are any indication, they did: popular politics was very much about the person, not just the policy). Partly as a result of his constant self-presentation, someone like Cobbett could never command real recognition in the elite public sphere. He was like a nouveau riche failing to recognize that he should avoid loud clothes that called attention to himself if he wished to enter a distinguished gentlemen’s club. But this was not an optional matter of style that he could in principle overcome with good sartorial or rhetorical advice. Indeed, Cobbett’s habitus and self-dramatizing narrative style were well attuned not only to his readership but also to his position in the larger public sphere. Along with others who occupied dominated positions, he had little choice but to choose the approach he did.27

At the same time, the public sphere embodied a contradiction. On the one hand, the idea of an arena of reasoned debate to identify the public interest (rather than merely a compromise among private interests) placed a paramount value on independence and disinterested argumentation. This tended
to devalue the radical journalists, who could always be charged with pressing "special interests" and saying what their popular readers wanted to hear. On the other hand, the very idea of publicness disqualified attempts to close off participation, and especially to close it on the external grounds of material social position. It is, in fact, the contradiction between commitments to the highest quality of rational-critical discourse and to open participation of the greatest number of citizens that Habermas sees driving the structural transformation of the public sphere.

But looking at the public sphere as a field, in Bourdieu's sense, we see that this is not a "neutral" contradiction in the realm of ideas. On the contrary, it is closely associated with the distribution of capital—both material capital in the larger field of power and cultural capital within the public sphere. In the specific context of early-nineteenth-century Britain, this contradiction came to a head in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars. It divided the public sphere on class lines.

What emerged was a dominant and authorized elite public sphere significantly chastened and inhibited in what ideas could find expression—determined to be moderate would be a polite way to express it. And opposed to this, a radical counterpublic came into being, not merely contesting themes with elite writers but appealing to a largely distinct readership and integrating written argument more and more with popular meetings and pageantry.

This radical readership included many who were not (or at least not primarily) cultural producers or intellectuals, as well as those who were. It included would-be insurrectionaries who hatched schemes to overthrow the government—none of which came close to succeeding—and those who thought that mass petitions would persuade the king of the error of his ministers' ways and lead to the restoration of justice. Here the stakes were those of politics—principally, efficacy. Political crowds liked good rhetoric, critical analyses, and cultural creativity. They also wanted to win. Moreover, workers and others outside the elite could mobilize largely in and through communities and solidary groups like crafts. Their capital was significantly material—positions in webs of social relationships, the entitlements of those who had completed apprenticeships—rather than a capacity for symbolic production. And their loyalties to different leaders were not always based on the quality of reasoned argument alone.

Here we see why Wade was so frustrated with Cobbett and Hunt. They were persuasive, but on grounds that he found irrational. He was comfortable
with the struggles of workers whose interests he could understand within a Benthamite analysis of the larger interests of society as a whole; in general, he sought to make capitalism fairer to workers. But Cobbett and Hunt had no analysis comparable to Bentham’s or Mill’s of the overall questions of political economy in Britain. What they had was a compelling ability to articulate the frustrations, anxieties, and positive values of many who were displaced or devalued by political-economic change. In Bourdieu’s terms, their “capitals”—of craft skill or local community connections—were being devalued.

And here we can see more precisely the situation and difficulties of radicals like Wooler and Carlile. They were deeply committed to the public sphere, and they were deeply committed to radical politics. They struggled to reconcile the two sets of commitments, since at least some of the time they seemed to pull in different directions. Paine was their polestar but an inadequate guide, for his eighteenth-century rationalism suited their republican ideals but not their practical need to connect to a popular radicalism that articulated itself largely in terms of tradition and the English Constitution. Moreover, both Carlile and Wooler needed readers to survive. They could not focus their attentions and aspirations only on the “restricted market” (or restricted public) of their fellow cultural producers and political thinkers—as, say, Bentham could, and as Place could as he became more and more financially secure.

The theme that most clearly joined Carlile and Wooler to more traditionalist radicals like Cobbett and Hunt was the critique of corruption. This was a common denominator for professional journalists, activists, and ideologists. Whether one viewed corruption against the background of a golden age when English rulers were better men, or against a vision of a future in which reason governed more than selfish interest, corruption was a scourge. Corruption meant more than just self-dealing. Whether applied to “rotten boroughs” in which a single elector or a few cronies could name a member of Parliament, or to a tax structure that took from workingmen at the margins of subsistence and small businessmen at the margins of survival to support the pomp of the court, overseas military campaigns, and a growing number of placeholders and officials, corruption always suggested a system not merely in decay but reliant on deception to sustain itself. Corruption suggested not only or not even mainly illegality. It suggested the influence of opulence on republican virtue and the moral failings of consuming without producing. Corruption was detectable by its smell, and the smell was that of decay in
closed spaces. What it could not stand was the open light of real publicity. This was as important to Cobbett—the publisher who brought out records of parliamentary debates that Parliament wanted censored—as to Carlile and others who insisted, in Paineite and proto-Habermasian fashion, that public debate was the way to advance reason. Wooler’s *Black Dwarf* sought to embody public discourse, with Cartwright, Bamford, and Sir Charles Wolseley all joining debates in its pages. All were engaged in cultivating—even creating—a large-scale political public of a sort that had not existed since the Civil War and the Long Parliament. Even the tumultuous London politics of the late eighteenth century had not produced echoes of comparable strength throughout the country, or the scale of mass readership of a popular press.

**Conclusion**

Much writing about the public sphere approaches it as a kind of escape from the usual determinations of politics and social life. It is presented, not least by Habermas, as an arena of debate among autonomous individuals, in which status is disregarded and a learning process toward the universal is advanced. Habermas is well aware that the public sphere depends on both material and cultural supports and thus has limits. But his usage is shaped by Enlightenment-era ideas about the universality and sufficiency of reason and about rational-critical discourse as an escape from the more mundane world of interests. It is also influenced by the notion of a differentiation and separation of spheres. This is one reason that the intrusion of interests, movement mobilizations, and formal organizations can only appear as a corruption of the public sphere and occasion the pessimistic turn in the second half of Habermas’s classic book.

Celebrating counterpublics is not a solution to this problem, however, nor is simply describing indefinite contention. This evades the question of whether or to what extent diverse publics can contribute to the more general formation of public opinion on a scale sufficient to influence the state and other social institutions. We need instead to revisit the idea of a separation of spheres, recognizing that seeing them simply as semiautonomous and distinct misses the extent to which they are mutually constituting. It is also important to address the relationship of public spheres to social movements.

Situating the public sphere within the larger field of power—contention
over the shaping of shared institutions, including the state—can help with this. We can recognize the “semiautonomy” of the public sphere but also note that it is always subject to influences from other dimensions of “society” and contending political and/or economic projects. In this way we can approach it not as a privileged vantage point erected outside social struggles to give a view of the universal, and not simply as a product of rational-critical argumentation among individuals. We can see the always plural but not necessarily discrete public spheres instead as products of social struggles, institutional formations, and culture.

Notes

1 Max Weber’s (1968) later formulation of the differentiation of “value spheres” would become the most influential general formulation of this notion.

2 To be clear, Habermas was not committed to the term public sphere. He used its German equivalent in his original 1962 text, but more often Öffentlichkeit, which translates more directly as “publicness” and is often rendered as “public space” (not least in the French translation of Habermas’s book). See Habermas 2008a. Nonetheless, Habermas was and has remained committed to a general idea of the modern differentiation of realms of social organization as a necessary background condition that locates and limits the role of normative and communicative reason. For example, he draws on Parsons and Luhman to distinguish the ways that state and economy are constituted by nonlinguistic steering media (power and money, respectively) from the role of communicative action in the lifeworld and civil society (Habermas 1980–84).

3 See Hohendahl 1982; Ezrahi 1990; Zaret 1999; and Melton 2001. Both science and religion are, surprisingly, missing from Habermas’s account. Habermas also suggests a historical sequence in which literary publics precede political ones; this corresponds to his notion that individuals develop the capacity for public life inside bourgeois families and then venture out. As Melton notes, this seems wrong. Certainly, political debate flourished alongside and in close relationship to literary and other forms of public debate from the seventeenth century. The link between publication and critical debate seems to have been forged as much on religious themes, and directly in politics, as in literature. Moreover, print-mediated political discussions preceded the rise of feuilleton criticism and sentimental novels (like Samuel Richardson’s Pamela), which Habermas sees as shaping the necessary juxtaposition of individual and social.

4 When the idea of civil society returned to fashion in the late 1980s and 1990s, it was informed by frequent reference to late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century sources, notably the Scottish moralists to Hegel. But often without clarifying why, late-twentieth-century authors typically differed from their forebears in treating
civil society as a realm of voluntary action outside both state and economy. This was precisely the claiming of one dimension of the social distinct from the others.

5 See the defense of the older usage in Arendt 1958 and the discussion in Calhoun 2004.

6 Though his theoretical work took other turns, Habermas did not abandon hopes for the public sphere. He returned to it in relation to law in *Between Facts and Norms* (1996) and in relation to questions of religion and secularism in some of his most recent work, for instance, “Religion in the Public Sphere” (2008b).

7 The most influential early critics on this point were Negt and Kluge (1993) in *Public Sphere and Experience*. Their point, as their title suggests, was not only that there was a proletarian public sphere but that it was informed by distinctive experience, and learning from experience is significant alongside the rational-critical debate model on which Habermas concentrates. The terminological distinction of plebeian versus proletarian recognizes that those without property and political privilege in the eighteenth century were not necessarily constituted as a capitalist working class.

8 See Wang 1994: 579. Wang’s response is to a special issue of *Studies in Romanticism* with articles by many of those whose books are cited above.

9 From the era of “Wilkes and Liberty” through the American Revolution to the rise of English Jacobinism, as John Brewer (1976, 1980) points out, there was never simply a developmental “mainstream” but always alternative structures and frames for politics.

10 Thompson’s (1968) account remains classic; see also Goodwin 1979.

11 As Keen (2007) emphasizes, Godwin was hardly the extreme case of elite anxiety about popular action, and he stood by John Thelwall and others more radical and more activist than himself.

12 See Benchimol 2007 and several recent studies of Scottish Enlightenment thought discussed there.

13 Bentham, who authorized Wooler to print a popular edition of his *Plan of Parliamentary Reform*, for example (that edition appeared in 1818, a year after the original), was a public advocate of press freedom for years before the publication of his famous *Four Letters on the Liberty of the Press and Public Discussion* (initially in Spanish in 1820 and in English in 1821).

14 See *A Verbatim Report of the Two Trials of Mr. T. J. Wooler* (Great Britain 1817), discussed in Epstein 1994: 44.

15 In this sense, Max Horkheimer read Habermas correctly as encouraging a renewal of popular political activity that the older man feared on the basis of popular participation in fascism. Habermas was read by 1960s radicals as encouraging efforts to reopen the public sphere, though they quickly went beyond what he considered appropriate means to this end and especially beyond its containment in rational-critical discourse.

16 On the anti-Jacobins more generally, see Herzog 1998.

17 See the discussion in Claeys’s (1995) introduction and in Keen 2007.
Samuel Bamford's (1844) extensive account of preparations for the Peterloo meeting emphasizes how the meeting was organized to present an image of orderliness and decorum, how women were deployed as a sign of peaceful intent, and how the attendees arrived unarmed despite mounting tensions prior to the meeting. Accounts in the *Black Dwarf* and other contemporary publications make comparable points, and radicals are similarly portrayed: as a large and orderly crowd peacefully displaying its reformist agenda before being run down by the Yeomanry Cavalry. Indeed, the symbolic significance of Peterloo came to reside not just in the fact that the Yeomanry had murdered peacefully assembled people but in the claim that it was the Yeomanry, not the people, that had acted on emotion rather than reason and brought disorder into what had been an orderly occasion. See also Charles Tilly's article in the present issue.

See Negt and Kluge 1993 for a discussion of the way participation in public life reflects experience and often includes expressive dimensions as well as the rational-critical one emphasized by Habermas.

Carlile and Place were close enough to be able to collaborate on occasion. The following passage on Carlile, however, gives an idea of how small differences mattered: “Richard Carlile, a man of great courage, eminent for public service in what he dared, but utterly devoid of taste, — persecution had deprived him of that sense, — took up this question, and vulgarised it in a separate publication, which Place regarded as a scandal, and Mr. Mill must have been revolted at. Besides, Carlile’s production cost eighteenpence, and the one distributed cost a farthing. It is not credible that a Utilitarian philosopher would circulate the dearer and coarser paper when the cheaper and better was more than enough” (Holyoake 1873: 24). The publication in question was “To the Married Working People,” a tract advocating birth control.

On the notion of production for a restricted market, see Bourdieu 1984, 1992. Bourdieu uses this notion mainly to distinguish production for more or less autonomous cultural fields (like those of fellow artists or scientists) that may explicitly devalue fame and mass sales from production for broader markets. Analogous trade-offs between ensuring purity or autonomy and trying to reach broader publics are also significant in social movements, though, even where economic markets are not central concerns.

Like other veterans of early-nineteenth-century radicalism, Place focused later on population and birth control, associating more than their divergent early-nineteenth-century positions would have suggested with Carlile. He thus did not become conservative on all matters. Indeed, the opposition of conservative to liberal or radical is revealed as oversimplifying and misleading. The split between individualistic libertarian rationalism and protest rooted in traditional ideas, values, and communities may be more basic. Moreover, the categorization of Place as conservative (or sometimes simply as moderate, with the implication that this means resisting radicalism and tending toward conservatism) reflects the primacy of labor politics over, say, gender and sexuality in the views of later historians.
However, the idea of “dominant class” is somewhat ambiguous when one refers to the late eighteenth century, a period when class domination was not stable.

Thus every field is structured not only by the hierarchical opposition of high and low but by an opposition that defines the specific stakes of struggle within the field—usually in modern capitalist societies in terms at least partly homologous to the opposition between economic and cultural capital. Therefore the field of literature is shaped by an opposition of art to journalism (or, more precisely, by writing for the restricted market of other cultural producers versus a more mass market, and by seeking returns in prestige rather than cash) as well as by a hierarchy of greater or lesser success. See Bourdieu 1980. In this brief extension to the early nineteenth century, I am adapting rather than reproducing Bourdieu’s analytic scheme. What I want to emphasize is the relational perspective that Bourdieu employs more than the specifics of any of his analyses of specific fields.

This course of events, the extent to which there was integration, and the extent to which “Britain” or “England” is the right unit of analysis at any point in time are topics of a voluminous literature and are still contested. For one of the best recent guides, see Clark 2003. Most of what is in contest is not directly relevant to the present discussion, and I do not pretend to offer a general analysis of the structure of English society or politics, even for the period under study.

See Bourdieu’s (1993) strictures against trying to deduce individual intellectual orientations directly from class background or personal characteristics, rather than as mediated through the dynamics of social fields.

In a sense, Cobbett pioneered the sort of representation of authenticity made famous in France at the end of the century when Zola wrote “J’accuse.” The writer as individual person, sui generis, claims the right to accuse power of corruption.

See Zaret 1999 on the importance of public life in the seventeenth century and the neglect of this earlier flowering, linked obviously to religion, by Habermas and later theorists of the rise of the public sphere.

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